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Preface 
This publication contains the papers presented at the 1993 annual meeting of North Central 
Regional Project NC-207 "Regulatory, Efficiency and Management Issues Affecting Rural Financial 
Markets" held at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago on October 4 and 5, 1993. The program 
included an invited speaker session on "Agricultural Finance in the Year 2000." Participants in that 
session were Mike Frey of The Farm Credit Council, Marilyn K. Duff of Case Credit and Finance, 
William Whipple of Harris Trust and Savings Bank, and Michael Boehlje of Purdue University. Larry 
Mote of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago was also invited to present a paper on "Regulation and 
the Changing Role of Banking". Of this group, only Michael Boehlje provided the text of his 
presentation in a form that could be included in this publication. Mike Frey did provide copies of a 
publication titled "Positioning the Farm Credit System for the 21st Century, the Executive Summary of 
the Phase I Research Reports", which contains much of the substance of his remarks, to be distributed 
as a companion to this publication. 
The program for this meeting was developed by Steve Hanson, vice chairman of NC-207, with 
assistance from Bruce Sherrick, secretary of NC-207, and Eddy LaDue. Local arrangements were 
made by Gary Benjamin of the Fed~ral Reserve Bank of Chicago. 
Cooperating agencies in the NC-207 project are the agricultural experiment stations at the 
University of Arkansas, North Dakota State University, University of Illinois, Purdue University, Cornell 
University, Iowa State University, Texas A & M University, Kansas State University, University of 
Kentucky, Michigan State University, Pennsylvania State University, Southern Illinois University, Ohio 
State University, South Dakota State University, University of Florida and the University of Minnesota, 
as well as the University of Guelph, the Farm Credit Administration, the Federal Reserve Banks of 
Chicago and Kansas City, Federal Reserve Board of Governors and the Economic Research Service of 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
Eddy L. LaDue
 
Chairman NC-207
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AGRICULTURAL FINANCE IN THE YEAR 2000 
Michael Boehlje 
Purdue University 
The food production and distribution industry is currently and will continue to go through 
major structural changes during the next decade. Changes in the size, structure, organization and 
ways of doing business in agriculture suggest a vastly different climate for firms that finance that 
sector in the 1990's and beyond. This discussion briefly summarizes (in executive summary 
fashion) the key conclusions from work done at Purdue University as part of the Agriculture 2000: A 
Strategic Perspective project on the challenges of financing agriculture in the year 2000. 
A.	 The Market 
1.	 Demand for Capital- The traditional agricultural debt market is a mature, slow 
growth market (particularly in the input supply and production sector; less so in 
processing and distribution). The type of loan and credit needs are changing (more 
specialized and environmentally vulnerable assets). With more emphasis on 
"control" as opposed to ownership of resources, credit needs for operating loans 
may grow faster than the demand for long-term loans (except for forestry). The 
growth area for agricultural credit will be in the value added (beyond the farm gate) 
part of the food and fiber sector. 
2.	 Segmentation of the Market - The market will be further segmented (i.e., large­
small; full service-single product, etc.) with specific products and lenders focused on 
specific segments. More loan/financial products will be customized for individual 
borrowers. Borrowers targeted will have a broader array of products and services; 
those not targeted will have fewer options and choices. 
3.	 Competition and Credit Delivery Capacity - Competition will be keen from historical 
as well as new players (i.e., captive finance companies), keeping margins under 
pressure and rates competitive; credit delivery capacity is fully adequate 
(excessive?). Competition for large borrowers will intensify, creating greater margin 
rate disparities and access between large and small borrowers. 
4.	 Consolidation - Lenders will continue to consolidate, probably at a more rapid 
pace. There will be fewer lenders but as much or more opportunity for access on 
the part of qualified borrowers. 
5.	 Integrated Production Systems - Integration will require the lender to have a better 
understanding of more stages of the production/distribution system, and to have the 
ability to assess external linkages (for example, the financial stability of a contract 
integrator) as well as internal financial strengths of a business in credit decisions. 
6.	 Investors/Agribusiness - With more of the financing needed by agribusiness firms, 
integrated production units and investors. the clientele for which competition is 
greatest will grow-requiring a broader focus for traditional agricultural lenders. 
7.	 Global Businesses - Globalization requires global information about the customers 
and their international competitors as well as an understanding of different 
institutional, legal and cultural structures and different financial markets; and 
requires new services in terms of foreign currency exchange, international letters of 
credit, etc. 
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B. Rates, Terms and Products 
1.	 Interest Rates - Availability of funds and competition will keep rates competitive 
with those in other sectors. Rates will be less uniform as lenders price individual 
loans based on risk, size, cost of delivery and other characteristics. 
2.	 Diversified Financing - More sources of funds will be used in the typical farm and 
agribusiness firm including leasing, investors, contracting and various combinations 
of debt instruments. Lenders will face soft demand for traditional loan products. 
3.	 New Financial Products - Products such as discount debt or bonds, reverse 
annuity mortgages, convertible debt and leasing options will be demanded by the 
market. 
4.	 Financial Services - A broader set of financial services (cash management, 
property management and trust services. environmental assessment and financial 
appraisal and counseling, information services, marketing services, etc.) including 
sourcing equity funds similar to investment banking will be available from 
competitors and demanded by customers. 
C.	 ~anagementChanenges/Opportunmes 
1.	 Environmental Regulations - Regulations will increase costs, reduce cash flows 
and increase the demand for environmental investments. Concerns about liability 
may make credit for vulnerable assets/uses more difficult to obtain and will result in 
more use of environmental audits. 
2.	 Risk Control/Credit Quality - Lenders will attempt to reduce their credit quality risk 
by further increases in documentation standards, use of additional risk rating or 
assessment procedures, and in some cases requiring private or public guarantees. 
3.	 Asset/Liability Matching - With growth in demand for term loans and fixed rates, 
lenders will need to become increasingly conscious of the potential for maturity 
mismatching in sourcing funds and originating loans. They will need to alter funds 
sources/maturities and asset pricing/maturities accordingly. 
4.	 Cost Effectiveness/Containment - Lenders will need to further reduce cost of credit 
delivery through use of support personnel, more effective use of loan review time, 
increased use of rigid rules rather than judgement/documents in decision making 
for selected credits, etc. Borrowers may work with more specialized personnel, 
have less time available for general discussion/counseling and be required to 
provide more detailed and complete information on their business. 
5.	 Multiple Entity Business/Organizational Structures - Multiple entity businesses will 
require more sophisticated analysis techniques (consolidating financial statements, 
etc.), proper structuring of loan and security agreements and participation in lending 
consortiums. A major risk in lending to multiple entities will be analyzing the 
contingent environmental liability represented by related entities since the courts 
have largely shredded the corporate veil as a means of limiting environmental 
liability. 
6.	 Soft Assets and Securitization - Lending on performanceandlor investments in 
people, organizations and informationlknowledge (all intangibles) will increase; hard 
asset securitization will become increasingly difficult. New procedures will be 
required to lend to firms with less permanency and security. 
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7.	 Small Volume Borrowers - Smaller credits are higher cost to serve and such 
borrowers will have fewer options; this segment (which is very large in some rural 
areas) will require unique, lower-cost delivery or public subsidies to serve profitably 
and/or interest rates that reflect costs. 
8.	 Origination - Efficient producer loan origination activity may be by input suppliers, 
captive finance companies and contract integrators that have regular and frequent 
contact with producers; conventional lenders may have more of a role as a 
wholesaler rather than a retailer of credit. 
9.	 Human Resources/Skills - New financial products and services and more complex 
businesses will require different and/or more specialized personnel (possibly 
environmental auditors, financial counselors and investment bankers) and additional 
skills for current loan officers. 
10.	 Information Technology - New information and performance monitoring technology 
will increase the efficiency of loan processing and decision making and enable "real 
time" monitoring of physicaVfinancial performance; will also result in fewer 
personnel for greater volume. 
r 
GROWTH IN AGRICULTURAL LOAN MARKET SHARE FOR
 
ARKANSAS COMMERCIAL BANKS
 
Bruce L. Ahrendsen, Bruce L. Dixon and Atien Priyanti 1 
Abstract 
Changes in commercial bank market shares of farm debt are decomposed into portfolio 
decisions, loanable funds availability, and loan market size for 64 counties in Arkansas 
from 1986 through 1990. A seemingly unrelated regression model is hypothesized to 
identify county characteristics that are related to changes in commercial bank market 
shares. Regression results indicate that county differences in economic activity, the 
relative risk associated with agriculture, farm structure, and regional location contributed 
to changes in commercial bank market shares. The results imply a market niche for 
rural commercial banks emphasizing agricultural loans in the presence of unlimited 
branch banking. 
Commercial banks are currently the largest institutional lenders to the farm sector and have 
dramatically increased their market share of total farm debt since 1981. Factors influencing changes in 
market share over time and across regions in Arkansas are identified in this study. The extent to which 
changes in commercial bank lending to agriculture are associated with county economic, demographic 
and structural characteristics are investigated. 
Previous studies concerned with changing market share of nonreal estate farm debt are 
summarized in Wilson and Barkley (WB). Like WB, the study presented here is interested in explaining 
changes in commercial bank market share over time (1986-1990) and across regions as opposed to 
changes that are the result of macroeconomic effects. However, the study presented here differs from 
WB's in several ways. First, WB analyzed differences in changing market share across states, whereas 
the stUdy presented here analyzes differences in changing market share across counties, and therefore, 
at a less aggregated level. Second. since the present study analyzes changes in commercial bank 
market share for one state, Arkansas, differences in banking regulations among states need not be 
considered here, although structural differences between rural and urban counties are. Third, WB 
explained changes in commercial bank market share of nonreal estate farm debt as opposed to total 
(nonreal estate plus real estate) farm debt as is done here. Fourth, WB explained changes in 
commercial bank market share during a period of declining market share, whereas the study presented 
here considers a period of commercial bank market share growth. Finally, the present stUdy uses a 
more efficient estimator than WB to evaluate changes in commercial bank market share. 
The increase in the national, total farm loan market share by commercial banks is primarily the 
result of an increase in real estate farm debt held by commercial banks. Other lenders' farm real estate 
loan portfolio decreased. More stringent loan collateral requirements have increased the use of 
commercial bank revolving lines of credit backed by real estate. Hence, the increased collateral 
The authors are assistant professor of agricultural economics, professor of agricultural 
economics and economics, and former graduate student at the University of Arkansas, 
respectively. Ahrendsen and Dixon are principals of the Center for Farm and Rural 
Business Finance. Priyanti is with the Research Institute for Animal Production, Bogor, 
Indonesia. The helpful comments of David L. Neff and data provided by Paul N. Ellinger 
are gratefully acknowledged. This material is based upon work supported by the 
Cooperative State Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, under Agreement No. 
92-34275-8226. 
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Farm debt is categorized by loan security, not loan purpose. For example, a loan secured 
by a real estate mortgage will be categorized as real estate farm debt even though the loan 
funds are used for nonreal estate purposes. 
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The study is organized as follows. The first section reviews the regulatory environment for 
agricultural lending in Arkansas. The second section discusses the methodology, model, estimation 
approach and data used. The following section presents and interprets the estimated model. 
Finally, concluding comments are presented. 
requirements have shifted loans into the real estate category even though the loans may be for 
nonreal estate purposes (USDA, 1991).2 As a result, this study does not differentiate between 
nonreal estate and real estate farm debt as did WB since categorical differences have diminished. 
The regulations governing bank operation can have a sizable impact on banks' market 
share of a particular type of loan. Wilson and Barkley considered differences in the structure of 
Figure 1: U.S. Total Farm Debt Market Share: 1980-91 
40 --.----=~-----------------____, 
The farm debt owed to the five major U.S. farm lender categories - commercial banks, 
Farm Credit System (FCS), Farmers Home Administration (FmHA), life insurance companies and 
individuals and others - has dramatically declined from a 1983 peak of $205,400 million to 
$146,982 million in 1991, or a 28 percent decline (USDA, 1992). The bulk of the decline is 
attributable to the .FCS, FmHA and individuals and others while commercial banks experienced a 
net increase in farm loans. As a result, the market share of individual lender categories varied 
throughout the 1980s. For example, commercial banks, currently the largest agricultural lender, 
increased market share from a low of 21 percent in 1981 to a high of 36 percent in 1991 while the 
FCS lost market share from its peak of 34 percent in 1982 to 25 percent in 1991 as shown in 
Figure 1. The FmHA market share increased from 11 percent in 1980 to 17 percent in 1987 before 
retreating to 11 percent in 1991. Individuals and others decreased their market share continuously 
during the 1980s from 27 percent to 20 percent before experiencing modest gains since 1990, and 
life Insurance companies' market share remained stable at approximately seven percent. Figure 2 
demonstrates that Arkansas agricultural lenders experienced a similar pattern of changes in farm 
debt market share (Priyanti). 
Agricultural Lending Environment In Arkansas 
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Model Structure 
Methodology and Data 
Wilson and Barkley developed a model to explain changes in market share over time. In 
this paper their methodology is used to analyze the market share of Arkansas commercial banks for 
the aggregate of nanreal estate and real estate agricultural loans. First, the percentage change in 
commercial bank market share is decomposed into percentage changes in portfolio decisions, 
loanable funds availability and loan market size. Next, the changes in the components of market 
share are explained by exogenous factors in a seemingly unrelated regression framework. 
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 
ear 
Banks FCS FmHA Indiv. & Others Lite Ins. Co. 
Following WB, commercial banks' market share of agricultural loans can be expressed as: 
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Figure 2: Arkansas Total Farm Debt Market Share: 1980-91 
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Arkansas usury limits since 1982 have been the Federal discount rate plus 500 basis 
points. Although one of the most restrictive usury laws in the United States, the law has had a 
minimal impact on the number of agricultural loans banks grant. From a survey of western 
Arkansas bankers, Dixon, Ahrendsen and Barry found that few additional agricultural loans would 
be granted without usury. While usury constrains the amount of loan risk pricing a bank may 
undertake, FCS, for example, is not subject to usury and may risk price marginal loans. However, 
FCS has been interested in high-quality loans which have not required risk premiums. Thus, usury 
has likely had a minimal, if any, impact on market share during the study period. 
bank systems (unit versus branch banking) among states in their study. Although bank regulations 
did not vary from county to county in the study presented here, regulatory clianges during the 1986 
through 1990 study period were considered. In 1988 legislation was passed to allow county-wide 
branch banking as of January 1, 1989, branch banking to contiguous counties as of January 1, 
1994 and state-wide branch banking as of January 1, 1999. The relaxing of branch banking 
regulations to county-wide branch banking had a minimal, if any, affect on the commercial bank 
market share of agricultural loans for this study since market share data were aggregated to the 
county level and much of the county-wide branch banking occurred after the end of the study. 
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where MS is commercial banks' market share of agricultural loans, BAL equals total bank 
agricultural loans, TAL is total agricultural loans outstanding, BO represents "total bank deposits and 
ALOR is the agriculturalloan-to-deposit ratio for commercial banks. Totally differentiating (1) yields: 
dMS = [d(ALOR)*BOfTAI_]+[ALOR*d(BO)fTAL]-[ALOR*BO*d(TAL)fTALl " (2) 
By dividing (2) by (1), rearranging terms and multiplying by 100, a percentage change in 
commercial banks' market share can be expressed as: 
100*dMSIMS = 100*[d(ALOR)/ALOR + d(BO)/BO - d(TAL)fTAL] 
PCMS = PCALOR + PCBO - PCTAL, (3) 
where 
100*d(ALOR)/ALOR = PCALOR = the percentage change in the agricultural loan-to-deposit 
ratio (portfolio decisions), 
100*d(BO)/BO = PCBO = the percentage change in bank deposits (loanable funds 
availability), and 
100*d(TAL)fTAL = PCTAL = the percentage change in total agricultural loans outstanding 
(loan market size). 
The percentage change in agricultural loan-to-deposit ratio (PCALOR) measures the 
change in the portfolio decision of a commercial bank. Commercial banks service all sectors of the 
economy, and a decision must be made as to what proportion of the loan funds will be allocated to 
agricultural borrowers, other businesses, consumers or industry. In addition, commercial banks 
must allocate deposits among loans and alternative investments such as government securities, 
municipal bonds, agency bonds and reserves. 
The percentage change in bank deposits (PCBO) measures the change in fund availability. 
Commercial banks have relied extensively on local deposits as the principal source of funds to 
finance their assets. In some periods growth in local deposit volume, particularly for rural banks, 
has not kept pace with the growth in aggregate demand for loans. However, there are sources of 
funds from outside the local deposit market that banks may access such as loan participation with 
correspondent banks, the seasonal borrowing privilege from Federal Reserve Banks and loan 
origination for -rhe Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation (Farmer Mac) and other secondary 
markets. Thus, a rural bank may not have sufficient local funds to meet its goals in agricultural 
lending, but funds can be made available from other sources. 
Loan participations are quite common among banks. In fact, Arkansas Bankers Bank was 
chartered in 1990 for the sole purpose of prOViding these and other correspondent banking 
services. However, the seasonal borrowing privilege and Farmer Mac have been utilized to a much 
lesser extent. The seasonal borrowing privilege, which has been in existence since 1973, was 
used by no more than 20 percent of the banks in Arkansas in any given year from 1985 through 
1990 (Clark). Activity in the Farmer Mac secondary market by banks in Arkansas was negligible 
during the sample period. One reason for the past and current limited use of Farmer Mac is that 
banks have had sufficient funds available to finance their assets. 
3 BANK may also be a proxy for urbanization (MSA) or change in the number of farms 
relative to total population (POP). However, multicollinearity diagnostics indicated a 
nonharmfullevel of collinearity. 
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The perc,ntage change in total agricultural loans outstanding (PCTAL) indicates the 
changes in loan market size, lending activities of all lenders and overall demand for farm loans. 
Thus, PCTAl indicates the change in relative volume of farm loans. 
System of Equations 
Equation (3) is an identity because it is derived from (1) which is a definition. The WS 
approach explains variation in market share by explaining the variation in PCAlDR, PCSD and 
PCTAL. Each of the three components of change can be modelled as a dependent variable to 
yield a system of three equations such as: 
PCALDRj = aa + at PCNFlj + ~ PCFlj + a3 RIS~ + ~ POPj 
+ CIti BANK; + as MSA; + ej (4) 
PCSDj =bo + b, PCNFlj + b2 PCFlj + b3 POPj + b4 SAN~ 
(5) 
PCTALj == Co + c, PCFlj + ~ POPj + c3 PCSIZEj + c4 PCVALj 
+ ~ MSA; + vj (6) 
where PCALDRj, PCBDj and PCTAl; are the observations on the percentage changes for the rh 
county. 
The independent variables in (4) • {6} are defined in Table 1. These variables represent 
the demand for agricultural loans, demand for nonagricultural loans, the relative risk associated with 
agricultural lending, bank competition, farm structure and bank location. 
Table 1. Definitions of Independent Variables used In Model Specification 
Variable Definition 
PCNFI Percentage change in nonfarm income (%) 
PCFI Percentage change in farm income (%) 
RISK Ratio of the coefficient of variation in nonfarm income to the 
coefficient of variation in farm income 
POP Ratio of the percentage change in the number of farms to the 
percentage change in population 
PCUN Percentage change in unemployment rates (%) 
BANK Number of banks in the county in 1990 
PCSIZE Percentage change in average farm size (%) 
PCVAL Percentage change in the value of land and buildings (%) 
MSA Dummy variable for metropolitan statistical area (urban area) 
(1-urban, O==otherwise) 
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The variables selected to explain changes in the demand for agricultural loans are the 
percentage change in farm income (PCFI) and the ratio of the percentage change in the number of 
farms to the percentage change in total population (POP). The demand for nonagricultural loans is 
captured by the percentage change in nonfarm income (PCNFI) and the percentage change in the 
unemployment rate (PCUN). These variables are demand shifters. 
It is hypothesized that PCFI is positively related to the PCALDR, PCBD and PCTAL. As 
farm income increases, farming is more profitable and farmers are more likely to demand farm 
loans to finance farm investments as well as having more funds to deposit. POP as a local market 
demand variable is also expected to be positively related to the three dependent variables. The 
change in the number of farms relative to total population indicates the change in the relative 
demand for agricultural loans by farmers in the county. The PCNFI is expected to be negatively 
related to PCALDR and positively related PCBD. As nonfarm income increases, demand for 
nonfarm loans (commercial and consumer) and bank deposits increase. In addition, PCUN as an 
indicator of the growth of a county's economic vitality is hypothesized to be negatively related to 
PCBD. 
In equation (4), RISK measures the risk associated with nonfarm loans relative to farm 
loans. RISK is the ratio of the coefficient of variation of nonfarm income to the coefficient of 
variation of farm income. Commercial banks are concerned with the risk associated with their loan 
portfolios and, thus, the underlying variation in nonfarm income and farm income. Commercial 
banks can diversify their loan portfolios by lending to different sectors of the economy, but certain 
sectors may be more risky than others. As this risk differential increases, a banker must reevaluate 
the loan portfolio and make adjustments. Hence, RISK is expected to be positively related to 
PCALDR since increases in farm income risk, ceteris paribus, make RISK decline. 
The degree of bank competition is measured by the number of banks per county (BANK). 
This measure assumes farmers have uniform access across Mansas to other agricultural lenders 
such as the FCS. 
Changes in the size and structure of farms are reflected by the percentage change in 
average farm size (PCSIZE) and the percentage change in the value of land and buildings 
(PCVAL). These two variables are related to the changes in real estate and fixed asset purchases, 
which should be positively related to PCTAL. 
A measure of the diversification opportunities for a commercial bank is the degree of a 
county's rurality. A rural county is likely to have a large proportion of agricultural loans to total 
loans. The U.S. Office of Management and Budget designates ten Arkansas counties as 
metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs): Washington, Crawford and Sebastian in northwest Arkansas; 
Faulkner, Saline, Pulaski, Lonoke and Jefferson in central Arkansas; Crittenden in eastern 
Arkansas; and Miller in southwestern Arkansas. In this study, MSA is a binary variable taking on a 
value of one if an observation comes from one of these 10 urban counties, and zero otherwise. 
The coefficients in (4) - (6) are estimated using Zellner's seemingly unrelated regression 
(SUR) as opposed to ordinary least squares which was used by WB. SUR is used to gain more 
efficient estimates since the error terms (ei, uj and Vi) in these different equations are likely to reflect 
some common unmeasurable or omitted factors and, therefore, are contemporaneously correlated 
(JUdge, Hill, Griffiths, Luthkepohl, and Lee). SHAZAM (White, Wong, Whistler, and Haun) is used 
to obtain all estimates. 
Data and Sources 
The data used to construct variables are drawn from several sour(;es: U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (PCNFI, PCFI, POP, RISK); the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Call Reports of Income and Condition (PCALDR, PCBD, BANK); the FmHA 
State Office in Little Rock and the Farm Credit Bank of St. Louis (PCTAl); Arkansas State and 
10 
County Economic Data of the University of Arkansas at Little Rock (PCUN); and the Arkansas 
Agricultural Statistical Service (POP, PCVAL, PCSIZE). 
The sample is a cross-section with one observation per county. The percentage change 
variables compute the percentage change from 1986 to 1990 except for PCVAL, PCSIZE and the 
numerator of POP which are from 1982 to 1987. Because Arkansas has 75 counties. there are 75 
observations (n=75) for the model. All dollar values and percentage changes are based on real 
dollar figures (Consumer Price Index, 1982 = 100). "rhe bank financial information is based on the 
fourth quarter call reports as of December 31, 1986 and December 31. 1990 for 256 commercial 
banks aggregated to their respective county level. 
Initially, SUR was used on the full sample with all 75 counties to estimate (4) - (6). Results 
indicated a general lack of significance of the three equations at the one and five percent levels. 
The R2s of the regression equations were also low, approximately seven percent, respectively, for 
each equation. In addition. only a few of the individual parameters were statistically different from 
zero. As a result of the unsatisfactory results, outlier identification (discussed below) and other 
diagnostic procedures (discussed later) were performed to assess the reliability of the model. 
Eleven counties were identified as statistical outliers. These counties were Boone, 
Calhoun. Cleveland, Columbia, Dallas. Grant, Hot Spring, Independence, Marion, Ouachita and 
Sharp. They were omitted from the sample used to estimate (4) - (6). The PCALDR for Cleveland 
County is undefined since this county reported no agricultural loans in 1986. Marion County had an 
extremely large RISK value (31.7). It is unreasonable to expect that the coefficient of variation in 
nonfarm income is thirty-one times larger than the coefficient of variation in farm income. The other 
nine outlier counties were detected by identifying counties whose residuals from the estimation of 
(4) exceeded twice their standard errors. This is a common method for identifying statistical outliers 
(Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch, p. 43). PCALDR was the most strongly correlated variable with PCMS 
compared with PCBD and PCTAL. Thus, the outliers were identified using equation (4). 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the variables used to estimate the model for the 64 
observations remaining in the sample. The sample means for the dependent variables PCALDR, 
PCBD and PCTAL are 22.02 percent, 2.57 percent and -18.32 percent. Although the county 
average proportion of agricultural loans in commercial bank investment portfolios increased from 
1986 to 1990, PCALDR has very large variation as indicated by a standard deviation of 45.36 
percent. The positive mean of the PCBD indicates increased bank deposits, and hence, economic 
growth. The negative mean for the PCTAL implies that the total county-level agricultural loans have 
decreased from 1986 to 1990, which is consistent with the decline in Arkansas agricultural loans 
(Priyanti). 
The means of the demand independent variables (PCNFI, PCFI, POP and PCUN) are 5.12 
percent, 64.94 percent, 0.56 and -22.47 percent. The variability in nonfarm income is less than the 
variability in farm income, which is reflected by their standard deviations of 5.33 and 109.88 percent 
and their coefficients of variation of 1.04 and 1.69, respectively. This relative variability of nonfarm 
income to farm income is also reflected by RISK's mean of 0.7. A mean less than one indicates 
that, on average, nonfarm businesses have less income risk than farm businesses. 
Summarizing the growth patterns, county economic activity in Arkansas increased from 
1986 to 1990. In addition, farm income was more variable than nonfarm income. Since farm 
income in Arkansas is concentrated in rural counties, income variation is likely to be 
disproportionately concentrated in rural counties. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of the Variables Use(f 
Standard 
Variables Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum 
PCAlDR (%) 22.02 45.36 -46.88 258.92 
PCBD (%) 2.57 12.06 -58.38 25.01 
PCTAL (%) -18.32 11.51 -46.27 13.64 
PCNFI (%) 5.12 5.33 -6.49 16.63 
PCFI (%) 64.94 109.88 -42.92 461.13 
POP 0.56 5.55 -24.20 17.90 
PCUN (%) -22.47 17.86 -57.48 31.82 
RISK 0.70 1.41 0.005 6.41 
BANK 3.51 2.30 1.00 14.00 
PCVAl (%) -28.20 15.58 -52.53 21.34 
PCSIZE (%) 3.03 9.07 -21.43 32.40 
a Variable name definitions are presented in Table 1. Number of observations equals 64. 
Results 
Regression Diag nostics 
In addition to identifying and eliminating outliers as discussed previously, testing procedures 
were carried out to detect violations of the underlying regression model assumptions. The 
diagnostic procedures included tests for multicollinearity I heteroskedasticity and a regression 
specification error test. See Priyanti for additional discussion of the tests and presentation of test 
results. 
Multicollinearity diagnostics indicated the existence of potentially harmful levels of 
multicollinearity among the explanatory variables in e~ch of the three equations. The variable PCFI 
was omitted from each equation and collinearity was consequently lessened to a nonharmful level. 
Omitting a relevant independent variable can bias the remaining coefficient estimates. However, 
the results of the RESET tests (Ramsey) indicate no significant misspecifications at the 0.05 level. 
Homoskedasticity for the three component equations (4) - (6) is not rejected at the 0.01 
significance level for each regression equation. Thus no steps are taken in the SUR approach to 
compensate for heteroskedasticity. 
A preliminary specification was estimated with regional binary variables representing the 
rural coastal, delta and highland counties. However, the impact of these regions was not as 
significant as simply dividing Arkansas into rural and urban counties. 
Final Estimation Results and Discussion 
To obtain greater efficiency, equations (4) - (6) with PCFl j omitted were estimated by SUR 
using the sample with 64 observations. The implications of the estimated.equations are now 
discussed. 
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Portfolio Decision (PCALDR) 
The SUR estimates of equation (4) are shown in Table 3. The coefficient of determination 
(R2) for PCALDR is 0.24. All parameter estimates are significantly different from zero at either the 
0.10, 0.05 or 0.01 level. 
Table 3. Seemingly Unrelated Regression Results of
 
the Estimated Model (Variable PCFI Deleted, n=64)·
 
Dependent Variables (equation) 
Variable Name PCAlDR (4) PCBD (5) PCTAl (6) 
Constant 
PCNFI 
35.134*** 
(10.328) 
2.202* 
(1.162) 
0.422 
(3.219) 
0.524* 
(0.302) 
-10.071*** 
(2.780) 
b 
RISK -8.928** 
(3.998) 
b b 
POP 2.584*** 
(0.964) 
-0.289 
(0.271) 
0.531** 
(0.234) 
PCUN 
PCSIZE 
b 
b 
0.059 
(0.082) 
b 
b 
0.095 
(0.155) 
PCVAL 
BANK 
b 
-4.211* 
(2.450) 
b 
0.501 
(0.666) 
0.252*** 
(0.089) 
b 
MSA -46.511*** -5.151 -10.562*** 
(15.827) (4.652) (3.630) 
F-test 3.344c 1.154 4.182c 
R2 0.236 0.090 0.217 
a Standard errors are in parentheses. 
b Vanable not included in regression equation. 
c F-test is significant at the 0.01 level. 
* Two-tailed Hest is significant at the 0.10 level. 
** Two-tailed Hest is significant at the 0.05 level. 
*** Two-tailed t-test is significant at the 0.01 level. 
The coefficient estimate of percentage change in nonfarm income (PCNFI) is unexpectedly 
positive and significant at the 0.10 level. A similar unexpected result was found by Pederson. It 
was expected that increases in nonfarm income would indicate increased demand for 
nonagricultural loans, implying a decrease in the agricultural loan-to-deposit ratio. In addition, 
commercial banks may prefer to lend more to nonfarm activities since repayment capacity is likely 
to increase because of increases in nonfarm income. 
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However, a positive relationship between PCNFI and PCALDR can be explained. Suppose 
nonfarm income is not growing as fast as farm income. Then commercial banks may choose to 
lend to sectors with the highest rate of income growth. This may be true for Arkansas, since 
average county farm income grew 65 percent, compared with the five percent growth in average 
county nonfarm income during the study period. 
PCNFI also is significantly and positively related to PCBD in equation (5). This implies 
increases in nonfarm income increase bank deposits. If the best lending opportunities are in 
agriculture and there are limited lending opportunities in other sectors, then commercial banks 
would invest the additional bank deposits in farm loans, which results in an increase in the 
agricultural loan-to-deposit ratio. 
The sign of the RISK coefficient in the PCALDR equation is unexpectedly negative and 
significant at the 0.05 level. Wilson and Barkley's risk variable was not significantly related to 
PCALDR. The negative parameter estimate on the RISK variable implies that the agricultural loan­
to-deposit ratio rises with increases in relative risk of farm business income. This counterintuitive 
result can be explained by a number of reasons. 
Arkansas is primarily characterized by rural areas and these depend more on the 
agricultural economy than urban areas. Rural banks experience high risks in agricultural lending 
primarily as a result of variability in farmers' incomes and limited opportunities for asset 
diversification. Since farm income growth during the study period exceeded nonfarm income 
growth, commercial banks, especially in rural areas, may have chosen to invest in risky assets like 
agricultural loans because the fast growth in farm income may be associated with expected high 
agricultural profits. 
Robison and Barry cite a survey conducted by the American Bankers Association that 
identified bankers' probable changes in the agricultural loan-to-deposit ratio if farm lending became 
more risky. Only 38 of 119 bankers responding to the survey indicated a likely reduction in farm 
lending, and 24 bankers indicated an increase in farm lending. Cross-checking of answers for 
other risk responses, such as increases in interest rates, security requirements and degree of 
supervision of farm loans, confirms lenders responding to risk in ways other than denying loans. As 
an example, of the 81 bankers who would not reduce farm lending, 48 reported they would 
increase interest rates on farm loans as a risk response. Unfortunately, data regarding such 
commercial bank risk responses are not available for the present analysis. 
The proportion of the growth in the number of farms to growth in total population (POP) in 
each county is used as a proxy for agricultural loan demand relative to consumer loan demand. As 
expected, the coefficient estimate on POP is positive. Thus, counties having large growth in the 
number of farms relative to total population growth experienced greater growth in agricultural loan­
to-deposit ratios than counties having small growth in the number of farms relative to total 
population growth. Bank officers and loan committees made decisions to support the greater 
agricultural loan demand in those counties. This result is consistent with the results found by WB 
and Betubiza and Leatham. 
A proxy for bank competition is measured by the number of banks in each county in 1990 
(BANK). The negative parameter estimate on BANK implies that as there are more banks in a 
county, the agriculturalloan-to-deposit ratio decreases. Counties with more banks probably 
experienced greater opportunities for loan diversification from 1986 to 1990 than did counties with 
fewer banks. Thus, banks facing greater within-county competition lowered their emphasis on 
agricultural lending. 
The negative parameter estimate for urban areas (MSA) indicates urban commercial banks 
increased their agriculturalloan-to-deposit ratio at a much slower rate, or decreased their 
agricultural loan-to-deposit ratio (de-emphasized agricultural lending) at a much faster rate, than 
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rural commercial banks. This is not surprising because the more urban an area, the more diverse 
are the lending opportunities. Thus, commercial banks appear to diversify out of agriculture as long 
as diversification opportunities are available. Moreover, rural banks are more likely to lend more 
money to agriculture relative to their deposits than urban banks do because rural banks are more 
dependent on farm activities. Another reason for the inverse relationship between PCALDR and 
MSA may be that urban bank management has not maintained the past levels of agricultural 
lending expertise and commitment to agriculture. 
Loanable Funds Availability (PCBD) 
SUR coefficient estimates of equation (5) explaining variation in percentage change of bank 
deposits (PCBD) have only one coefficient significant at 0.10, that of percentage change in nonfarm 
income (PCNFI). The coefficient of determination for the PCBD equation is 0.09. Additional 
analysis shows that variation in PCBD explains relatively little variation in PCMS compared with 
PCALDR. Thus the lack of regressor significance is not particularly troublesome for this study. 
Loan Market Size (PCTAL) 
All of the SUR coefficient estimates in (6) explaining variation in percentage change of total 
agricultural loans (PCTAl) are significantly different from zero at either the 0.05 or 0.01 level except 
the coefficient of PCSIZE. Also, the coefficient estimates have their anticipated signs. The 
coefficient of determination for the PCTAl equation is 0.22. 
Growth in number of farms relative to a county's population is represented by the POP 
variable. The positive parameter estimate on POP indicates that the greater the percentage 
change in the number of farms relative to the percentage change in the total population, the higher 
the percentage change in total agricultural loans outstanding. Thus, a relatively large decrease in 
the number of farms in a county indicates that the agricultural sector has become a less important 
part of the county's economy and that there is less demand for agricultural loans. 
The overall decrease in loan market size from 1983 through 1990 is consistent with the 
general perception of weak farm loan demand during the last few years of this period. Farm loan 
demand was weak because farmers, in general, were concerned with decreasing their debt levels 
and were perceived to be more risk averse regarding debt. Weak farm loan demand affects all 
lenders, and thus, the total loan market size is reduced. 
The positive parameter estimate on PCVAL indicates that increases in farmland and 
property values are associated with higher agricultural loans outstanding. Betubiza and leatham 
showed that a farm located in an area with higher farmland and property values has greater 
collateral value, and thus, a farm can support a higher level of loans. An increase in property 
values, ceteris paribus, decreases the financial risk of the firms so that lenders are likely to grant 
more loans and farmers are likely to request more loans. 
The negative parameter estimate for urban areas (MSA) implies that urban areas 
experienced larger declines in total agricultural loans outstanding than did rural areas. Urban areas 
are characterized by large financial institutions that can lend to many businesses in a variety of 
industries. Therefore, the relatively small concentration of farm loans among large urban financial 
institutions may reflect an opportunity for these institutions to lend 10 nonfarm business. This 
reasoning is supported by the evidence presented by Barkley, Mellon and Potts; and Gilbert and 
Belongia. Other possible explanations for the inverse relationship between PCTAL and MSA are: 
significant levels of urban growth displace agriculture in urban cOunties; and just as with the 
relationship of PCAlDR to MSA, urban bank management may not have maintained their historical 
level of agricultural lending expertise and commitment. 
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Concluding Comments 
Changes in commercial bank market shares of farm debt were decomposed into portfolio 
decisions, loanable funds availability and loan market size. In general, commercial banks increased 
the proportion of agricultural loans in their portfolio. Commercial banks had ample loan funds . 
available to service the demand for farm debt. Decreased loan market size, primarily a result of 
decreased loan demand by farmers, affected all agricultural lenders, but commercial banks were 
affected to a lesser extent than other lenders. 
Factors affecting the three components (portfolio decision, loan funds availability and loan 
market size) of percentage change in commercial banks' market share were identified. The 
percentage change in nonfarm income had a significant impact on the changes in the agricultural 
loan-to-deposit ratio as well as total bank deposits. Since nonfarm income growth was slower than 
farm income growth, bank management invested more money in agriculture by granting more 
agricultural loans. Hence, the agriculturalloan-to-deposit ratio increased even though farm income 
was more variable than nonfarm income. Results demonstrate that the growth in the number of 
farms relative to total population growth in an Arkansas county had a significant impact on the 
changes in the agriculturalloan-to-deposit ratio as well as loan market size. This implies that 
structural and demographic effects have an impact on the demand for agricultural loans. In 
addition, the decrease in agricultural asset values was associated with decreased loan market size 
because less collateral was available to secure loans and lower credit reserves were available for 
farmers while at the same time increasing financial risk. Also a county being urban led to lower 
agriculturalloan-to-deposit ratio levels and lower total agricultural loans from 1986 to 1990 than a 
county being rural. 
While the variation in bank deposit changes was not strongly associated with hypothesized 
regressors, changes in deposit availability explained little of the market share variation. The 
secondary markets for farm real estate and rural housing mortgages (Farmer Mac I) and FmHA 
guaranteed portions of operating and farm ownership loans (Farmer Mac II) diminish the 
dependency of commercial banks on bank deposits as a source of loan funds. However, loan 
funds availability has not been a limiting factor in the growth of commercial banks market share of 
farm loans. Commercial banks have other options available, such as loan participations and the 
seasonal borrowing privilege, that allow them to have adequate funds available to satisfy loan 
demand. Thus, the success of Farmer Mac appears to depend more on lenders' need to reduce 
risk than to increase liquidity by selling loans in the secondary market. 
The deregulatory trend toward unlimited branch banking in Arkansas and other states may 
have an impact on commercial banks' market share of farm loans. Gilbert and Belongia; and 
Lawrence and Klugman have found that rural banks controlled by urban-based banks have 
proportionately few agricultural loans. Similarly, the study presented here provides significant 
evidence that a commercial bank located in an urban county has a propensity to grant fewer 
agricultural loans than a commercial bank located in a rural county. Possible explanations for these 
results are: rural banks controlled by urban-based banks have more opportunities for loan 
diversification and urban management may not feel it has sufficient expertise in agricultural lending. 
Given these results and explanations, to the extent that unlimited branch banking will be dominated 
by urban-based banks and their lending practices, branch banks associated with the urban banks 
may grant fewer agricultural loans relative to other loans in rural areas. This might portend a 
market niche for rural commercial banks emphasizing agricultural loans. 
-
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FINANCING NORTH DAKOTA'S AGRIBUSINESS 
Cole R. Gustafson and Sara J. Andersod 
Abstract 
Results from stratified, random, cross-sectional mail survey of 272 agribusinesses 
in North Dakota found limited evidence of external credit rationing. Only half of the 
agribusinesses feeling constraint would be willing to pay a premium for additional 
financing. Significant internal credit rationing existed. The study also provided 
information on the financial characteristics of agribusiness firms operating in the 
input, output, and service sectors. 
During the 1990-92 recession of the U.S. economy, a "credit crunch," which contributed to 
the recession and jeopardized the strength of the recovery, was perceived to exist (Bacon and 
Wessel; Bernanke and Lown; and Greenspan).2 Reasons ascribed to the decreased availability of 
credit from commercial banks have included disintermediation, overzealous regulators, banks' 
unwillingness to lend, and lack of business firms' demand for credit. The extent to which the credit 
crunch or credit rationing, in general, has impacted agribusiness firms3 is unknown, partly because 
few studies about the financial structure, sources of credit, and methods of financial management 
for agribusiness firms exiSt.' 
The objectives of this study were to quantify the capital structures of agribusiness firms in 
North Dakota, to measure the extent of credit rationing in these firms, and to gauge the relationship 
between a firm's financial position and whether it had been formally or informally denied credit 
since 1987. The majority of agribusiness firms in North Dakota are small, privately held firms. 
Little information exists on the types and terms of their financial arrangements. Necessary 
information for the study was elicited through a stratified, random, cross-sectional mail survey of 
272 agribusinesses in North Dakota. The following sections describe credit rationing as it applies to 
agribusiness, discuss administration of the survey, and present the results of the study. 
Credit RationIng 
The primary function of financial markets is to optimally distribute scarce debt capital to 
savers and borrowers. However, these markets do not always work efficiently because of market 
Cole R. Gustafson is associate professor and Sara J. Anderson is former graduate research 
assistant, Department of Agricultural Economics, North Dakota State University, Fargo, NO. 
The authors received useful comments from Frank Dooley, Marvin Duncan, and Charlene 
Lucken on earlier drafts of this manuscript. North Dakota Experiment Station paper no. _. 
2	 See Kaufman for a discussion of the origin of this term. For a discussion of previous credit 
crunches, see Wojnilower. 
-

3 In this study, agribusinesses are narrowly defined to exclude farm firms directly involved in 
production agriculture. The definition is intended to include firms that supply inputs to or 
process and distribute the outputs of farm units. For other definitions see Davis and Goldberg, 
and Miller and McNamara. 
, Two studies include Barry, Sonka and Lajili, and Featherstone and Sherrick. 
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imperfections and transaction costs. Thus, some projects with positive net gresent values are 
rejected because of credit rationing.s 
Forms of Credit Rationing 
Credit rationing can be either internal or external. Internal credit rationing occurs when 
management imposes criteria for either project acceptance or risk exposure to limit debt financing. 
Extemal credit rationing occurs when lenders quote an interest rate on loans and supply a smaller 
amount of funds than borrowers want. External capital rationing can involve either loan quantity 
rationing or loan size rationing (Aguilera). With loan quantity rationing, applicants receive fewer 
loans than applied for; with loan size rationing, applicants receive all of their loans but with fewer 
funds. In either case, borrowers have exhausted all sources of loanable funds, but still find the 
marginal value of credit exceeds its marginal cost. Thus, financial institutions are not willing to loan 
funds, even though borrowers are willing to pay premiums for debt capital. 
Credit rationing can prevail in a market economy because lenders do not think the risk 
premiums borrowers are willing to pay cover potential costs of default (Stiglitz and Weiss). Also, 
rationing occurs from information asymmetries since lenders do not have complete information 
about the investment prospect. 
Credit rationing is a chronic problem for North Dakota agribusiness firms (Springer). Torok 
and Schroeder reported that agribusiness firms in Montana and Wyoming are more concerned with; 
1) obtaining long-term loans, and 2) financing new technology than nonagribusiness firms. They 
inferred that this concern reflects agribusiness firms' drive to expand and creditors' perceived loan 
risk. 
Small businesses, in general, experience credit rationing because of the gap that exists in 
the number and type of financing institutions that provide long-term debt to small businesses. 
Credit crunches affect small businesses most severely, particularly if they do not have established 
lines of credit with a financial institution (Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen). 
Commercial firms in agriculture do not receive equal credit. While agribusiness firms have 
credit shortages, farmers continue to benefit from excess supplies of credit (USDA). Farmers can 
choose from a variety of public and private sources for short-term credit, including various state and 
federal government lending agencies; local, regional, and national credit programs of merchants; 
the Farm Credit System; and a more extensive commercial banking system. 
Reasons for Credit Rationing to Agribusiness 
Rationing debt capital to agribusiness could occur for several reasons. First, most 
agribusiness firms are located in rural areas. Mikesell noted that rural banks serving this market 
tend to be conservative with loanable funds because of the high risks associated with lending in 
rural areas. He reported that rural banks generally do not make loans beyond the amount that 
deposits alone can support, unlike many urban banks that obtain additional funds from the Federal 
funds market. 
Second, agribusiness firms do not represent a diversification opportunity for banks. 
Adverse conditions in agriculture directly affect agribusiness firms. Lending to agribusiness would 
increase the financial risks of rural banks more than would their diversifying a portion of funds into 
an area that is not directly related to agriculture. • 
.' 
S A more general study of capital rationing that includes equity capital is not considered in this 
study. 
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Third, rural lenders have limited experience evaluating agribusiness loans (Gustafson, 
Beyer, and Saxowsky). When reviewing farm loan proposals, lenders have sufficient applications to 
compare borrowers and to determine credit risk. However, loan officers frequently do not have an 
equivalent database for evaluating agribusiness loan applications. Moreover, agribusinesses 
involve more enterprises than most farm operations. lenders who do not fUlly understand 
businesses hesitate to extend credit to them. 
A final problem relates to the value of the collateral pledged to secure agribusiness loans. 
Unlike farmers. who pledge assets that have minimal economic depreciation and relatively low 
transaction costs of liquidation, agribusiness collateral is generally highly specialized and illiquid. 
Quantifying Credit Rationing 
Extemal credit rationing exists if a firm is willing to pay a premium for credit but is unable to 
obtain necessary funding. One could survey agribusinesses to determine the extent of credit 
rationing. However, other techniques to determine the extent of credit rationing have been 
developed. 
Morgan identified three indicators of credit rationing: lack of a loan commitment from a 
bank, a positive correlation between investment spending and cash flow, and low investment when 
prospects are available. loan commitments offer protection during periods of low external credit 
availability and signal the creditworthiness of a firm to secondary creditors. The positive correlation 
between investment and cash flow implies that outside financing is unavailable. Therefore, any 
investments must be internally funded. 
The final indicator that compares actual investment with available opportunities is difficult to 
measure empirically. Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen have devised a measure of investment 
opportunity "q," which is defined as the market value of a business as an ongoing entity divided by 
the current replacement value of the firm. When "q" exceeds zero, firms should invest because the 
marginal value of investment exceeds its cost. Comparing "q" with actual investment behavior 
becomes another indicator of financial constraint. 
Shaffer and Pulver created an index that defines a capital-stressed firm, based on whether; 
1) debt/equity capital to finance expansion could not be obtained within 30 miles of its present 
location, 2) the firm ranked its banks as fair, poor, or very poor in meeting its credit needs, 3) the 
firm ranked all sources of capital as fair, poor, or very poor in meeting its credit needs, and 4) the 
firm had been denied credit on at least one loan application. 
Policy Implications 
If agribusinesses in North Dakota are experiencing credit rationing, policymakers may want 
to shift public credit programs from farmers to agribusiness firms. Credit-constrained 
agribusinesses are unable to attain optimal size, leverage. profitability, and capital structure 
positions. Reduced levels of economic activity adversely affect rural communities. less efficient 
agribusinesses impact farmers through reduced services and increased transaction costs. 
Survey Procedures 
A stratified, random, cross-sectional mail survey of 272 agribusinesses in North Dakota was 
•conducted to quantify the capital structures of agribusiness firms in North Dakota, to measure the 
extent of credit rationing in these firms, and to gauge the relationship between credit rationing and 
the firm's financial position (Anderson). Agribusiness firms included in the survey were divided into 
three sectors: input, output. and service firms. 
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Input firms supplied products/services to farmers, such as implement, crop, and feed 
dealerships. Output firms processed or distributed what farmers produce, such as grain elevators, 
auction markets, and food processors. Service firms provided technical services to farmers, such 
as aerial sprayers, crop consultants, and farm management/accounting firms. Individual firms within 
each group were randomly selected from association and telephone directories in North Dakota. 
The mail survey contained seven sections: the first section ascertained the firm's type of 
business, the proportion of the firm's business that was agriculturally related, the business 
organization of the firm, and the number of employees. The second section elicited the 
respondents' opinions regarding credit availability, his firm's ability to raise capital, and the 
performance of rural financial markets. The third section elicited their perceptions about their firm's 
financial health. These perceptions were compared with actual financial information obtained later 
in the questionnaire. 
The fourth section determined the firm's willingness to pay for additional capital and the 
amount of capital needed, in essence, a demand schedule for debt financing. Willingness to pay a 
premium for debt capital is one indicator of credit rationing. If credit rationing existed, the 
respondent completed the fifth and sixth sections of the survey to determine whether the rationing 
was internal or external. The seventh section contained respondent's summarization of his financial 
statements. 
The first of two pretests was conducted under the supervision of a researcher involved in 
the project. After the general survey was mailed, a follow-up mailing was sent to improve response 
rates. A telephone survey of nonrespondents was conducted to test for nonresponse bias and to 
increase the overall rates of response. After these contacts, an overall survey response rate of 
27.6 percent was obtained (73 usable questionnaires returned). Sector response rates were 
comparable: input firms (29 percent), output firms (23 percent), and service firms (29 percent). 
Tests of nonresponse bias included a comparison of responses across mailings (Siegel), a 
geographic comparison of response rates, and a corriparison of respondent characteristics with 
published industry averages. In summary, respondents differed from the population in terms of 
geographic location. level of liabilities, and net income and were more financially constrained than 
nonrespondents. . 
Results 
Ninety percent of the agribusinesses surveyed indicated that more than 75 percent of their 
business was directly related to agriculture. Over half of the respondents considered themselves 
retailers. The average number of full-time employees ranged from 10 to 13. Unincorporated firms 
represented 60 percent of the respondents, whereas only 13 percent were incorporated. 
Attitudinal Responses 
Table 1 summarizes the respondents' attitudes toward financial markets and lenders.6 The 
majority of agribusinesses agreed or strongly agreed that lending criteria are not the same for 
everyone. The input sector may be experiencing more stringent criteria because only four 
respondents agreed with the statement. The majority of respondents also indicated that 
agribusinesses have a limited number of lenders to deal with. Based on their divided response, 
service firms apparently have greater access to credit. In contrast, 80 percent of the input suppliers 
• 
... 
6 Selected disaggregated results pertaining to input, output, and service firms are discussed in 
this section. Due to space limitations, the disaggregated results are not included in the tables. 
However, Anderson reported them. 
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indicated the number of lenders was limited. Over half of the respondents said lenders were 
knowledgeable about agribusiness finance. 
Table 1. North Dakota Agribusiness Attitudes Toward
 
Financial Markets and Lenders
 
Strongly Strongly Don't 
Statement Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Know 
Percent 
1)	 Lenders apply similar criteria to 
all agribusinesses 2.8 23.9 36.6 16.9 19.7 
2)	 Agribusinesses have a limited 
number of lenders to deal with 20.0 44.3 22.9 2.9 2.9 
3)	 Lenders are knowledgeable 
about agribusiness finance 5.7 47.1 24.3 14.3 8.6 
4)	 Loan applications are too time 
consuming 7.1 28.6 40.0 10.0 14.3 
5)	 Collateral requirements are 
excessive 11.8 35.3 26.5 8.8 17.6 
6)	 Credit agreements are too short 7.4 20.6 35.3 10.3 26.5 
7)	 Geographic distances to lenders 
are too great 1.4 8.6 51.4 14.3 24.3 
Lenders have the option of rationing credit through nonprice mechanisms by increasing 
paperwork burdens, increasing collateral requirements, or shortening credit agreements. 
Agribusiness firms surveyed did not indicate these impediments. Geographic distances between 
the firms and their lenders were not considered excessive. 
Table 2 shows the firms' attitudes toward credit availability. Thirty seven percent of the 
respondents indicated agribusiness firms had greater difficulty obtaining credit than did other small 
businesses. Twice as many input suppliers agreed with this statement, indicating that they are at 
greater risk of not obtaining credit. Overall, the respondents received necessary funding for 
profitable investments. The service sector had the least difficulty obtaining funds, whereas the input 
sector had the most difficulty. Respondents indicated long-term capital was the most difficult type 
of credit to obtain. 
Many of the respondents' credit difficulties may be internal. Over 91 percent of the 
respondents agreed that managers of agribusiness firms could benefit from improved financial 
management skills. One-fourth of all firms surveyed (36 percent of input firms) had difficulty 
meeting debt service obligations. Over half of the firms did not have account receivables up to 
date. More than a third of the firms did not have a financial plan for the coming year. 
Financial Position • 
The financial characteristics of the agribusiness firms responding to the survey are 
summarized in Table 3. Although considerable variation existed across firms, most respondents 
were relatively profitable with an average return on assets of six percent and used only modest 
levels of financing (debt/asset ratio of 34 percent). Output firms operated with the highest level of 
... 
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assets and input firms with the least. Input firms also had the lowest level of financing (debt/asset 
ratio of 28 percent). 
Table 2. Nonh Dakota Agribusiness Attitudes Toward
 
Credit Availability
 
Strongly Strongly Don't 
Statement Agree Agree DIsagree Disagree Know 
Percent 
1)	 Agribusinesses have greater 
difficulty obtaining credit than 
other small businesses 9.9 26.8 35.2 24.0 28.2 
2)	 Do you have equal access to 
capital relative to other 
agribusiness firms 16.9 60.6 15.5 1.9 5.6 
3)	 All of your firms profitable 
investments have received 
necessary funds 20.3 47.8 17.4 11.6 2.9 
4)	 Short-term capital is not 
available 2.9 12.9 52.9 20.0 11.4 
5)	 Long-term capital is not 
available 5.8 . 20.3 42.0 17.4 14.5 
The current mar1<et value of the firms, based on the respondents' assessments of what outside 
investors would be willing to pay for the firms as ongoing entities, was substantially less than 
reported equity. The greatest disparity existed for output firms. In a related question, nearly half of 
the respondents indicated that such an investor could not adequately appraise their firms. 
Sources and terms of debt financing the responding agribusiness firms obtained are shown in 
Table 4. The most popular sources of debt financing were local banks and the Small Business 
Administration (SBA). Private sources of credit, including stockholders, individuals, family, and 
other p~ivate sources, ranked next. The terms for most credit were fewer than 10 years, with most 
on an annual basis. Average interest rates ranged from 5.0 percent on public sources of credit to 
12 percent on self-financed loans. 
Most of the respondents had obtained secured credit from their financial institution (77 
percent). Only 12 percent had obtained unsecured credit. Collateral provided as security included 
the firm's assets and equipment (49 percent), inventory (47 percent), real estate (37 percent), 
personal assets (31 percent), accounts receivable (27 percent), and other (4 percent). When 
applying for credit, the following information was required: balance sheet (89 percent), income 
statement (76 percent), personal financial records (73 percent), business plan (61 percent), and tax 
returns (60 percent). Input firms were required to submit more information than other sectors. 
Over 76 percent of the respondents had easy or moderate access to additional equity funds, 
•including past earnings (37 percent), asset appreciation (19 percent), family (14 percent), friends (9 
percent), venture capital (7 percent) and other (5 percent). 
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Table 3. Financial Characteristics of North Dakota Agribusiness Firms 
Balance Sheet All Firms Input Firms Output Firms Service Firms 
Current Assets 
Cash 267,930 41,800 815,930 161,680 
Accounts Receivable 248,660 76,160 680,870 134,420 
Inventory 1,162,480 1,137,040 1,715,nO 798,220 
Intermediate Assets 512,140 135,750 1,781,330 202,300 
Long-term Assets 498,690 167,380 1,221,250 391,620 
Accounts Payable 313,140 500,430 218,000 131,120 
Total Debt 384,820 344,000 632,370 273,310 
Equity 1,991,940 713,700 5,364,860 1,283,810 
Market Value of Firm 852,000 726,000 1,246,000 701,000 
Current Asset/Current 
Liabilities 
22.72 20.78 35.88 12.78 
Debt/Asset Ratio .34 .28 .33 .43 
Income Statement 
Annual Sales 12,600,000 12,630,000 25,970,000 1,880,000 
Depreciation 142,120 25,450 366,870 72,930 
Interest Expense 28,710 26,090 18,670 41,430 
Tax Expense 17,440 8,890 15,440 31,310 
Net Income 111,340 43,240 329,600 64,310 
Return on Assets .06 .12 .03 .09 
Credit Rationing 
One indicator of credit rationing is how close firms are to the minimum amount of debt 
necessary to operate the business. Those below the minimum assumably would have difficulty 
obtaining credit. Agribusiness firms in North Dakota report a range of minimum and maximum 
levels of financing necessary to operate their firms (Table 4). The level of debt most respondents 
wanted was substantially below current levels. Respondents above their desired debt level 
indicated that low profitability, unexpected losses, and slow farm economy prevented them from 
reducing their debt while respondents below their desired debt level indicated that high interest 
rates and poor cash flows prevented additional borrowing. 
Overall, 41 percent of the respondents indicated a financial constraint on the amount of 
debt capital that they could borrow (Table 5). Thirty one percent of the respondents had been 
informally denied credit, and 18 percent had had formal applications for credit denied. The average 
loan amount formally rejected was $432,300. However, this constraint does not indicate capital 
rationing. Financial markets appear to be operating satisfactorily because only 8 percent of the 
respondents would be willing to pay a premium for additional debt. If firm$ willing to pay a premium 
could obtain additional credit, but had to pay an additional 200 basis points of interest, they would 
only borrow, on average, an additional $13,800. 
• 
... 
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Table 4. 
Source 
Sources and Terms of Debt Financing 
Original Term Interest Rate 
Mean Mean 
Amount 
Mean 
Stockholders 
Local Bank 
Individual 
Parent Company 
Bank for Co-ops 
SBA 
Family 
Private 
Personal Notes 
Self 
Regional Bank 
Credit Union 
Financing Company 
Years 
6.3 
1.1 
5.0 
Ongoing 
1.0 
12.0 
7.2 
10.0 
Demand 
5.0 
5.0 
1.0 
1.0 
% $ 
9.4 225,600 
11.1 122,300 
10.0 17,000 
9.0 1,142,000 
6.7 995,000 
5.0 96,000 
8.5 75,100 
9.0 32,500 
8.7 115,000 
12.0 6,000 
7.5 1,000,000 
10.5 23,500 
12.0 10,000 
Applying the credit rationing analysis of Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen resuhed in an 
average q of 67.3, which indicated that market value of the firms is below replacement value and 
that lack of credit arises from limited internal investment prospects. Based on the index of Shaffer 
and Pulver, less than three percent of the firms were capital stressed. Therefore, North Dakota 
agribusiness firms did not seem to experience credit rationing during the last recession. 
If all firms in the survey could borrow additional capital at 200 basis points below their 
existing rate, they would increase debt financing an average of $148,860. 
Summary 
Results of a stratified, random, cross-sectional mail survey of 76 agribusinesses in North 
Dakota show limited evidence of external credit rationing among the firms surveyed. Ahhough 
nearly half of the agribusinesses were constrained in the amount of debt capital that they could 
borrow, only eight percent of them would be willing to pay a premium for additional financing. Of 
those willing to pay a premium, the amount of credit that they would borrow at 200 basis points 
over their present interest rate averaged $13,800. Significant internal credit rationing existed. The 
survey provided significant information on the financial characteristics of nonfarm agribusiness firms 
operating in the input, output, and service sectors. 
The resuhs of this survey are limited to one time period and geographic area of the country. • 
Similar studies should be replicated in other regions to increase the understanding of the financial 
characteristics and management practices of agribusiness firms. 
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Table 5. Indicators of Credit Rationing 
All Input Output Service 
Firms Firms Firms Firms 
Minimum debt level $95,700 $93,800 $75,400 $111,200 
Maximum debt level $733,700 $353,300 $1,218,300 $767,500 
Desired debt level $60,400 $58,000 $111,400 $25,500 
Firms constrained in the
 
amount of debt they can
 
borrow 41% 19% 13% 9%
 
Willing to pay a premium
 
for additional debt 8% 8% 6% 8%
 
Informally denied credit 31% 48% 22% 21%
 
Formally denied loan
 
application in past 5
 
years 18% 26% 11% 15%
 
Average amount of rejected
 
loan $432,300 $701,000 $211,000 $131,667
 
Amount firm would borrow at
 
-200 basis points of interest $148,060 $165,200 $233,200 $54,250
 
Amount firm may borrow at
 
+200 basis points of interest $13,800 $6,200 $35,300 $5,000
 
• 
.
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ECONOMIC MOTIVATIONS FOR VENDOR FINANCING:
 
THEORY AND EVIDENCE
 
Bruce J. Sherrick and Robert W. Lubben' 
Abstract 
Vendor financing is shown to have advantages over competitive bank financing in
 
cases where: there is some "market power" in the prodUct market; there are
 
positive margins in the product market; credit can be used to segment the demand
 
and extract additional economic rents; funding, collateral or security disposition
 
rates favor the vendor; or there is asymmetric infonnation and differing abilities to
 
assess credit risk among the various participants in the credit market. Further, the
 
theory employed predicts that the "optimal" risk exposure for vendor financed
 
operations exceeds that of the traditional lenders, even in cases of purely
 
competitive lending environments. Summary evidence from one vendor finance
 
operation is then presented that is largely consistent with the theory.
 
Introduction and Background 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the economic incentives for input supply firms to 
offer credit in conjunction with their products. Although these types of vendor finance programs 
have been in existence for nearly half a century, several have recently increased in both scale and 
visibility. These vendor finance programs have become the subject of much additional debate -- by 
traditional lenders who are uncertain whether to view the "new" entrants in the credit market as 
competition or opportunity; by other vendors interested in the value of financing their own 
customers' purchases; and by customer-borrowers interested in the "best deal" they can get. 
Furthermore, an accurate understanding of the incentives and impacts on the market of these 
relatively unregulated lenders is needed by policymakers and regulators as they design and 
implement guidelines for behavior. 
At the center of the debate are the economic motivations of the supply firms who chose to 
create a financing unit. Although there has been relatively little formal treatment of the economics 
of intermediation by these lenders operating in agricultural markets, there have been several 
studies and hypotheses put forth related to automotive, industrial supply, and consumer prodUcts 
vendor finance operations. The question remains as to what form of history may repeat with 
agricultural input supply finns. Will the vendor finance companies largely displace bank supplied 
financing as has been somewhat the case with automobiles? Or, perhaps only a small number of 
specific-need borrowers will develop relationships with their suppliers to formalize common trade 
credit into real debt relationships as has been the case with some industrial supply vendors 
(Remolona and Wulfekuhler). 
There have been many reasons cited for, or explanation of, vendor financing. For example, 
it may be that the firm is able to stimulate sales of its products through creative financing for 
customers who, in the absence of the vendor supplied financing, could not purchase the prodUcts. 
•For this practice to improve firm profits, it must be the case that the firm earns at least as much on 
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the additional product sales as the financing costs. Furthermore, the financing contracts must be 
designed to effectively attract additional sales, rather than simply substitute tor other financing (or 
cash) by current customers. Next, vendor financing may simply be used in attempts to solidify 
market share. Or, there may be real cost advantages conveyed to the vendor through reductions in 
information collection costs because much of this function is accomplished in the course of doing 
other business with the customer. Furthermore, in addition to shared delivery costs for point-of-sale 
financing, "scope" economies of providing financing along with the product may also come about 
because of reduced transactions costs on the part of the borrower.2 Or, the lending operation may 
serve as a direct profit center; or a means of accomplishing related diversification for risk 
management. Further, the bonding costs for the vendor may be lower than for a traditional lender. 
Hence, what may appear to be an unacceptable credit risk to a bank may be an acceptable credit 
risk to a vendor, because the borrower needs to maintain relationships with the supplier other than 
credit alone. Finally, as is argued later, the vendor may use credit terms to effectively offer different 
price schedules to segments of demand with differing elasticities to more perfectly discriminate 
according to Willingness and ability to pay. Thus, the credit function can be used to move toward a 
more monopolistic outcome, exploiting market power in the goods market and extracting more rents 
from the customers than would be the case under uniform pricing without credit. 
Other studies have addressed related issues such as the market valuation effect of forming 
a captive finance unit. Lewellen; Roberts and Viscione(b); and Dipchand, Roberts and Viscione 
each found that the formation of a captive finance company effectively increased the parent firm's 
total borrowing capacity. To the extent that this additional capacity is used, the effect may be to 
expropriate value from existing bondholders toward equity holders (Kim, McConnell, and 
Greenwood). Roberts and Viscione(a) also consider agency theory implications to the management 
of the financing function through the formation of a captive. They conclude that the separation of 
management and credit, but the joint contribution to one firm's performance, potentially reduces 
monitoring costs and improves overall performance. Staten, Gilley, and Umbeck indicate that 
indirect lending may reduce a bank's cost of screening potential borrowers. However, issues of the 
relative merits of the "two-desk" strategy versus formation of a captive are left largely unresolved. 
Finally Brennan, Maksimovic, and Zechner offer a theory of financial intermediation that indicates 
some conditions under which vendor financing improves the profitability of firms. Further, they 
derive "industrial organization" impacts (numbers of firms in equilibrium) and indirectly demonstrate 
that it may be optimal for only some firms with market power to offer financing to thereby "divide" 
the customers among differing firms depending on their relative demand elasticities. In other 
words, it may be optimal for one firm to service the less elastic demand at a high price and another 
firm to service the more elastic demand customers with credit and somehow share the cartel-like 
profits. 
As noted in the literature, classical economic models with no frictions, no market power, 
and no information asymmetries leave little room for strategic behavior among financial 
intermediaries. However, the purely competitive paradigms do not permit many of the interesting or 
realistic solutions. For example, firms with some market power may chose to cross-subsidize 
activities away from the activity that is somewhat insulated from the effects of perfect competition. 
Considering local supply firms. there is likely to be some proximity-conferred market power enabling 
a situation where price may be greater than marginal product cost and where cross-subsidization of 
the financing operation may be sustainable. Again, classic theories with perfect competition would 
prohibit cross-functional subsidies, as the primary activity would simply be "bid away" from the 
subsidizing firm. Hence, elements of imperfect competition, resulting in some market power (quasi­
monopoly supply) are important for much of the theory developed and presented below. 
• 
This "one-stop" shopping concept has also been imitated in the form of "two-desk" lending
 
operations where a bank or other traditional lender simply sets up a lending branch at the
 
point of sale (Staten, et. al).
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Framework to Evaluate Economic Motivations 
In order to better understand the motivations and practices that are observed in the market, 
an economic framework is needed. Below, a simple structure is presented that is then used to 
demonstrate expected outcomes in a simple Intermediation market when multiple players (such as 
pure intermediaries and vendor finance operations) are present. It is recognized that there are a 
myriad of situations involving competition among vendor finance operations and traditional lenders. 
Rather than attempting to depict various specific markets, several "boundary" cases are examined 
to impart structure to the entire market. A simple graphic will help illustrate this point. 
Figure 1 maps the competitive structure of the market (from pure monopoly, to pure 
competition) against the level of informational uncertainty about the borrower (from purely 
asymmetric where the borrower knows credit risks exactly and the lender cannot tell at all, to 
actuarially fair and exactly observable credit risk). Clearly there are other important features of the 
credit market that could be contrasted with the present two thereby increasing the dimension of the 
map. Some of these features are examined (i.e., collateral coverage rates) but are left off this 
figure for clarity. Two interesting extremes are identified in the graph. First, consider the perfect 
monopolist's case when exact information about the borrower is available (lower left). The 
monopolist can design price discriminating supply schedules to completely extract all the producer's 
surpluS in the system. At the top right, the credit market breaks down because the purely 
competitive nature of the industry means that in equilibrium the lenders will just break even and the 
asymmetric information situation means that at any interest rate, only borrowers who know 
themselves to be of higher risk than reflected in the interest rate will present themselves to the 
offer. Hence, the average risks presented by the borrowers will always be above the level reflected 
as actuarially fair in the interest rate (this situation is similar to the "Market for Lemons" problem 
described by Akerlof). However, there are still many other cases of interest. For example, with any 
level of market power, and hence the potential to cross-subsidize activities from the partially 
monopolistic activity to another, the amount by which a manufacturer would or should be willing to 
subsidize a lending operation is potentially positive. Further, the design of the sales offer (price 
and financing terms) should be such to exploit any self-identification motives present among the 
borrowers. These and a few related issues are addressed in tum. 
Market Structure Dimensions 
Perfect Co!IJ.Petition 
I 
I 
• 
Figure 1 
Pure Monopoly 
32
 
For ease of notation, the paper considers the number of $1 loans to be made in a "banker's 
discount" framework. That is, the loans are made such that the future value is one dollar, and the 
interest rate is the amount that needs to be charged to convert the current value to $1 in the future. 
This convention significantly simplifies the exposition that follows, but does not affect any result that 
does not depend on loan size. Figure 2 reinforces some of these concepts. 
Product and Lending Margins 
COF 
, 
o	 T 1 
1-----1 I I 
---- ..----"- '-v--'.. ---~-	 ~ 
.COP	 P m 
FIgUre 2 
In Figure 2, the following are used: 
T price of product0: 
COF = total cost of funds to acquire product sold 
COP cost of production0: 
m = lending margin = (1-T) 
P manufacturing margin0: 
The purely competitive interest rate mJst be m/(1-m), and for simplicity, this rate is 
assumed to exactly offset additional expenses such that the net economic rents to pure lenders are 
zero. The lenders are assumed to access a perfectly elastic supply of funds at COF sufficient to 
finance all borrowers in the market. In this framework COF is the total cost of acquiring the 
resources that are transferred to the borrower. It is convenient to think of the lender simply buying 
the input at price T and giving it to the borrower in return for $1 promised future payment. Again, 
the problem has been placed on this scale for later convenience; and this scaling should not affect 
any important interpretations. 
In what follows, three cases are examined in which banks' and vendor finance units' 
behavior depend on the competitive structure of their businesses and on varying abilities to discern 
credit risks. Implications are drawn from the models that can then be compared and contrasted 
with observations to both validate the structure of the model and improve understanding of the 
observed behavior. Following these, some summary empirical evidence is provided from one such 
vendor finance operation. Finally, conclusions and summary remarks are given. 
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Case 1: Some market power in the product market; purely competitive lending environment; 
perfectly identifiable credit risks. 
In this first ~ase, assume that the borrowers have been correctly and precisely classified 
and ranked such that the individual (marginal) probability of default can be exactly identified. For 
exposition sake, the borrowers are sorted with the resulting marginal default function as O(n) shown 
in Figure 3. A lender faced with such blissful knowledge will lend to the point that the marginal 
return from lending is equal to the marginal cost. The lender's total profit 1t, as a function of the 
number of loans, n, is: 
n n 
(1)1t(n) • m(n-fO(k)dk)-cfO(k)dk*(1-m) 
o 0 
where c is the "collateral loss rate", 0<c<1. lt can be thought of as 1 less the proportion of principal 
collateralized. Hence, if c =1, there is no collateral coverage and defaulted payments are full 
losses. If c =O. then there is full collateral on principal value and there is no additional loss from 
default other than unearned margins. Equation (1) indicates that the profit is equal to the number 
of nondefaulted loans times the margin earned per loan less the total number of defaulted loans 
times the principal value as adjusted for collateral recovery. The profit maximizing lender will lend 
to the point that d1tIdn =0 or: 
cht =m(1-0(n» -c(1-m)0(n) =0 (2) 
dn 
which holds at O(n") =ml{c(1-m)+m). Notice that if there is no collateral (c=1), the lender will lend 
until the marginal default rate is equal to the margin earned on each unit. In the case of partial 
recoveries, 0<c<1, n" =0-1(mI{c(1-m)+m)). In these circumstances, the lender will lend to even 
riskier borrowers, as expected. Because O(n) is monotonically increasing in n, dO(n)/dn is 
everywhere positive and therefor e dn"/dc takes on the same sign as dO(n")/dc. It is easily shown 
2that dO(no)/dc <0 if m - m <0 (as is the case for m<1 in this example) implying that more collateral 
coverage permits lending to riskier customers. A vendor finance company may very well be better 
able to deal with specialized collateral than a traditional lender thereby reducing the value of c 
relative to a traditional lender who recovers the same item as security. For example, a John Oeere 
dealership may be better able to dispose of a repossessed tractor than a local bank; hence the 
vendor finance unit of John Oeere should be able to make loans to some riskier borrowers than the 
bank because of its lower implied c. 
Perfectly Identified Credit Risks 
D(n) 
D(n) 
• 
Number of Loans 
Figure 3 
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The impact of additional product margin in addition to the lending margin can also be easily 
established by considering the product margin to simply increase the lending margin to the total 
margin, (m+p). as in Figure 2. From equation (2) above, it is easily confirmed that dno/dm >0, 
hence, the vendor finance operation if viewed simply as a financing operatiorr will always optimally 
lend to more risky borrowers than the traditional lender if there is any market power which permits 
T to exceed COP. 
It is instructive to work out similar conditions for the vendor finance unit to highlight the 
interaction between the product margin, lending margin, and collateral coverage rate. For the 
manufacturer with a vendor finance program, the profit function becomes: 
" " (3)n(n) '" (m+p)(n-fD(k)dk)-CfD(k)dk*(1-m-p) 
o 0 
Again setting d1tldn = 0 and solving implies that O(no) = (m+p)/(m+p+c-cm-cp) which is everywhere 
greater than rnI(c(1-m)+m] (and also greater than m) in the relevant cases 0<c<1, and (m+p)<1. 
This result shows that the vendor finance unit will again finance more risky borrowers than the 
lender in the purely competitive banking-only business. Again notice that if c=O, the firm will lend 
to everyone (always earning p, whether through payment or sale of collateral) and if c=1, the 
vendor will lend until the marginal default rate equals the combined product and lending margin. 
The optimal level of lending can be found at nO=O-'((m+p)/(m+p+c-cm-cp)). The sign of dno/dc <0 
again as expected, indicates that the lender with the higher valued or less costly to dispose 
collateral will find lending more profitable to any given borrower and will in equilibrium lend to more 
borrowers. 
Case 2: Perfectly competitive banking system; borrowers risk-elassified according to distribution on 
returns; both lenders competing for market share; vendor sets price T and interest rate, rv 
separately from bank. 
Consider the next case where there are two classes of borrowers, rich-low risk, and poor­
high risk; and those with some potential to default have insufficient cash to buy outright and hence 
require financing if they are to use the product at all. Further, the only collateral pledged is the 
return on the product itself. Hence, it is convenient to view both the product ang the loan as lasting 
only one period (Le., seed, chemicals, etc.) and generating an uncertain return, F,l.over that period. 
·In contrast to the previous case which considered only the financing decision for the class 
of purchasers who use credit, the situation now admits the possibility of using credit to discriminate 
among borrowers according to their risk class while selling some product for cash as well. Again, 
the risk of default is observable among potential customers, but that default risk is now captured in 
the form of a distribution of returns that each individual farmer face~. Presume that there are 
some number N, of rich farmers each of whose retums distribution, I;\is sufficient that there is no 
possibility of default. The competitive banking system will be forced to "break even" on this class 
or borrowers again implying an interest rate of (m/(1-m)) to this class of borrowers. Next, consider 
one of the Np "poor" farmers whose retums distribution ~includes some outcomes less than 1 or 
T(1+r), in which case he/she would default on the loan and simply turn over the realized returns to 
the lender.4 Before the returns are realized, the farmer knows the distribution, but not the actual, 
or realized level (this situation may very well corresponds closely to the realities of farming). 
• 
3	 In other words, the internal transfer of the product to the lending operation takes place at a 
price of COP, hence all returns accrue to the intermediation function alone. 
4	 The value of scaling the problem to number of $1 loans should now be more apparent as it 
simplifies the computation of probability weighted retums as the fraction of $1 is now also 
equivalent to the "return". 
5 
35 
It will also be convenient to utilize two other measures h+j k and hOi kwhich correspond to the 
conditional expectation for a variable i over the domain that the variable is greater or les~s than k 
respectively, scaled for the proba!;>i1~y of meeting that condition. For example, s!:lppose ~takes on 
values from F\,;n to Rmu. Then E[~ I~>k] =Q"4(f\,)RpdRJI[1-F(k)] =h\"k' and E[~ I~ <k] =Lt 
f(f\,)RpdRp]/[F(k)] = h'FIo,k' where f(.) is the probability density function, and F(.) is the cumulative 
distribution function. Note that [1-F(k)]*h+FIo,k + [F(k)]*h'FIo,k = E(Rp) by definition. Further, h+Flo, Am. = h­
FIo,R_ =E(f\,) as well. These measures are closely related to the incomplete expectation frequently 
used in the insurance literature, but differ by the weighted value of the variable beyond the 
boundary k. The incomplete expectation, IER,k is defined as 1.t.{f\,)RpdRJ + k*[1-F(k)]. These 
measures are useful in describing expected values of positions that are contingent or dependent 
upon the outcomes of other variables. For example, the lender may wish to compute expected 
values of loan positions recognizing that if the borrower eams more than the debt obligation, they 
will simply pay the face value; but under default, there is some distribution of recovery values. 
Hence, the expected value of the total loan position contingent on eamings R, is the face value 
(FV) times the probability of being paid that amount plus h-R,FV * F(FV) which is the expected value 
of payments on R given that they are less than FV. 
In this framework. "k" is the point that determines default corresponding to outcomes less 
than the future loan payment. T(1 H y). If the fanner earns more than enough to pay back the loan. 
then he/she will simply pay the lender and keep the difference. If, on the other hand, the returns 
do not meet the debt obligation, the farmer simply turns over the realized proceeds and terminates 
the debt through partial default. A bank lending to this class of farmers will be forced to add a risk 
premium to the interest rate in an amount to compensate for the average losses on defaulted loans 
to break even. This rate can be found as the rate rb, that is the solution to:5 
(4) 
It is apparent that if T(1 H) < Rp,min there is no chance of default and even the "riskier" 
farmers are "risk-free" in terms of lending. On the other hand, if T(1 +r) > Rp,mu then no farmer will 
be able to purchase the input. However, if Rp,mu > T(1 +r) > f\"min' there is some possibility that 
there will be a price-interest rate combination attractive to both the farmer and the vendor. 
Suppose the vendor offers financing at rate ry which is positive, but less than the "default adjusted" 
rate banks are required to charge to breakeven on the high risk class of borrowers. The vendor's 
problem is now to maximize profits over the joint choice" of T and ry • 
To see this, consider the average "loss" on defaulted loans, or T(1+rb)-h-R,T{l+r) and since 
only the fraction F(T(1 +rb)) default, the remaining loans must generate enough additional 
margin that the sum of the returns on defaulted and nondefaulted loans returns to 1. A 
discrete example will help illustrate. Suppose R is distributed uniformly on the interval 
(0,3). Then, by definition, f(R) = 1/3, F(k) =k/3, h-Rk =k/2, and [1-F(k)] = (k-3)/3. The 
choice of the interest rate, rbcan be made such that the incomplete expectation over R is 1. 
Hence, h-R,T(1+r/F(T(1+rb))+T(1+rb)*[1-F(t(1+rb))] = 1; or the average payoff in default times 
the probability of default plus the face value times the probability of nondefault equals the 
competitive rate of return, or 1. Solving for (T(1+rb)) in the discrete example given above 
implies that T(1+rb) = (3-31~ or approximately 1.2679. A fairly good first order 
approximation is to notice that from the competitive interest rate, returns below 1 will default 
and on average return 1/2 in that state. The remaining 2/3 of the loans must generate the 
additional margin or the losses (1-(1/2)(113)) must be "spread" over 2/3 of the loans. 
Hence, (1-(1/2)(1/3))/(2/3) = 1.25. The difference is due to the fact that the approximation 
ignores the fact that the slightly higher interest rate also marginally increases the likelihood 
of default. 
-
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Before turning directly to that issue, it is first important to understand the farmer's decision 
framework. As depicted in Figure 4, the cr~dit customer receives inputs worth +T and then at the 
.end of the production cycle either receives ~> T(1+ry ) and pays off the loan worth T(1+ry ) or earns 
~ < T(1 +ry ) and simply surrenders that return as payment on the debt. Although the relative 
probabilities (Iabele.d (Pl. and (t-p)) of the two types of return outcomes delineated at T(1+ry ) are 
simply the integrals of f(f;1) split at (T(1+ry )), the relative weights in the "upstate" and "downstate" 
are immaterial as the sign of the expected value of the sum of the two outcomes depends only on 
whether the expression on the top line in the figure is positive (and, hence the expected value of 
the two outcomes will be positive for any p>0 because the other component will equal 0)6. Under 
this scenario, the farmer will accept and fully finance inputs T any price less than F\.max so long as 
there is no equity commitment and no additional costs of default. However, under the more usual 
arrangement of partial financing (positive equity commitment), and other costs of default (such as 
reputation damage and the like), additional constraints are imposed on the farmer's behavior. For 
convenience, it is assumed that the farmers are only willing to finance if the expected returns on 
their purchase at T increase their expected return on equity. Hence, the inputs are accepted only 
in cases where the leverage is expected to have a positive boost to return on equity. Finally, the 
lender is also expected to have some control over the extreme-risk borrower and exclude those for 
whom there is no possible solution to the risk-premium-equation (4) above. The details of the 
mechanisms are not important at this point, only there are no "free" options to default, and some 
level of improvement by the farmer (i.e., an increase in expected returns) is expected from the use 
of the input. 
Farmer's Decision Framework 
[E(R p)+h +] -T(l+r.) 
(E(R p)-h-] - [E(Rp)-h-] 
+T 
. Figure 4 
The operational convenience this affords is that, because the decision does not depend on 
relative probabilities of outcomes, we may proceed as though the farmers are risk-neutral • 
and prices will, in equilibrium return to their expected values (see Ingersoll). Risk neutral 
pricing is not necessary, but convenient in that we do not need to understand the differing 
risk attitudes among the farmers, and instead can assume purchase will occur if expected 
returns are positive. Again, it does not mean we are unconcerned with risk, it simply 
means that the risk-neutral solution has a unique parallel under risk. 
6 
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Returning to the issue of jointly determining T and r to maximize profits for the vendor,v 
assume that the representative returns distributions for poor and rich farmers are as shown in 
Figure 5. Then, it is clear that an interest rate adjusted for default will deter the rich farmers from 
purchasing on credit as they will instead use cash. However, the poor farmers who do not have 
sufficient cash will still find it to their advantage to purchase on credit if: 
(5) 
implying that they are "better off" with the input. Hence. one strategy for the vendor finance unit to 
employ would be to set the highest price consistent with purchase by both classes of farmers and 
charge an interest rate that is as high as possible that permits purchase by poor farmers. The 
positive level of interest rates and the risk premium will deter the rich farmers from financing; and 
the interest rate is as high as possible to be consistent with purchase by poor farmers. 
Returns Distributions 
Self-SelectiDg OIltcome 
FIgUre 5 
Setting T .. E[R,] extracts all the rents possible from the rich farmers; and solving for the 
maximum rO consistent with the decision framework (equation (5)) of the poor farmer implies rOv " v [(E(Rp)+ h+R".T(l+,))1T - 1]. The vendor's profit in this case is n ... N,(E[R,]-COP) + Np(E[RJ-COP).7 
Comparing this to the maximum profit to the vendor with no financing where n ... (N,+Np}{E[RJ­
COP) .. N,(E[RJ-COP) + Np(E[RJ-COP, it is apparent that the vendor earns more from 
implementing its own vendor finance operation than from relying on external financing of its 
To see this, consider the discrete analog case where one half of the poor borrowers default 
and one half payoff the loan at the "default" adjusted interest rate. It is then easily shown 
that the expected value of the payments from the poor group equals the expected value of 
the returns because the interest rate was chosen to exactly offset losses from the defaulting 
group with gains from those who do not. Algebraically. total expected profits in this case 
are equal to: E(n) ... N,(E[R,]-COP) + (P(f\>T(1 H)))*Nil{[(1 HOv)T]-90P} + (P(f\<T(1H)))*Np{{E(RJ-h·I\,Tll+'))-COP}. Substituting r v" [(E(Rp) + h\T(l+,))IT· 1] and 
recognizing that (P(Rp<T(1 H))) +(P(f\>T(1 H))) .. 1 gives the stated result. 
-
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purchasers.s Importantly, the banks will be unable to compete for the financing of the poor farmer 
purchases because the rate of return on the lending operation is actually negative. To see this, 
notice that the vendor nominally lent to the poor borrowers an amount in total equal to N/T and 
received only Np(E[RJ). Substituting E[R,J II: T implies a rate of return to lending equal to 
{{E[RJlE[R,D-1} < O. Hence, the traditional lenders will neither want nor be able to compete for this 
business, and the rich farmers will "self-select" cash due to the positive additional interest rate. The 
vendor has thus been able to extract all the economic rents from the rich farmers by judiciously 
setting price, and has been able to extract additional manufacturing margin from the additional 
sales to the poor farmers. Further implications of the model remain consistent with the earlier 
section in that the expected average credit quality is less than in cases without vender 
intermediation, and that the manufacturing margin positively affects the amount of lending 
undertaken. Even in cases where E(R,»E(Rp)+h+, the vendor may find it advantageous to 
"subsidize" poor borrowers with a negative effective interest rate, if they can effectively exclude the 
rich farmers from taking advantage of the negative interest rate.s 
Case 3. Some Self-Selection; incentive alignment motives; and information revelation. 
In contrast to the previous cases, suppose that each farmer, i, has a returns distribution 
that is known to him/her (i.e. they know the likelihood and extent to which their outcomes may 
deviate from that which is expected), but this information is unobservable to the lenders. Further, 
before the uncertainty is resolved (i:e., before the production cycle), the farmer will pay cash for a 
product if T<E(Rj) and will finance it if the contract (price and interest rate) permits an increase in 
the expected value over T for the equity committed. In other words. the expected rate of return is 
higher than the cost of debt, so any degree of leverage is preferred.lO 
Although the lenders are unable to determine the individual's riskiness, assume that the 
"distribution of riskiness" is at least known. The lender may attempt to set an interest rate such that 
T(1 +r)<E[RJ+i where 'Y. is the critical level below which farmers will have no incentive to finance 
and above which the remaining farmers will generate more product margin than they cost in default 
expenses. However, if this is all the structure imposed on the problem, the credit market can break 
down if farmers fUlly self-select. This breakdown occurs if there is no solution to the following two 
equations. 
8	 The highest price that can be set to sell to both groups of farmers and rely on external 
financing is to set the price equal to E[RJ. Then, both groups purchase and the banks just 
break even on the financing of the poor farmer's purchases. Brennan points out that in 
some cases (i.e., if there are relatively few poor farmers) it would be more profitable to sell 
only to the rich farmers at a higher price. However, this condition is already precluded in 
cases where ~+h+>R" as we have assumed, because that case permits charging the rich 
farmers the highest price they can pay already. However, the possibility that it would be 
more profitable to restrict sales only to rich farmers should be pointed out for logical 
completeness. 
S	 Price discrimination (in its legal forms) exploits the relative elasticities of segments of 
demand. Much as a phone company may be able to charge the less elastic business users 
higher rates during typical business hours, the vendor may be able to reduce its rates to 
• 
poor farmers through a creative interest rate program that somehow screens out rich 
farmers. 
10	 Using earlier notation, this is equivalent to accepting an option to default and an expected 
return equal to (p){E(R)+h+R.,T(l+r)-T(1 +r)}. 
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and, 
T(1 +'")<E[R)+Y 
[E(T(1 +'")IR>(T(1 +'"))]+E[R1R<T(1 +'")]]-T>O 
(6) 
(7) 
Equation (6) simply insures that farmers will buy and finance product at price T. The first 
term in equation (7) reduces to the probability that the return is sufficient to pay the loan times the 
loan payment; the second term adds the payoffs in cases where there are shortfalls; and then the 
principal lent is subtracted. The feasibility of the solution depends upon the distribution of returns, 
but it is easy to construct cases where there is no solution. 
Cases where there are no solutions are again similar to the "Market for Lemons" problem 
popularized by Akerlof. The analogy is that at any rate, r, only customers whose risk adjusted 
interest rate (that they know from private information) should be higher than r will present 
themselves to the market. Hence, at a rate r, the pool of potential borrowers will possess higher 
risks than reflected in rate r, hence, to service that pool, a higher r is needed, but at that rate, only 
the portion that are still favorably misclassified will remain in the pool; and so on until there are no 
applicants left because the only rate at which the average borrower's risk will not exceed the 
offered rate is when the rate is higher than would correspond to the riskiest borrower. But, the 
vendor sponsored finance, while not guaranteed to be feasible, at least has a higher chance of 
obtaining so long as there are positive manufacturing margins that are fungible with the lending 
margins. In other words, if the manufacturing unit "sells" the product to the lending unit at an 
internal transfer price that results in a profitable financing operation, there remains some possibility 
of a functioning credit market that effectively discriminates by borrower characteristics. 
A further possibility is that the different lenders have differing abilities to assess the risks of 
the borrowers, hence further polarizing the activities toward lending to higher risk borrowers with a 
better ability to distinguish risks. The obvious outcome is that the lender is better able to extract 
the farmer's rents if the risk assessment is more accurate (and hence fewer profitable borrowers 
are excluded more unprofitable borrowers are excluded). 
Also, it remains likely in this case as well that the same borrower is of different risk to the 
different lenders because of different bonding costs due to other relationships the customer has 
with the input supplier. Further, the likelihood that the vendor would be better able to dispose of 
specialized collateral than a traditional lender again favors the vendor. 
Empirical Evidence 
To date, the evidence collected directly from these types of vendor finance operations is 
broadly consistent with the theory. Operational differences make direct observation of an isolated 
lending function difficult. But on balance, the theory suggests that the vendor's portfolio of loans 
should be riskier than that of a bank, and yet that the performance should reflect losses that are 
subsidized at least partly by manufacturing margins. 
A few summary measures are presented from Growmark's F.S. Credit (FS) program as 
"case" evidence of one of the (apparently well run) vendor finance programs serving agriculture. 
These measures are given in terms of performance ratios and the like rather than in absolute • 
numbers both to partially protect information and to make the comparisons to other sized 
institutions more apparent. 
First, consider the composition of the loan portfolio. An examination of the distribution of 
the debt to equity and debt to asset ratios at application gives a coarse measure of the riskiness of 
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the borrowers. As shown in Figure 6, a significant portion of the portfolio (perhaps as high as 20 
percent according to a Farm Credn System employee) is represented by loans that probably would 
not have been made by banks or the Farm Credn System. 
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Figure 6 
Corresponding to those crude measures of risk at application are measures of performance 
in the portfolio. Figure 7 shows the loan loss experience of FS compared to banks of various size 
over various recent calendar quarters. It is important to note that the bank numbers are averages 
over a large number of instnutions that fall into the various size categories and the FS numbers are 
from one institution. Also, the sample periods available were not identical, yet the overlapping 
sample periods give some indication of the correspondence. The rates are left in quarterly 
measures (not annualized) to highlight the seasonal nature of the vender operation. To get annual 
equivalents, one would simply combine any four adjacent quarters. Given the types of loans in the 
portfolio, the loss levels may actually be quite low. Further, the accounting convention used at FS 
is highly conservative and quickly moves defaults to a loss category, even though prospects for 
recovery may be quite good. In fact, judging by the past seven years, the pattern suggests that the 
losses could be largely recovered in Mure periods. 
A couple of profitability measures are of interest as well. As shown in Figure 8, the 
quarterly ROA performance is highly variable and has obvious seasonality. The ROA compares 
quite well with the bank counterparts, but the operation is leveraged less than a typical bank 
thereby mitigating some of the benefit to ROE, as can be seen in Figure 9. 
Again, it is difficult to get a ·clean· read of these issues because the sharing of resources 
with local delivery points and the allocations of shared costs with the parent company make 
individual measure of performance difficult to determine. For example, in one major equipment 
manufacturer's operations, the marketing department pays for many interest rate incentives • 
programs, and even some of the default costs to the lending operation. This practice is probably 
appropriate for two reasons. First, the interest rate incentives are probably true marketing tools, 
and the higher quality loans (in essence, partially guaranteed by the marketing department) help 
maintain the company's low funding costs. Further, it is expected that loans that seem like bad 
risks to a traditional lender would perform a bit better than expected in the traditional lender's 
41 
portfolio reflecting the improved bonding that the other relationships provide. This performance 
may also reflect differing abilities to screen applicants. and perhaps reflect better effective collateral 
positions as well. 
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Summary and Concluding Remarks 
A simple model of vendor financing was constructed that demonstrated some behavioral 
differences between a bank and a vendor finance unit. It was shown that the "optimal" risk level up 
to which to lend was positively related to the total margin and negatively related to "c", a measure 
of collateral loss rate. In cases where there is some market power, credit can be used to segment 
the demand and effectively offer different price schedules to segments with differing demands. 
Further, the banks have no incentive to compete for this business since the rate of return on a 
lending program that would compete with the vendor would actually be negative. However, total 
profits for the vendor firm go up because of the positive manufacturing margins eamed on 
incremental sales. In cases where the risks of the individual borrowers were not exactly 
identifiable, it was argued that the vendor still has advantages if they held superior knOWledge, had 
reduced bonding costs, or improved collateral or security disposition rates. Further, summary 
evidence from one vendor finance operation is largely consistent with the theory, except that the 
performance is perhaps a bit better than expected. 
Several industrial organization questions remain. For example, why should the vendor 
become its own parallel lender rather than simply subsidize the banks for making poorer quality 
Ioans?" Further, given the virtual equivalence between negative lending margins and a reduction 
in production margin captured, there must be some level of market power for the subsidizing activity 
to remain. As mentioned, local suppliers may have sufficiently isolated markets that other firms 
cannot compete in the primary product lines by supplying to the rich fanners alone at lower prices. 
Hence, the existence of some market power may result in segmented pricing schedules; the 
existence of which raises other welfare question. These issues, and ancillary investigations such 
as the impact on total debt supplied deserve fuller attention in the future as well. 
• 
In fact, each of the "Big Three" automakers' captive finance units have at one time in 
history made that offer to banks (Andrews; Brennan). 
11 
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EXPLAINING FARMLAND PRICE DYNAMICS 
Madhab R. Khoju and Bruce L. Ahrendsen1 
Abstract 
The relationship between farmland price and cash rent is examined in this paper.
 
Cointegration and error correction models are applied to Arkansas farmland prices and
 
cash rents for the period 1922 through 1992. Results show that Arkansas farmland
 
prices and cash rents are cointegrated of order one. Thus a long-run relationship
 
between farmland price and cash rent and the present value model for asset valuation
 
are supported. The error correction model is used to better explain the short-run
 
adjustments in farmland prices. Cash rents are found to cause farmland prices.
 
Although the cointegration results are consistent with some studies, the results are
 
inconsistent with other studies. The particular reasons for the different results among
 
studies should be identified in the future.
 
The average per acre farmland price in the United States increased at an average annual rate 
of 13.5 percent from 1971 to 1981. However, by 1987. farmland prices fell by more than a third from 
their 1981 peak. In inflation adjusted terms, the price of farmland declined by 55.9 percent from 1981 
to 1987. Since farmland constitutes the largest share of assets for the majority of farmers, farmers' net 
worth and, therefore. their financial security are sensitive to farmland price dynamics. Moreover, since 
farmland is often mortgaged as collateral to secure loans, the safety of these loans and, therefore, the 
financial condition of the lending agencies are also dependent on farmland price dynamics. 
Accordingly. the appreciation of farmland prices in the 1970's contributed to the financial prosperity of 
both farmers and lenders while the depreciation of the 1980's had the opposite effect. As a result, a 
better understanding of farmland price dynamics has been a topic of widespread research interest. 
This paper investigates the appropriateness of the cointegration and error correction models in explain­
ing Arkansas farmland price dynamics. 
A brief discussion on the time series properties of farmland prices from previous studies is 
given in the next section. Then cointegration and error correction models for farmland prices and cash 
rents are presented. The model presentations are followed by a description of the data. Next, the 
results from the estimated cointegration and error correction models are presented and analyzed. 
Finally, concluding comments are offered. 
'"Ime Series Properties of Farmland Prices 
Different explanations for the rise and fall of farmland prices include changes in risk (Barry), 
changes in nonfarmland returns to land (Robison, Lins. and Venkataraman), changes in net rents 
(Alston; Burt), capital gains (Melicher; Klinefelter; Castle and Hoch), inflation rates and changes in real 
returns on alternative uses of capital (Just and Miranowski); credit market constraints and imperfections 
(Shalit and Schmitz), interaction of inflation and tax laws (Feldstein) and overreaction to changes in net 
rents (Featherstone and Baker). The basic framework for the majority of these studies is based on the 
present value model of asset prices. 
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Following the present value model, farmland price equals the discounted value of the future 
stream of net rents from the land (Burt; Featherstone and Baker; Alston). Moreover, for a constant 
discount rate, there is a long-run relationship between the equilibrium farmland price and net rent (Burt; 
Tegene and Kuchler). A change in land price, therefore, should arise from a change in expected net 
rents to land. Net rent expectations, however, are influenced by many factors like input and output 
prices, mortgage rates, discount rates, supply of land, technological change, etc. Since these factors 
are difficult to forecast, rent formation expectations of the buyers and sellers of land result in short run 
dynamic adjustments to land valuation. As information about future rents becomes available, rent 
expectations are updated which in turn affect the farmland value. Burt used a second-order rational 
distributed lag on net crop-share rents received by landlords to capture the dynamic movement of 
prices. 
Engle and Granger used the cointegration techniques to study the long-run relationship 
between consumption expenditures and income, wages and prices, and short and long term interest 
rates. They also used the error correction representation to represent the short-run dynamics. 
Accordingly, the cointegration technique also seems appropriate to study long-run relationships between 
farmland prices and rents while the error correction representation is appropriate to study the short-run 
dynamics of farmland prices. Cointegration, however, requires that each of the two series must be 
integrated of the same order and their linear combination yield a stationary series. Furthermore, 
Campbell and Shiller have shown that if rents are integratecf of order one and farmland prices evolve 
according to the present value model then it is necessary that farmland prices must also be integrated 
of order one. 
Tegene and Kuchler applied the cointegration technique and error correction representation to 
explain the movement of farmland prices in the U.S. Corn Belt (Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri and 
Ohio). They found that both farmland prices and rents were integrated of order one and were also 
cointegrated implying a long-run relationship between farmland values and rents. They also claim that 
the error correction model provides more efficient parameter estimates of the dynamics involved than 
the usual distributed lag models. 
Tegene and Kuchler's results are based on the aggregate farmland prices and net rents 
(weighted by the state acreage) for the U.S. corn belt. Sherrick, Tirupattur, and Monke, however, argue 
that if the farmland prices themselves are not cointegrated across the states, their aggregation may 
cause "canceling out" effects and the loss of important state specific information. Accordingly, Sherrick 
et aI., evaluated the time series properties of farmland prices from 1950 to 1990 for each of the eight 
states - Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, Ohio, Minnesota, Nebraska and Wisconsin. They conclude that 
the farmland prices are stationary in levels for Illinois, Indiana and Iowa while their first differences are 
stationary for other states. Thus the existence of different time series properties across the states has 
made the use of aggregated data (Tegene and Kuchler) questionable. Falk, on the other hand, found 
that annual farmland price and cash rent time series data for Iowa from 1921 to 1986 were each first 
difference stationary. Similar investigation for three other sets of data - U.S. data from 1910 to 1990, 
U.S. data from 1950 to 1990, and Illinois data from 1950 to 1990 - however, produced different results 
(Clark, Fulton, and Scott). For Illinois and U.S. data (1950 - 1990), land values are integrated of order 
two while land rents are integrated of order one. In contrast, for U.S. data (1910 - 1990), land values 
are integrated of order one and the land rents are integrated of order zero. These findings are similar 
to those reported by Baffes and Chambers. As a result, Clark et aI., conclude that the present value 
formulation of farmland values is not appropriate. 
The time series properties of farmland prices and rents seem to be sensitive to the particular 
•time series studied, geographic location and level of aggregation. For example, Illinois and Iowa are 
A farmland price time series with no deterministic component that .has a stationary, 
invertible, ARIMA representation after differencing d times is said to be integrated of 
order d. 
2 
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adjoining states that are part of the U.S. corn belt and, therefore, have similar land use patterns. 
However, the time series properties of farmland prices and rents are different. Furthermore, the 
application of cointegration techniques requires that both farmland price and rent be integrated of the 
same order. This paper investigates the appropriateness of the cointegration and error correction 
models in explaining Arkansas farmland price dynamics. 
Theoretical Framework 
The tests of cointegration have been used to establish the existence of long-run relationships 
between economic variables (Davidson, Hendry, Slba, and Yeo). The theory of cointegration states 
that if farmland prices, p., and rents, F\, are integrated of the same order, d, then they are said to be 
cointegrated if their linear combination produces a stationary series (Engle and Granger). The linear 
combination of farmland prices and rents is represented by 
(1 ) 
Accordingly, if u. is a stationary series then p. and F\ are cointegrated and the relation p. = ex + 
~F\ is considered the long-run relationship between the two variables (Engle and Granger). u. is the 
deviation from the long-run equilibrium and is interpreted as the rational forecast of the present value of 
all future changes in net rents (Falk). 
The test of cointegration involves a stationarity test of each of the series separately. Dickey­
Fuller unit root tests are appropriate for the stationarity tests and the standard procedure has been to 
first test for the unit root in the series levels. If the hypothesis of the presence of a unit root is not 
rejected, the first difference series is tested for the presence of a second root and so on. Since the 
Dickey-FUller tests are based on at most one unit root, at least the first few tests in this sequence 
would not be theoretically justified if the series had more than one unit root (Sen). As a result, Dickey 
and Pantula have suggested a different order for pertorming tests. One should start with the largest 
order of integration (suppose k) and work down, i.e., decrease k by one each time the null hypothesis is 
rejected. Once the null hypothesis is not rejected, the testing procedure stops (Dickey and Pantula). 
If p. and F\ are integrated of order one then the cointegration between these two variables is 
tested by estimating the following OLS regression (cointegrating regression) 
(2) 
If p. and F\ are not cointegrated, any linear combination of them will be nonstationary, and hence the 
residuals will be nonstationary. Accordingly, the null hypothesis of no-cointegration is that u. is 
nonstationary. 
The test of the hypothesis that u. is nonstationary can be done in two ways. First, the test can 
be performed using the Durbin-Watson statistic (OW) from the cointegrating regression. If U. is a 
random walk, the expected value of (u. . U\.l) is zero, so the OW should be close to zero. Thus one can 
simply test the hypothesis that OW is equal to zero. If the calculated OW is greater than the critical 
value (Engle and Granger, Table II) the hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected in favor of 
cointegration. 
The second test, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, however, is recommended by Engle 
and Granger based on the stability of critical values and power considerations. The ADF test involves 
running the following regression: ­
n 
~u. = S U\.l + . 1: 9~UI.i + v. (3) 
1=1 
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where ~ is the residual series from the OLS regression of P, on R.. The order of n for the lagged terms 
is chosen such that the residual series, VI' is white noise. The null hypothesis of no cointegration 
between P, and R. is rejected if B is negative and significantly different from zero. For the ADF test, the 
ratio of the estimated Bto its estimated standard error from the OLS regression is compared to the 
critical values of t in Fuller. Choice of the critical value, however, depends on whether the estimated 
model has an intercept and/or a linear trend. 
If P, and R. are both integrated of order one without trends in the mean and are cointegrated 
then there exists an error correction model that is free from 'spurious regression' (Granger and 
Newbold). These error correction models (Engle and Granger) are presented in (4) and (5): 
n n 
~PI = -p, uPt_1 + . 1: Tl~Pt.i + . 1: 'Y~R.-i + ePt (4)1=1 1=1 
n n 
~R. = -P2 uRl.I + . 1: 9~Pt.i + . 1: ~R.-i + eRl (5)1=1 1=1 
Engle and Granger suggest a two step estimation procedure for estimating the error correction 
model. In the first step the parameters of the cointegrating regression are estimated, and in the second 
step the residuals from the cointegrating regression are entered in the error correction model. Both 
steps require only single equation least squares and they are consistent for all parameters. Moreover, 
because in a bivariate cointegration, there must be causality in at least one direction, a significant 
coefficient for the error correcting term implies the direction of Granger causality. Therefore. 
incorporation of the error correcting term should contribute to improved forecast of at least one of the 
variables. 
The literature indicates that different studies of the same relationship, which use different 
methods of testing. often report causality results that are not in conformity with one another (Hsiao; 
Jacobs, Leamer, and Ward). Such conclusions suggest that different methods of causality testing 
should be applied to the same data set. Accordingly, besides the causality implied by the error 
correcting term, the methods utilized by Granger (1969) and Sims are also used to examine the 
causality between farmland prices and rents. 
Granger's notion of causality states that Rt causes Pt if the past lagged values of Rt can be 
used to predict PI more accurately than merely by using the past lagged values of P" For Granger's 
causalitY. estimation of the following linear models is needed: 
p. = f(Past lags of R., Past lags of PI) (6) 
R. =f(Past lags of PI' Past lags of R.) (7) 
A unidirectional causality from R. to p. requires that all the coefficients of the past lags of R, be 
jointly different from zero in (6) and that all the coefficients of past lags of p. be jointly equal to zero in 
(7). 
Sims's method, on the other hand, involves regressing farmland prices on past, current and 
future values of rent and vice versa: 
• 
p. = f(current value of R" past lags of R" future lags of R,) (8) 
R, = f(current value of p•• past lags of p., future lags of P,) (9) 
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Sims has shown that in a regression of Pion past, current and future values of F\, the null hypothesis 
of no causality from PI to F\ is equivalent to all the coefficients of the future values of RI being equal to 
zero. Thus Sims' method tests the null hypothesis that all the coefficients for future lags in (8) and (9) 
are zero. 
Data 
Farmland prices and cash rents from 1921 through 1992 for Arkansas are deflated to real terms 
and used in this study. Because the tenant agrees to pay a prespecified amount and bears all the risk 
from farming, cash rent is preferred to share lease as a measure of the net benefit of owning land. 
Moreover, cash rents have been found to predict land price changes more accurately than other 
measures of returns from land (Burt; Tweeten). The data from 1921 through 1959 are based on 
unpublished USDA data and the data from 1960 through 1988 from Jones and Hexem. The data from 
1989 through 1992 are pUblished in USDA, Agricultural Resources: Agricultural Land Values Situation 
and Outlook Summary. 
The surveys on which farmland prices and cash rents are based are obtained at the beginning 
of the year. As a result, these nominal figures are expected to lag the general price level. The nominal 
farmland price and cash rent in year t, therefore, were deflated by dividing by the personal consumption 
expenditure component (PCE) of the GNP deflator in year t-1 to arrive at data in real terms. 
Tests and Results 
A necessary condition for the cointegration between farmland prices and rents is that each of 
the series must be integrated of the same order. Accordingly, Dickey-Fuller tests were performed 
following the sequential procedure recommended by Dickey and Pantula. Dickey and Pantula also 
suggest to include the intercept term when the alternative hypothesis is that the series is stationary in 
levels. The test procedure was carried out by considering the possibility of the presence of three unit 
roots as in Clark et al. The lagged dependent variables in each test are added to make the residuals 
from the regressions serially independent (Dickey, Bell and Miller): 
(1) First the Ho of three unit roots (integrated of order three) in time series ><t against the Ha of 
two unit roots (integrated of order two) is tested by estimating the model: ~3><t = CXo + b2~2><t., + E Xi ~3><t.i +~' The 't-value associated with the estimated b2is compared against the critical value of 't in 
Fuller. If the Ho is rejected the Ho of two unit roots is tested otherwise the Ho of three unit roots is not 
rejected and the testing procedure stops. 
(2) The Ho of two unit roots against the Ha of one unit root is tested by estimating the model: 
~3><t =CXo + b1~><t., + b2~2><t., + E Xi ~3><t.i +~' The 't-value associated with the estimated b, is 
compared to critical value of 't in Fuller. If the Ho is rejected the Ho of one unit root is tested otherwise 
the Ho of two unit roots is not rejected and the testing procedure stops. 
(3) The Ho of one unit root against the H. of zero unit root is tested by estimating the model: 
~3><t =CXo + bo ><t., + b, ~" + b2~2><t., + Ex; ~3><t_i +~' The 't-value associated with the estimated bo is 
compared to the critical value of 'til in Fuller. If the Ho of one unit root is not rejected the testing 
procedure stops. 
The results of Dickey-Fuller tests are presented in Table 1. The results of test numbers 1 and 
2 in Table 1 reject the null hypotheses of three and two unit roots in each of the series. The result of 
test nuni>er 3, however, does not reject the null hypothesis of one unit root, i.e., the series are each ­
stationary in their first differences. The significance levels of the Box-Q statistics indicate that the 
residuals in all cases are white noise. These results are consistent with those of Falk for Iowa data but 
at odds with those of Clark et al. for Illinois data. 
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Table 1. Dickey-Fuller Test Results for Arkansas Farmland·Prlce 
and Cash Rent SerieS-
Test Number Test Farmland Prices Cash Rents 
Ho: 3 unit roots vs. 
2 unit roots 
-11.669* 
(0.997) 
-12.611* 
(0.433) 
2 Ho: 2 unit roots vs. 
1 unit root 
-4.114* 
(1.00) 
-6.842* 
(0.701) 
3 Ho: 1 unit root vs. 
zero unit root 
-1.416 
(1.00) 
-1.430 
(0.734) 
a t-values are presented for the corresponding coefficients. The numbers in parentheses are the 
significance levels of Box-Q statistics from Dickey-Fuller regressions. 
* Indicates significance at the one percent level. 
Given that farmland prices and cash rents are both integrated of order one, the test for 
cointegration proceeded as follows. First, the cointegrating regressions were estimated by OlS. 
estimated results are: 
The 
PI = -688.09 + 30.412 R, 
(-9.383) (16.361) 
R2 = 0.795 OW = 0.4979 (10) 
RI = 25.873 + 0.026 PI 
(28.581) (16.361) 
R2 = 0.795 OW = 0.6386 (11 ) 
where the figures in parentheses are t-ratios. The cointegrating regression Durbin-Watson tests 
(CROW) of 0.4979 in (10) and 0.6386 in (11) reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration between the 
variables. 
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests were also performed on the residuals of the 
estimated cointegrating equations for cointegration. Since the lagged terms of the dependent variables 
were found to be insignificant, instead of ADF, Dickey-Fuller tests were performed. The estimated 
Dickey-Fuller regression results for the residuals UPt of (10) and uRI of (11) are presented in (12) and 
(13), respectively: 
6UPt = -0.245 uPt_, 
(-3.046) 
(12) 
6URl = -0.315 uRl_, 
(-3.520) 
(13) 
where the figures in parentheses are t-ratios. Since the computed t-ratios are less than the tabulated 
critical value of -1.95 (Fuller) in both equations, the Dickey-Fuller tests reject the null hypotheses that 
the residuals are nonstationary (noncointegration) implying that the series are cointegrated. 
Since farmland prices and cash rents are cointegrated there is a long-run relationship between 
them. To represent the short-run adjustments in farmland prices, an error correction model is estimated 
for PI and R, separately. The results are: 
• 
... 
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~Pt = 2.238 - 0.131 uPt., + 0.260 ~Pt.' 
(0.363)(-2.624) (2.164) 
(14) 
M\ = 0.048 - 0.160 uRI.' 
(0.109)(-1.43) 
(15) 
where the figures in parentheses represent t-ratios. The lag structure was chosen based on the 
significance of lagged terms. The error correcting term uPt., is significantly different from zero at the 
one percent level in (14) while uRI.' is not significant in (15). Since farmland prices and rents are 
cointegrated, these results indicate that rent is weakly exogenous and, therefore, Granger causality 
runs from rents to farmland prices. 
The causality from rents to farmland prices is also investigated by utiliZing the methods outlined 
in Granger and Sims. For the Granger method. the following regression models were estimated: 
Pt = f(2 past lags of F\, 2 past lags of Pt) (16) 
F\ = f(2 past lags of Pt. 2 past lags of F\) (17) 
Pt =f(2 past lags of Pt) (18) 
Rt = f(2 past lags of Rt) (19) 
Equations (18) and (19) represent the restricted versions of (16) and (17) respectively. The choice of 
lag structure was based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). The Granger method results are 
presented in Table 2. The results indicate Granger causality runs from rents to farmland prices. 
Table 2. Granger Causality Test Results 
Null Hypothesis F·Ratios Results 
No Causality from Rents to Farmland 3.905* 
Prices (2,65t Reject He 
No Causality from Farmland Prices to 2.256 
Net Rents (2,65)a Fail to reject He 
Causal Inference Cash Rents to Farmland Prices 
a Figures in the parentheses are the degrees of freedom. 
* Significant at the five percent level. 
To utilize the Sims' method, the two-sided regression models in (20) and (21) were estimated 
together with their restricted versions, (22) and (23), respectively. The choice of lagged and lead terms 
was based on AIC. 
Pt = f(Rt, 3 past lags of F\. 3 future lags of F\) (20) 
-
F\ = f(P" 3 past lags of Pt, 3 future lags of Pt) (21 ) 
Pt =f(F\. 3 past lags of F\) (22) 
(23) 
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The results of the Sims' test are presented in Table 3. In the test for causality from farmland 
prices to rents (20), the null hypothesis is that farmland prices do not cause rents. Rejection of the null 
hypothesis implies that farmland prices cause rents. Similar1y, in the test for causality from rents to 
farmland prices (21), the null hypothesis is that rents do not cause farmland prices. Rejection of the 
null hypothesis implies that rents cause farmland prices. The results in Table 3 indicate that the 
causality between farmland prices and rents is unidirectional from rents to farmland prices. 
Table 3. Sims Causality Test Resuhs 
Null Hypothesis F·Ratios Results 
No Causality from Farmland Prices to 0.80 
Net Rents (3,58t Fail to reject Ho 
No Causality from Net Rents to 3.00* 
Farmland Prices (3.58t Reject Ho 
Causal Inference Cash Rents to Farmland Prices 
a Figures in the parentheses are the degrees of freedom. 
* Significant at the five percent level. 
The results of each of the three tests imply Granger causality from rents to farmland prices. 
Accordingly, the data were also used to investigate the movements in farmland prices that were 
attributed to rents. Following Alston, the percentage change in the growth of real land prices is 
compared to the percentage change in the growth in real rents with the difference between the two 
attributed to other factors. The results for the period 1922 through 1992 are: 
Mean Percentage Change in Real Farmland Prices =1.6409 (94.90) 
Mean Percentage Change in Real Rents = 0.6467 (115.06) 
Difference Between the Two Mean Percentages = 0.9942. 
The figures in parentheses are the sample variances. The significance of the difference between the 
two sample means is tested using the t-test. The computed t-ratio for the difference is 0.574. Since 
the computed t-ratio is less than the tabulated critical value for any reasonable significance level, the 
null hypothesis of zero difference between the sample means is not rejected. In other words, the mean 
growth rate of real farmland price is not significantly different from the mean growth rate of real rent 
implying that the movements in farmland prices are fully explained by the movements in rents. 
Concluding Comments 
Results from previous studies display differences in the time series properties of farmland 
prices and cash rents. These differences may be the result of differences in the particular time series 
studied, geographic location, aggregation level or methodology. The results from the study presented 
here show that Arkansas farmland prices and cash rents for the period 1922 through 1992 are 
cointegrated of order one. Thus a long-run relationship between farmland price and cash rent is • 
supported since these time series are cointegrated. In addition, since both farmland prices and cash 
rents are cointegrated of order one, the present value model for asset valuation is supported. Although 
these results are consistent with some studies (Tegene and Kuchler), the results are inconsistent with 
other studies (Clark et al.; Baffes and Chambers). The particular reasons for the different results 
among studies should be identified in the future. 
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The error correction model is used in this study to better explain the short-run adjustments in 
farmland prices. The results from the error correction model and Granger and Sims causality tests 
support Granger causality running from cash rents to farmland prices. Also, the mean growth rate of 
real farmland price is found to be insignificantly different from the mean growth rate of real cash rent 
which implies that movements in farmland prices are fully explained by movements in cash rents. 
While the results from this study support the present value model for asset valuation. additional 
research is needed. The underlying factors causing changes in cash rents should be identified. These 
underlying factors such as input and output prices. mortgage rates, discount rates. taxes. inflation and 
technological change could be used to explain the short-run dynamics between farmland price and cash 
rent. 
-
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Preliminary Results on 
INTEREST RATE DIFFERENCES ON
 
NONREAL ESTATE FARM LOANS
 
FROM COMMERCIAL BANKS
 
Sharon K. Bard, Peter J. Barry and Paul N. EJlinger1 
In a highly efficient financial market, interest rates charged to borrowers on comparable 
loans (i.e., similar loan purposes, sizes and lending risks) should be the same in all geographic 
regions. Differences in rates among dissimilar loans should reflect differences in credit risk, loan 
maturity, servicing costs, loan size, and other known characteristics of the borrowerllender 
relationship. If differences in rates on comparable loans occur, they should reflect imperfections in 
the financial market, barriers to the efficient flows of funds among geographically dispersed lending 
markets, and less than perfectly competitive lending conditions. 
For commercial bank lending to agriculture, a study by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City (Swackhamer and Doll) in the late 1960s found significant differences among 
geographic areas in interest rates charged on farm loans for similar purposes among firms of 
similar size and for loans of similar risk and secured by similar assets. These differences likely 
have declined over time in response to financial deregulation and easing of geographic restrictions 
on banking, grOWing competition in financial markets, a closer relationship between rural financial 
markets and the nationaVintemational markets, and improvements in electronic technology and 
communication. Nonetheless, empirical evidence, (e.g., Walraven and Rosine) still indicates that 
differences in interest rates on farm loans across banks are relatively large. For example, Federal 
Reserve Data indicate that interest rates on nonreal estate farm loans made by banks during the 
first week of November 1990 ranged from 10.0 to 12.9 percent of the loan volume. Causes of such 
differences are not well understood, and substantial variations among regions in commercial banks' 
market shares of farm debt (Wilson and Barkley) suggest that differences in lending competition 
and pricing arrangements may still be the case. 
In addition, the use of risk adjusted interest rates on farm loans has grown considerably in 
the past decade (Miller, Ellinger, Barry, and Lajili). This growth suggests improved efficiency in 
loan pricing at the individual borrower level, but also greater difficulty in measuring and explaining 
geographic differences in interest rates. 
The purposes of this stUdy is to measure and explain differences in average annual interest 
rates on nonreal estate farm loans from commercial banks. Annual data on average farm loan 
rates from individual banks are taken from quarterly bank call reports and related to selected bank 
and market characteristics. The following sections of the paper consider the concepts of loan 
pricing, review related literature, introduce the data and analytical procedures, report the descriptive 
characteristics and average annual interest rates on nonreal estate farm loans charged by 
agriculture banks, and analyze differences among the banks' calculated rates. 
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Concepts of Loan Pricing 
In principle, interest rates on farm loans result from the interaction between the demand for 
and supply of farm credit. On the supply side, for a lending institution to remain financially viable, 
the loan rates must cover the major sources of lending costs (Schramm and Barry; Barry and 
Calvert; Ellinger and Barry). Included are the costs of funding and administering the loan, as well 
as compensating for credit, liquidity, interest rate, prepayment and solvency risks. Pricing may also 
reflect different degrees of competition for the borrower's loan business. 
Most of these factors can be measured to some degree, although the process is a difficult 
one especially when measurement occurs at the individual borrower level. Costs of funds must 
consider the major sources of a bank's loan funds: purchased funds, deposit balances, and the 
risk-adjusted required return on the bank's equity capital assigned to the borrower's loan. Equity 
capital costs reflect assessment of the borrower's credit risk (Ellinger, Barry, and Mazzocco) and 
the liquidity risk associated with unanticipated variations in the borrower's loan and deposit 
balances. Adjustments for interest rate risk may also be made when pricing fixed rate versus 
variable rate loans. 
Administrative (or operating) costs include the nonfunding costs (e.g., salaries, data 
services, occupancy, legal, etc.) of delivering agricultural credit to individual borrowers. These 
costs are considered to depend on bank size, loan size, bank holding company affiliation, degree of 
involvement in farm lending, and metropolitan versus nonmetropolitan location (Ellinger and Barry). 
Other factors also influencing interest rates on farm loans include special circumstances of 
the borrower, the range of credit and noncredit services provided, and lending competition. Special 
circumstances of the borrower may affect interest rate patterns over time. For example, interest 
rate concessions in the near term might occur in order for young farm borrowers to establish their 
businesses and grow to become profitable bank borrowers in the future. Similarly, interest rate 
concessions to financially stressed borrowers may aid in their financial recovery and return to a 
profitable borrower status in the future. Evaluation of loan pricing is further complicated if interest 
rates reflect a bundling of credit and noncredit services provided to a borrower, rather than using 
fees and service charges to compensate for the noncredit services. 
Finally, interest rate pricing also may reflect different degrees of competition for a 
borrower's loan business. That is, a lender may eam a premium or accept a discount on a loan 
based on its competitiveness in the farm credit market. For example, borrowers who are especially 
attractive customers to other lenders may be priced at lower profit levels to reflect the greater 
competition. Less attractive borrowers or lower degrees of competition in the credit market may 
lead to higher interest rates. 
Evaluation of competitive conditions in farm credit markets involves numerous factors. One 
element is precise identification of the lending market for different types of loans, deposits and other 
types of financial services. However, this is a challenging process; ideally, identification of a 
market should evaluate responses of customers' demands to changes in interest rates, but this is 
difficult to assess. Therefore, evaluation of geographic boundaries is a more feasible approach. 
Another factor is measurement of the competition, which involves determining the number of 
competing firms, and the firms' concentration ratios and market shares. More fundamental 
measures are also involved, including market size, institution size, degrees of specialization, and 
quality of market information, as well as measures of pricing and loan profitability. ,
.. 
Literature Review 
Differences in interest rates charged on loans have been researched for agricultural loans
 
(Swackhamer and Doll), for mortgage loans (SChaaf; Ostras; Zabrenski, S'hilling, and Sirmans;
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Jameson, Barth, and Marlow; and Jud and Epley), real estate (Longbrake and Peterson) and for 
commercial loans (Hester). Schaaf analyzed lender and market characteristics and found that 
regional differences did occur. The empirical results indicated that rates were influenced by 
distance from capital markets and by local market demand for savings. Ostras re-estimated 
Schaaf's model, but also included a state usury law variable. He concluded that the usury ceiling 
and local market conditions influenced mortgage interest rates, but the distance from capital 
markets did not influence the rates. 
Zabrenski, et al. compared regional mortgage rates to regional factors such as loan risk, 
market structure, market demand, lender's cost of funds, and usury ceilings. The results indicated 
that regional variation in mortgage interest rates existed, due to loan risk and usury ceilings. 
Jameson, et al. used a simultaneous-equations system to measure how borrower and lender 
characteristics affect the regional variation of mortgage yields. They concluded that the rates did 
vary across regions and that the differences were due to the expected loss from default or because 
of differences in demand characteristics. Jud and Epley modeled mortgage loan rates as a function 
of the level of mortgage points, national economic conditions, risk characteristics of the loan, and 
institutional and regional factors. They found no regional differences, but that the disparities were 
caused by other factors. 
Longbrake and Peterson researched inter- and intra-regional variations in real estate loans. 
They utilized bank characteristics (such as cost and product mix), market power, market demand, 
and usury ceiling. Inter-regional differences were found, with significant regional differences in 
market organization and cost structure, product mix, and local demand factors. 
Hester analyzed borrower, lender and market characteristics and how they affect business 
loans. He concluded that the statistically significant differences in average terms of lending were 
primarily attributable to differences in the sizes of borrowers and to differences in bank 
concentration in urban markets. 
Procedural Issues 
The procedural approach to this study first involves the calculation and evaluation of bank 
financial characteristics and the average annual interest rates on farm loans charged by agricultural 
banks, using call report data to calculate the values. The bank characteristics (Le., average 
agricultural loan balance, ROE, ROA, farm loan ratio, net interest margin) convey descriptive 
information about the agricultural banks and can provide insight regarding potential income or cost 
differences across banks. Measures of rate dispersion (i.e., frequency distributions, means, 
standard deviations) and average rates at various levels of disaggregation (Le., bank size) can 
indicate the relative importance of rate differences across the levels of disaggregation. 
Using average interest rate data for the farm loan portfolio will not account for the rate 
differences that occur among individual borrowers, but it will allow for the comparison of farm loan 
rates among agricultural banks. In addition, using average annual rates will permit analysis of 
average rate differences over time, assuming that such differences hold over time. 
If significant rate differences are observed, the next step is to identify factors causing these 
rate differences. This part of the procedures involves identification of the relative importance of the 
key cost components of interest rates for which call report data are available. Included are: 
•	 Funding costs--funding costs are available at the bank level but not at the individual • 
loan level. Thus, the effect of individual deposit balances cannot be captured. 
However, it is unlikely that small banks explicitly account for deposit balances in 
loan pricing (Barry and Calvert); rather, they rely more heavily on the pooled cost of 
all of the banks' purchased funds. Thus, utilizing costs of funds at the bank level is 
appropriate. 
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Administrative or operating costs--these data also are only available at the bank 
level from call reports, but not for specific types of loans or borrowers. Thus, any 
variation in operating costs is only attributable to bank characteristics (e.g., bank 
size) rather than characteristics of specific types of loans or borrowers. The 
allocation of operating costs from the bank to the farm loan level can be estimated 
using cost data from Ellinger and Barry. This procedure will not directly reflect the 
cost differences by size of individual loan, but it will reflect cost differences at the 
institutional level. 
•	 Loan losses (provisions and charge-offs)--data on farm loan losses are available 
from call reports and will directly used in the analysis. 
Descriptive Characteristics and Average Annual Interest Rates 
Bank call data from U. S. commercial banks are used for this stUdy. The analysis of 
nonreal estate farm loan interest rates focuses on rates charged by agricultural banks which are 
defined as having total agricultural loans exceeding or equaling $2.5 million or being more than 25 
percent of total loan balance for each quarter. A total of 4,913 banks for 1989 and 4,933 banks for 
1990 meet that criteria. Banks without agricultural loan balances in any single quarter are deleted 
from the study. 
Tables 1A and 1B present all agricultural banks by asset size with their average total 
assets, average balances of agricultural loans, and loans secured by farm real estate and to 
finance agricultural production, average return on assets (ROA), and average return on equity 
(ROE). In 1989 (Table 1A), banks with average assets between $100 and $300 million have the 
highest average ROA (1.03 percent), and banks with between $50 and $100 million in average 
assets have the highest average ROE (14.79 percent). As reported by Walraven, Ott, and Rosine. 
agricultural banks and other small banks earned 11 and 10 percent, respectively, on their equity 
and one and 0.8 percent, respectively, on their assets. The average ROE for the agricultural banks 
defined for this study is slightly higher (11.13 percent) than the two groups of banks, but the 
average ROA for the group falls within the range (0.95 percent) of the two bank groups. 
Table 1B presents the 1990 agricultural banks. Banks with average assets between $50 
and $100M have the highest average ROA (1.04 percent) and banks with between $100 and 
$300M in average assets have the highest average ROE (12.29 percent) of the five bank size 
categories. This exceeds the average ROA and ROE values for small banks (.7 and 8.5 percent, 
respectively) and agricultural banks (1 and 10.8 percent, respectively) in 1990 as reported by 
Walraven, et al. However, as a group, these agricultural banks lie between small banks and 
agricultural banks for both average ROA and ROE. 
The availability of interest revenue data attributable directly to nomeal estate farm loans 
varies by bank size and reporting requirements. Banks with more than $25 million in total assets 
and with nomeal estate farm loans exceeding five percent of total loans and banks with less than 
$300 million in total assets report interest and fee income from all agricultural loans in a single 
category. Banks with less than $25 million in total assets are not required to report interest and fee 
income on agricultural loans. but some banks in this size category do voluntarily report the 
information. Since the reporting banks may not be representative of that group and the number of 
obselVations is low, banks with less than $25M in total assets are dropped from the study. Banks 
•
with more than $300M in total assets report interest income on nomeal estate farm loans in a 
separate category and farm real estate interest income under the real estate category. Therefore, 
the reporting requirements for banks with less than $300M in total assets do not allow interest and 
fee income from nomeal estate farm loans to be distinguished from farm r~al estate loans. 
Table lA 
All Agricultural Banks by Average Total Asset Size 
Year - 1989 
(In Thousands) <$25M $25·<$50M $50-<$I00M $100-<$300M >=$300M Total 
Number of Banks 1616 1321 1002 600 374 4913 
Average Total Assets $14,718.27 $36,490.72 $69,616.86 $156,945.43 $4,257,434.57 $372,115.38 
Average Agricultural Loan Balance $3,482.57 $6,702.28 $8,468.73 $10,619.50 $32,449.88 $8,441.92 
Ave Ag Prod Loan Balance $2,589.46 $4,559.93 $5,288.46 $6,381.29 $22,419.62 $5,642.37 
Ave Ag RE Loan Balance $893.11 $2,142.35 $3,180.27 $4,238.21 $10,030.26 $2,799.55 
Return on Assets 0.87 I 1.02 1.03 0.76 0.95 
Return on EQuity 7.87 11.54 14.79 13.49 10.24 11.13 U'I 
<0 
Table IB 
All Agricultural Banks by Average Total Asset Size 
Year - 1990 
(In Thousands) <$25M $25-<$50M $50-<$IOOM $IOO-<$300M >=$300M Total 
Number of Banks 1538 1291 1048 661 395 4933 
Average Total Assets $15,073.13 $36,470.20 $69,599.93 $158,218.23 $4,575,184.35 $416,579.40 
Average Agricultural Loan Balance $3,623.41 $6,797.61 $8,867.83 $11,110.59 $33,272.69 $8,945.63 
Ave Ag Prod Loan Balance $2,685.42 $4,618.95 $5,516.67 $6,699.18 $22,975.23 $5,955.42 
Ave Ag RE Loan Balance $937.99 $2,178.66 $3,351.16 $4,411.41 $10,297.46 $2,990.21 
Return on Assets 0.85 0.98 1.04 1.03 0.7 0.94 
Return on Eauitv 8.46 9.95 11.43 12.29 8.28 9.98 
I
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Due to the aggregation of agricultural loan interest and fee incom~Jor banks with less 
than $300M in total assets, an unambiguous interest rate for nonreal estate fann loans and for farm 
real estate loans cannot be calculated. Therefore, banks within each total asset size category are 
further categorized by the percentage of agricultural production and other loans in their agricultural 
loan portfolio. This' categorization is intended to isolate banks whose interest and fee income data 
would be dominated by loans to finance agricultural production. To evaluate interest rates charged 
on nonreal estate farm loans, banks with more than 75 percent of their agricultural loan portfolio in 
loans to finance agricultural production and other to farmers are examined. The threshold of 75 
percent is chosen on the basis that a portfolio with less than 75 percent of agricultural production 
loans would begin to bias the derived interest rates for the agricultural production loans. 
Gross interest rates charged for agricultural loans are tabulated by dividing the interest and 
fee income from agricultural loans by the average quarterly balance of agricultural loans, adjusted 
for nonaccrual agricultural loans. Not all banks report quarterly balances, and, therefore. those 
institutions not reporting quarterly balances are deleted from the study. Once the interest rates are 
calculated, a range of interest rates charged for nonreal estate fann loans is established. The 
range of seven to fifteen percent is selected for two reasons. First, the calculated cost of funds for 
the qualifying agricultural banks ranges from 6.94 to 8.01 percent, and it seems unlikely that a bank 
would charge an interest rate lower than its cost of funds. The second reason is based on the 
evaluation of the interest rate dispersion for similar loans as reported by Walraven, et al. Their 
reported interest rates are tabulated from a survey of commercial banks and range from nine to 
fifteen percent. Since the bank call data are from a broader sample of banks than the survey's 
sample, the wider range of interest rates is used for this study. Observations with a calculated 
interest rate of less than seven percent and exceeding fifteen percent are eliminated from the 
sample. 
The number of banks used for this study is 1,089 in 1989 and 1,135 in 1990 after 
eliminating institutions whose average total assets are below $25M, banks whose agricultural loan 
portfolios are composed of less than 75 percent agricultural production loans, institutions who don't 
report quarterly loan balances or banks whose calculated agricultural loan interest rate falls outside 
the range of seven to 15 percent. Average total assets, average balances for all agricultural loans, 
agricultural production loans, and agricultural real estate loans, and average ROA and ROE for 
these banks are presented by bank size category in Tables 2A and 26. The average total asset 
balance in 1989 is $1.176 and in 1990 is $1.416. The banks meeting the criteria have over twice 
the average agricultural, ag production and farm real estate loan balances in both years and a 
higher ROE than do all the agricultural banks. 
Tables 3A and 36 present descriptive information and financial ratios for the selected 
sample of banks. The net interest margin (NIM) ranges from 3.82 to 3.99 percent, with 3.94 
percent and 3.9 percent being the average NIM for 1989 and 1990, respectively. In both years, the 
largest banks receive the highest gross interest income and pay the highest interest expense, 
resulting in the lowest NIM. Total loan balance as a percentage of average assets increases with 
bank size while loans secured by farm real estate and used to finance agricultural production 
decrease with bank size. The loan portfolio composition of the banks parallels the balance sheet 
items with the percentage of both types of agricultural loans decreasing as bank size increases. 
In general, the loan to deposit and loan to asset ratios increase with bank size and the 
equity to asset ratio decreases as banks increase in size. The sample banks' loan to deposit ratios 
fall between the averages for commercial banks (81.8 percent in 1989 and 81.1 percent in 1990 
•(Agricultural Income and Finance Situation and Outlook Report, February 1990 and February 
1991)) and for agricultural banks (54 percent in 1989 and 55 percent in 1990 (Walraven, et al.)). 
This sample of agricultural banks' average equity to asset ratio is higher than for all commercial 
banks (6.4 percent for both years (Situation and Outlook Report, Feb. 199.0 and 1991)) but lower 
than agricultural banks (10.1 percent in 1989 and 9.9 percent in 1990 (Walraven, et al.)). All 
commercial banks average a higher loan to asset ratio of 62.2 percent in 1989 and 62.4 percent in 
Table 2A 
Agricultural Banks Meeting Criteria by Average Total Asset Size 
Year - 1989 
(In Thousands) $25-<$50M $50-<$IOOM $IOO-<$300M >=$300M Total 
Number of Banks 415 256 117 301 1089 
Average Total Assets $36,135.67 $68,805.49 $152,555.75 $4,054,265.82 $1,166,936.22 
Average Agricultural Loan Balance $1,542.10 $10,287.85 $15,065.18 $34,443.53 $16,431.40 
Ave Ag Prod Loan Balance $6,469.17 $8,830.86 $13,030.22 $24,361.38 $12,674.67 
Ave Ag RE Loan Balance $1,072.93 $1,456.99 $2,034.96 $10,082.15 $3,756.73 
Return on Assets 1.01 1.04 1.02 0.84 0.97 
Return on Equity 14.05 11.02 12.6 12.45 12.74 
en
..... 
Table 2B 
Agricultural Banks Meeting Criteria by Average Total Asset Size 
Year - 1990 
(In Thousands) $25-<$50M $SO-<$IOOM $IOO-<$300M >=$300M Total 
Number of Banks 411 264 140 320 1135 
Average Total Assets $36,173.48 $68,310.26 $154,174.15 $4,816,591.41 $1,405,986.64 
Average Agricultural Loan Balance $1,584.83 $10,707.02 $15,096.69 $38,102.43 $17,841.71 
Ave Ag Prod Loan Balance $6,434.94 $9,137.58 $12,976.15 $27,139.14 $13,707.73 
Ave Ag RE Loan Balance $1,149.89 $1,569.44 $2,120.54 $10,963.29 $4,133.98 
Return on Assets 0.93 0.99 1.03 0.75 0.91 
Return on Equity 9.17 10.52 12.48 10.21 10.18 
• 
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Airicultul'lll Baaks Medill& Crileria By Average Asset Size 
Year - 1989 
$2..S- < $50 M $~ <S100 M $I()o' < S300 > -$300 M Total . 
Number of BaDb 415 256 117 301 1089 
IncomelExpeuea u " of Ave Alsets 
Orou Interest Income 9.43 9.46 9.41 9.64 9.49 
Orou Interest Expense 5.44 5.51 5.46 5.79 5.56 
Nd Interest MargiD 3.99 3.96 3.94 3.85 3.94 
Ba1uee Sbcet JleIDJ u " of Ave AueU 
ToW LoaDs 46.99 46.79 51.9 62.48 51.75 
Loau Secured by Farm ~ 1.98 1.1 1.37 0.73 1.98 
Ai Prod ok Olher 18.11 11.85 8.75 1.1 11.1 
LoaD Portfolio CompoaitioD (" of ToW LoaD BalU1Ce) 
LoaDs Secured by Farm RE 6.41 4.68 1.78 1.16 4.16 
Ai Prod ok Olhera 39.25 18.85 17.5 1.04 14.18 
Farm LoaD JWio 45.66 33.53 20.18 3.1 18.35 
Ratios 
LoIIlIDepoait 53.07 51.71 58.98 77.95 60.5 
Equity!Asset 9.83 9.19 8.3 6.77 8.67 
1.oaDIAsset 46.99 46.79 51.9 62.48 51.75 
EffCC\ive Interest Rates 
Grou Rate Eamed 11.74 11.71 lU5 1U 11.65 
Rates Paid 
1DIerest Bearing Deposits 6.91 6095 6.97 7.19 7.03 
AlIInte1eSt BeariD.. Liabilities 6.94 6.99 7.06 7.61 7.15 
Table 3B 
Aaricultul'lll Bub MeeliD& Criteria By Average Asset Size 
Year· 1990 
$2.5-<$50 M ~<$100 M $I()O.<$300 >-S300M Total 
Number of BaDb 411 264 140 310 1135 
Income/ExpeDses u " of Ave AueU 
Orou 1D1erest Income 9.34 9.39 9.31 9.4 9.37 
Orou lnlereIt Expease 5.4 5.48 5.37 5.58 5.47 
Net lnlereIt MargiD 3.94 3.91 3.94 3.82 3.9 
Ba1uee Sheet JleIDJ u " of Ave AueU . 
ToW LoaDs 46.95 47 51.51 62.4& 51.91 
Loau Secured by Farm RE 3.11 1.34 1.44 0.68 1.07 
AI Prod ok Olher 18 13.64 8.78 1.22 11.11 
LoaD Portfolio CompolitioD (" of ToW LoaD Ba1aDce) 
LoaDs Secured by Farm RE 6.94 5.16 1.95 1.1 4.39 
AI Prod ok Otben 39.31 30.22 17.6 1.06 14.1 
Farm LoaD JWio 46.16 35.38 20.54 3.16 18.41 
• 
Ratios 
LoIII/Depolit 53.06 51.95 58.96 77.75 60.71 
Equity!Asset 9.81 9.25 8.51 6.79 8.67 
1.oaDIAsset 46.95 47 51.51 62.48 51.91 
Effective lnlereIt Rates 
Orou Rate EarDed 11.64 11.62 11.41 11.15 11.47 
Rates Paid 
Interest BeariDc Depolits 7.82 7.96 1.91 7.11 I 
All IDteresl BeanD! Liabilities 7.85 7.99 8.01 8 7.94 
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1990 (Situation and Outlook Report, Feb. 1990 and 1991), while the sampled agricu~ural banks' 
average loan to asset ratio is 51.75 and 51.91 percent, respectively. 
As with NIM, the group of the smallest banks earned the highest gross rate and the largest 
banks earned the lowest rate for both years. The smallest banks in 1989 and 1990 paid the lowest 
rate for both interest bearing deposits and all interest bearing liabilities, and the largest banks paid 
the highest rate for both categories only in 1989. 
The dispersion, mean, standard deviation (SO), and coefficient of variation (CV) of the 
calculated interest rates are presented for the agricu~ural banks meeting the criteria by bank asset 
size, by bank group, and by agricultural production loan portfolio percentage in Tables 4 - 6. Table 
4A presents the interest rate information for each bank size category and for all the banks in 1989. 
Banks with average assets between $50 and 100M earn the highest rate on nonreal estate loans 
(11.92 percent), in addition to having the highest CV (12.1). The smallest banks earned the lowest 
rate of 11.76 percent with the lowest CV (9.9). The average interest rate earned for all banks in 
the sample is 11.81 percent, and interest rates for two-thirds of all the banks fall within the range of 
10.54 to 13.08 percent. Table 4B shows that in 1990, banks with average assets between $50M 
and $100M earn the highest rate of 11.74 percent, and banks with more than $300M in assets earn 
the lowest rate (11.26 percent). The largest banks exhibit the widest variation in interests rates with 
a CV of 11.03. The average interest rate for all agricultural banks is 11.58 percent, and interest 
rates for two-thirds of all the banks fall within the range of 10.38 to 12.78 percent. 
The overall interest rate earned for nonreal estate loans decreases by 0.23 percent from 
1989 to 1990. The standard deviation and coefficient of variation also decrease by 0.07 and 0.34, 
respectively. Banks with total assets between $50 and $100M earn the highest rate and the 
smallest banks have the lowest CV in both years. 
Tables SA and 5B present the banks grouped as small «$300M in total average assets) 
and large (>~$300M in assets). In 1989, the small banks earned 11.82 percent on their 
agricu~ural production loans, while the larger banks earned 11.77 percent. The smaller banks have 
a larger CV (10.97) than do the larger banks (10.07). The small banks in 1990 earn 11.71 percent 
on their agricu~ural production loans, while the larger banks earn 11.76 percent. 
When comparing the data for the two bank groups between 1989 and 1990, it is noted that 
the interest rate declines from 1989 to 1990 for both bank size categories, but the variation 
decreases for the smaller banks and increases for the larger banks from 1989 to 1990. The 
coefficient of variation decreases in 1990 for the small banks and increases for the large banks 
from the previous year. 
The interest rates categorized by the percentage of agricu~ural production loans in the ag 
loan portfolio are presented in Tables 6A and 6B, summarizing the information for each percentage 
group. For 1989 (Table 6A), banks with ag loan portfolios consisting of 75-80 percent nonreal 
estate loans exhibit the lowest rate earned (11.71 percent) and have the highest CV (11.73). The 
highest interest rate of 11.86 percent is earned by two portfolio groups - the 85-90 percent and the 
95-100 percent groups. Banks with 95-100 percent of nonreal estate loans possess the lowest CV 
(10.33). 
In Table 6B, portfolios with 90-95 percent of their ag loan portfolio in ag production loans 
earn the highest rate (11.83 percent). Portfolios with 95-100 percent of their ag loan portfolio in ag 
-
production loans earn the lowest rate of 11.39 percent. This low interest rate may be attributed to 
the fact that 78 percent of the loans in the category are located at the largest banks, which earn the 
lowest interest rate of all bank size categories. Banks with portfolios of 80-85 percent ag 
production loans have the highest CV (10.8). 
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Table 4A 
Agricultural Banks Meeting Criteria By Average Asset Size 
Year - 1989' 
Total Asset Size for Agricultural Banks 
Interest Rate $25-50 M $50-1ooM $loo-3OOM >$3OOM Total 
7-7.99% 0.24 % 1.95 % 1.71 % 0.33% 0.83% 
8-8.99% 2.17% 2.73% 5.98% 2.33% 2.75% 
9-9.99% 5.30% 2.34% 5.13% 3.99% 4.22% 
10-10.99% 15.18% 14.84% 5.13% 13.62% 13.59% 
11-11.99% 33.49% 28.91 % 31.62 % 36.21% 32.97% 
12-12.99% 31.08% 28.13% 35.90% 32.89% 31.40% 
13-13.99% 10.36% 15.63% 11.11 % 6.64% 10.65% 
14-14.99% 2.17% 5.47% 3.42% 3.99% 3.58% 
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
No. of Banks 415 256 117 301 1089 
Mean 11.76 11.92 11.79 11.77 11.81 
Stand. Dev. 1.17 1.44 1.4 1.18 1.27 
Coefof Var. 9.9 12.1 11.87 10.07 10.73 
Table 4B 
Agricultural Banks Meeting Criteria By Average Asset Size 
Interest Rate 
7-7.99% 
8-8.99% 
9-9.99%
 
10-10.99%
 
11-11.99%
 
12-12.99%
 
13-13.99%
 
14-14.99%
 
Total
 
No. of Banks
 
Mean
 
Stand. Dev.
 
CoefofVar.
 
Year - 1990 
Total Asset Size for Agricultural Banks 
$25-50 M $SO-100M $IOO-3OOM 
1.46% 
-
0.71% 
1.22% 3.79% 2.86% 
4.62% 3.79% 4.29% 
10.22% 11.74% 16.43% 
42.58% 42.80% 38.57% 
29.20% 25.38% 25.00% 
8.76% 9.09% 9.29% 
1.95% 3.41% 2.86% 
100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
 
411 264 140
 
11.7 11.74 11.68 
1.16 1.17 1.19 
9.89 9.96 10.18 
>$3OOM 
1.56% 
3.44% 
5.63% 
25.00% 
44.06% 
12.19% 
5.63% 
2.50% 
100.00% 
320 
11.26 
1.24 
11.03 
Total 
1.06% 
2.64% 
4.67% 
15.51 % 
42.56% 
23.00% 
8.02% 
2.56% 
100.00% 
1135 
11.58 
1.2 
10.39 
•
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• Table 5A 
Agricultural Banks Meeting Criteria by Bank Size Group 
Year· 1989· 
Interest Rate Ag Banks < $3OOM Assets Ag Banks > = $3OOM Assets 
7-7.99% 1.02% 0.33% 
8-8.99% 2.92% 2.33% 
9-9.99% 4.31% 3.99% 
1()'10.99% 13.58% 13.62% 
11-11.99% 31.73% 36.21% 
12-12.99% 30.84% 32.89% 
13-13.99% 12.18% 6.64% 
14-14.99% 3.43% 3.99% 
Total 100.00% 100.00% 
No. of Banks 788 301 
Mean 11.82 11.77 
Stand. Dev. 1.3 1.18 
CoefofVar. 10.97 10.07 
Table 5B 
Interest Rate 
7-7.99% 
8-8.99% 
9-9.99% 
10-10.99% 
11-11.99% 
12-12.99% 
13-13.99% 
14-14.99% 
Total 
No. of Banks 
Mean 
Stand. Dev. 
Coefof Var. 
Ag Banks > =$3OOM Assets 
1.56% 
3.44% 
5:63% 
25.00% 
44.06% 
12.19% 
5.63% 
2.50% 
Agricultural Banks Meeting Criteria by BalIk Size Group 
Year· 1990 
Ag Banks <$3OOM Assets 
0.86% 
2.33% 
4.29% 
11.78% 
41.96% 
27.24% 
8.96% 
2.58% 
100.00% 100.00% 
815 320 
11.71 11.26 
1.17 1.24 
9.95 11.03 
• 
.. 
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Table 6A 
Agricultural Banks Meeting Criteria By Portfolio Percentage 
Year -1989 
% Nonreal Estate Farm Loans of Total Ag Loans 
Interest Rate >75-80% > 80-85% >85-90% >90-95% >95-100% Total 
7-7.99~ 1.45~ 0.54% 0.68% 0.97% 0.83% 
8-8.99% 2.9O~ 2.15~ 2.04% 5.84% 2.18% 2.75% 
9-9.99% 4.83% 4.84% 7.48% 2.19% 3.16% 4.22% 
10-10.99% 15.94% 16.67% 8.16% 15.33% 12.38% 13.59% 
11-11.99% 32.37% 31.18% 34.01 % 32.85% 33.74% 32.91% 
12-12.99% 26.09% 31.18% 31.97% 29.20% 34.71 % 31.40% 
13-13.99% 13.04% 9.14% 12.24% 13.14% 8.74% 10.65% 
14-14.99% 3.38% 4.30% 3.40% 1.46% 4.13 % 3.58% 
Total 100.00% 100·09% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
No. of Banks 207 186 147 137 412 1089 
Mean 11.71 11.79 11.86 11.77 11.86 11.81 
SlaDd. Dev. 1.37 1.26 1.28 1.23 1.22 1.27 
CoefofVar. 11.73 10.65 10.79 10.45 10.33 10.73 
Table 6B 
1Dterest Rate 
7-7.99% 
8-8.99% 
9-9.99% 
10-10.99% 
11-11.99% 
12-12.99% 
13-13.99% 
14-14.99% 
Agricultural Banks Meeting Criteria By Portfolio Percentage 
Year -1990 
% Nonreal Estate Farm Loans of Total Ag Loans 
>75-80% >80-85% >85-90% >90-95% >95-100% 
0.42% 2.54% 0.78% 1.21 % 
2.53% 1.52% 3.77% 0.78% 3.39~ 
5.06% 4.57% 3.77% 3.88% 5.08% 
11.39% 12.18% 13.21 % 10.08% 22.03% 
41.35% 43.15% 43.4O~ 44.19% 42.13% 
28.27% 25.38% 21.38% 27.91 % 17.92% 
8.44% 7.61 % 11.95% 10.08% 5.81 % 
2.53% 3.05% 2.52% 2.33% 2.42% 
Total 
1.06% 
2.64% 
4.67% 
15.51 % 
42.56% 
23.00% 
8.02% 
2.56% 
Total 
No. of Banks 
100.00% 
237 
100.00% 
197 
100.00% 
159 
100.00% 
129 
100.00% 
413 
100.00% 
1135 
• 
Mean 
SlaDd. Dev. 
CoefofVar. 
11.7 
1.18 
10.12 
11.61 
1.25 
10.8 
11.69 
1.19 
10.16 
11.83 
1.05 
8.87 
11.39 
1.22 
10.7 
11.58 
1.2 
10.39 
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There is no similarity in pattems of increases or decreases in the statistics between the 
years when comparing Tables 6A and 6B. Unlike the unanimous decrease in interest rates from 
1989 to 1990 across all bank size groups. interest rates do not consistently decrease from 1989 to 
1990 across portfolio categories. The interest rate earned for nonreal estate loans increases and 
the SO and CV decrease for the 90-95 percent category from 1989 to 1990. The interest rate 
decreases for the remaining categories, and the variation decreases for all categories except the 
largest portfolio percentage for which in remains constant. °ll1e coefficient of variation increases for 
the 80-85 percent and 95-100 percent categories and decreases for the 85-90 percent category 
from 1989 to 1990. 
Model Specification 
To begin identifying the factors that influence the interest rate differences, the relative 
importance of the interest rates' key cost components are determined, utilizing the bank call data. 
This consists of defining an econometric model with the fann loan interest rate being a function of 
various lender characteristics, evaluating the means of the independent variables across the 
interest rate categories for similarities or differences, and estimating and assessing the model. 
The dependent variable is the derived interest rate earned for nonreal estate farm loans. 
Nine independent variables are chosen to measure lender characteristics. It is hypothesized that 
the bank's average asset size might influence interest rate charged - the larger the bank. the lower 
the lending costs. This is measured by the log of average asset size. The loan to deposit ratio is 
included, measuring the lender's supply of loanable funds. It is possible that the higher the ratio, 
the lower the availability of bank's funds for lending. This might positively affect the interest rate. 
The agricultural loan ratio can be used as a proxy for credit risk as it measures loan portfolio 
diversification. The lower the ratio, the more diversified the bank's loan portfolio, lowering the 
idiosyncratic risk. However, the higher the ratio, the more specialized the bank is in agricultural 
lending; this can potentially lower lending costs and the interest rate. The expected sign of the ag 
loan ratio is not predicted. Problem agricultural loans are another proxy for credit risk. It is 
projected that the higher the proportion of 90 day past due and nonaccrual agricultural loans to total 
agricultural loans, the higher the interest rate. Return on equity is included as a proxy for required 
rate of return on bank's equity capital assigned to agricultural production loans, with the belief that 
the higher the ROE, the higher the interest rate earned. 
The costs associated with acquiring funds for lending include both interest expense and 
operating costs. For the interest expense component. it is assumed that a pooling of acquired 
funds for loans occurs and that the same interest rate is applied to all loans. A bank incurs 
operating costs while managing its fund-acquisition and fund-using activities (Ellinger and Barry). 
To appropriately allocate operating costs across the fund -acquisition and -using activities. gross 
operating costs are adjusted for noninterest income and allocated proportionately across all bank 
assets and liabilities. It is expected that the higher the interest paid on borrowed funds, and the 
higher the percent of net operating costs allocated across asset and liability accounts, the higher 
the interest rate charged. 
Dummy variables for whether or not the bank is located in a metropolitan statistical area 
(MSA) and whether the bank is associated with a multibank holding company (MBHC) are also 
included. Ellinger and Barry observed that banks in MSAs have higher operating costs, implying 
that these urban banks may charge a higher interest rate. However, there also may be a higher 
degree of competition in the MSA, influencing the bank to charge a lower rate. The loan portfolio of 
• 
a multibank holding company should be more diversified, therefore decreasing credit risk. 
Nonetheless, the loan policy mandated by the holding company may not allow the local bank to be 
flexible and responsive to local competition. The expected signs for these two dummy variables are 
not predicted. 
68
 
The resulting model is: 
AGLNlR:a. + ~1 T1 + ~2MSA + ~3MBHC + ~4IER+ +B5NOC + ~6ALR + ~7AGPRLN +
 
~8ATA + ~9LDR + ~loROE + ~
 
where: 
AGLNIR = derived agricultural production loan interest rate 
T1 =0 for 1989; = 1 for 1990 
MSA = metropolitan statistical area; 0 if not in MSA; 1 - otherwise 
MBHC = multibank holding company; 0 if not with MBHC; 1 - otherwise 
IER = interest expense rate 
NOC = net operating costs 
ALR =ag loan ratio 
AGPRLN =problem agricultural loans as a proportion to total ag loans 
ATA = log of average total assets 
LOR = loan/deposit ratio 
ROE = return on equity 
Empirical Results 
The means for the independent variables by interest rate category are calculated for 1989 
and 1990 for two bank size categories: banks with less than $300M in total assets and banks with 
more than $300M in total assets (Tables 7 and 8). All the variable means for the larger banks 
exhibit wider variation than for the smaller banks in both years. The mean variation for the interest 
expense is less than one percent for the small banks and is between 0.71 and 1.59 percent for the 
larger banks. The mean variation of net operating costs as a proportion of asset and liability 
accounts is less than one percent for both banks size groups. The proportion of problem loans to 
total agricultural loans range from 1.86 to 3.96 percent for the small banks and from 0 (one bank 
within the interest rate category) to 9.51 percent for the large banks; the upper boundary is close 
for both bank size groups. The ROE mean displays wide variation (1.45 to 22.45 percent), and 
analysis of the data indicates that outliers are present. As expected, the loan to deposit ratio is 
lower for the smaller banks, ranging from 49.18 to 57.8 percent, than for the large banks which 
vary from 70.88 to 82.77 percent. It is hypothesized that an increase in average ag production loan 
interest rate is a function of an increase of one or more of the following independent variables: 
interest expense, operating costs, problem loan proportion, ROE and loan/deposit ratio, and of a 
decrease in bank size. However, the variable means show no statistical pattern of increases or 
decreases across the interest rate categories. 
To further investigate the effect of these lender characteristics on interest rates, OLS 
regressions are run on the complete sample of banks and on the banks grouped into the small and 
large categories. The coefficients, t-statistics, and adjusted-R squared are presented in Tables 9­
11. The adjusted-R squared for all three regressions are 3.73 percent, 2.73 percent and 7.59 
percent for all, small and large banks, respectively, which a~e low even for cross-sectional data. 
The coefficients are inconsistent in sign and significance. The MSA coefficient is positive for all 
three regressions and significant for all institutions. The MBHC coefficient is positive for all banks 
and the large banks and insignificant for all three models. The coefficients for the interest expense 
and operating costs are positive, as predicted, for all three regressions; both the IER and NOC 
• 
coefficients are significant for all banks and the small institutions and insignificant for the large 
banks. The AGPRLN and ATA coefficients have the predicted signs for all institutions and the large 
banks, but both are significant for only the large banks. The ROE coefficient is positive but 
insignificant for all three models, and the ALR and LOR coefficients are not consistent in sign or 
significance across the regressions. 
Table 7A 
Agricultural Banks with <$300 M Assets Meeting Criteria 
Year· 1989 
Interest Rate 
Variables 7-7.99% 8-8.99% 9-9.99% 10-10.99% 11-11.99% 12-12.99% 13-13.99% 14-14.99% Total 
Ave Interest Rate 7.57 8.7 9.56 10.56 11.59 12.46 13.44 14.43 11.82 
Interest Expense Rate 7.13 6.86 6.93 6.96 6.95 6.94 6.96 6.98 6.95 
Net Operating Cost 0.91 1.23 1.02 1.08 1.11 1.19 1.27 1.2 1.15 
Problem Ag Loans 1.9 1.86 2.27 2.26 2.32 2.33 2.97 3.85 2.47 
ROE 11.96 11.03 11.2 10.62 11.04 18.48 7.47 10.8 12.85 
Ag Loan Ratio 36.02 36.55 41.89 38.66 39.21 38.49 33.34 31.85 37.95 
Loan/Deposit 49.89 53.87 50.12 52.84 53.92 54.06 55.22 55.9 53.84 
Ave Total Assets (l1lOuSandS) $82,n7.22 $78,659.01 $60,357.12 $54,990.25 $63,051.73 $66,361.98 $66,085.12 $67,370.15 $64,034.94 
No. of Banks 8 23 34 107 250 243 96 27 788., 
$ 
Table 78 
I 
Agricultural Banks with <$300 M Assets Meeting Criteria 
Year· 1990 
Interest Rate 
Variables 7-7.99% 8-8.99% 9-9.99% 10-10.99% 11-11.99% 12-12.99% 13-13.99% 14-14.99% TotAl 
Ave Interest Rate 7.41 8.57 9.65 10.59 11.55 12.36 13.38 14.43 11.71 
Interest Expense Rate 6.29 6.82 6.74 6.88 6.83 6.79 6.94 6.79 6.83 
Net Operating Cost 1.03 1.08 1.14 1.1 1.14 1.24 1.2 1.26 1.17 
Problem Ag Loans 3.63 3.37 3.75 3.96 3.54 3.5 3.34 3.43 3.56 
ROE 9.18 8.02 8.97 7.91 11.1 10.51 8.75 11.28 10.17 
Ag Loan Ratio 40.13 33.52 38.49 37.87 39.79 38.44 34.01 33.61 38.32 
Loan/Deposit Ratio 49.18 57.8 51.44 53.45 54.58 54.02 52.84 54.65 54.04 
Ave Total Assets (Thousands) $52,549.20 $73,502.35 $60,436.85 $74,310.52 $66,054.54 $66,256.38 $62,796.99 $75,635.74 $66,853.48 
No. of Banks 7 19 35 96 342 222 73 21 815 
~ . 
Table 8A 
Agricultural Banks with> =$300 MAllets Meeting Criteria 
Year - 1989 
Interest Rate 
Variables 7-7.99" 8-8.99" 9-9.99" 10-10.99" 11-11.99" 12-12.99" 13-13.99" 14-14.99" • Total 
Ave Interest Rate 7.04 8.47 9.57 10.54 11.57 12.37 13.52 14.32 11.77 
Interest Expense Rate 6.22 7.81 7.6 7.62 7.56 7.71 7.66 7.43 7.63 
Net Operating Cost 1.85 1.03 1.18 1.1 1.01 1.08 1.25 1.09 1.08 
Problem Ag Loans 0 4.33 2.79 1.17 2.05 2.66 5.63 2.04 2.44 
ROE 15.7 12.21 11.49 4.21 13.97 12.63 22.45 9.47 12.45 
Ag Loan Ratio 2.69 1.96 2.01 2.71 3.45 3.16 4 3.44 3.2 
LoanlDeposit Ratio 70.88 82.77 75.87 77.53 77.9 77.89 79.58 77.35 77.95 
Ave Total Assets (Thousands) $575,278.40 $10,177.84 M $1,692,452.82 $5,225,770.82 $3,219,737.06 $4,612,419.03 $4,189,181.13 $1,881,945.77 $4,054,265.82 
"No. or Bank! 1 7 12 41 109 99 20 12 31)J 
..... 
o 
Table 88 
Agricultural Banks with> =$300 M Assets Meeting Criteria 
Year - 1990 
Interest Rate 
Variables 7-7.99" 8-8.99" 9-9.99" 10-10.99" 11-11.99" 12-12.99" 13-13.99" 14-14.99" Total 
Avelnterest Rate 7.65 8.47 9.47 10.56 11.46 12.43 13.48 14.3 11.26 
Interest Expense Rate 7.45 7.45 7.44 7.57 7.19 7.24 7.05 7.76 7.32 
Net Operating Cost 0.95 0.96 1.07 1 1.08 1.1 1.19 1.17 1.06 
Problem Ag Loans 0.08 0.92 2.66 2.75 2.54 1.8 2.53 9.51 2.59 
ROE 16.76 7.62 6.7 11.03 10.37 9.4 14.12 1.45 10.21 
Ag Loan Ratio 1.71 1.25 1.14 2.98 3.59 2.89 5.4 1.9 3.16 
LoanlDeposit Ratio 78.95 74.05 82.78 77.29 78.81 75.6 72.22 79.59 77.75 
Ave Total AssetJ (Thousands) $2,933,680.92 $4,172,229.96 $5,482,444.99 $8,443,156.37 $3,462,116.11 $2,455,534.93 S5,664,864.86 $2,589,749.52 $4,816,591.41
 
No.orOank! 5 11 18 80 141 39 18 8 320
 
.­
Table 9 
OLS Estimates for all ag banks, 1989 & 1990 
Coefficient Coefficient 
for Variable Value t-statistic 
Tl -0.00206 
-3.928* 
MSA 0.001471 1.887** 
MBHC 0.000087 0.146 
IER 0.11302 2.486* 
NOC 0.511058 5.821* 
ALR -0.00132 -0.79 
AGPRLN 0.007432 1.392 
ATA -0.00106 -3.758* 
LOR -0.00264 
-•.402 
ROE 0.()00712 1.007 
Adjusted R-squared - 0.0373 
* - Significant at the 95% confidence interval 
** - Sismificant at the 90% confidence interval 
Table 10 
OLS Estimates for ag banks with <$300 M assets 
1989 & 1990 
Coefficient Coefficient 
for Variable Value t-statistic 
Tl -0.00102 -1.649** 
MSA 0.00135 1.471 
MBHC . -0.00085 -1.142 
IER 0.184047 2.447* 
NOC 0.667306 6.208* 
ALR -0.00043 -0.239 
AGPRLN -0.00158 -0.247 
ATA 0.00051 0.802 
LOR -0.00422 -1.81** 
ROE 0.000508 0.694 
Adjusted R-squared - 0.0273 
* - Significant at the 95% confidence interval 
** - Si2nificant at the 90% confidence interval 
Table 11 
OLS Estimates for ag banks with> =$300 M assets 
1989 & 1990 
Coefficient Coefficient 
for Variable Value t-statistic 
Tl -0.00464 -4.718* 
MSA 0.001717 0.984 
MBHC 0.00163 1.586 
IER 0.064822 1.09 
NOe 0.265564 1.643 
ALR 0.031684 2.347* 
AGPRLN 0.26612 2.722* 
ATA -0.00122 -2.48* 
LOR 0.001664 0.497 
ROE 0.002156 0.765 
Adjusted R-squared - 0.0759 
* - Significant at the 95% confidence interval 
** - Si2nificant at the 90% confidence interval 
....,
.... 
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Concluding Remarks 
The objective of this study is to evaluate the differences in interest rates charged on 
nonreal estate loans from commercial banks. After reviewing the concepts of loan pricing, related 
literature, and the Rrocedural issues involved in utilizing bank call data, criteria for institutions to be 
used in this study is established. The criteria identifies agricultural banks, and eliminates 
institutions who are smaller than $25M in average total assets, who do not report quarterly 
averages, whose ag loan portfolio falls below 75 percent in nonreal estate farm loans, and whose 
derived interest rate does not fall between seven and 15 percent. The derived nonreal estate farm 
loan interest rates for agricultural banks meeting this criteria are evaluated across bank asset size 
categories and agricultural loan portfolio composition. A model reflecting lender characteristics and 
the cost component of pricing a loan is then specified, and the means of the independent variables 
are analyzed across the interest rate categories. Noting that there is little variation in the cost 
component variables as the interest rate increases, OLS regressions are run to determine how 
much variation in the interest rate the variables explain. The adjusted R-squared is less than eight 
percent for all three models, and the coefficients are inconsistent in sign and significance across the 
models.. These results indicate that the derived ag production interest rates are not determined 
strictly according to the loan pricing model, and that other factors affecting the supply and demand 
for loans need to be considered. 
The preliminary results provide the foundation and direction for the next step in this 
research project, which is to analyze the differences in the earnings rate component of interest 
rates on the ag production loans. The net earnings on the farm loans can be calculated as a 
residual factor reflecting the difference between the calculated interest rates and the sum of the 
defined cost components. The objective of this analysis is to determine if the differences can be 
attributed to competitive or other systematic factors in the farm credit market. 
• 
---~! 
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DYNAMICS OF FARM INTEREST RATES 
Allen M. Featherstone, Barry K. Goodwin, and Alan D. Barkema' 
A concern of many U.S. farmers in recent years is that interest rates on farm loans have 
declined less than short-term interest rates in the national money market. Interest rates on farm 
loans and in the national money market have generally declined during the early 1990s. During 
that period, however. short-term rates in the money market have fallen nearly twice as much as 
farm interest rates. 
The four sections of this paper explore the relationship between interest rates in the 
national money market and interest rates on farm loans. The first section introduces the problem in 
greater detail. The second section reviews the theoretical concepts which underlie the relationships 
among various interest rates. The third section describes the empirical methods and data used in 
the analysis. The fourth section presents the results of the analysis. 
Introduction 
Interest rates in the U.S. money market have generally declined since early in 1989. but 
short-term rates fell much more than long-term rates. For example, the yield on six-month Treasury 
bills fell much more than twice as much (a decline of 621 basis points) as the yield on 10-year 
Treasury bonds (a decline of only 269 basis points) from March 1989 to December 1992. As a 
result, the "Treasury spread" (the difference between the yields on the six month T-bill and the 10­
year T-bond) widened markedly (Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Quarterly Spreads for Farm Lending
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Interest rates on farm loans in the Tenth (Kansas City) Federal Reserve District also 
declined sharply during this four-year period, but they did not follow money market rates in lock 
step. Short-term farm interest rates fell much less than short-tenn money market rates while long­
term farm interest rates fell slightly more than long-term money market rates. For example, the 
average rate charged on farm operating loans, which usually have a term of less than a year, fell 
316 basis points--about half the decline in the six-month T·bill yield, much to the dismay of district 
farmers. Meanwhile, the average rate on farm real estate loans fell 311 basis points, about 50 
basis points more than the decline in the 10-year bond yield, a fact which should lend some 
comfort to farm borrowers. Thus, the farm interest rates fell almost uniformly, regardless of the 
term of the loan leaving the "farm spread" (the difference between interest rates on farm real estate 
loans and on farm operating loans) at about zero, in sharp contrast to the marked widening of the 
Treasury yield spread (Figure 1). 
In contrast to the striking difference in the behavior of farm and money market interest rates 
in recent years, earlier data point to a closer relationship between the two. For example, the 
correlation between the farm spread and the Treasury spread from 1976 to 1984 is 74 percent. But 
after 1984, the correlation drops to only 37 percent. These trends in farm and Treasury interest 
rates points to the central question of this paper: what relationship exists between farm interest 
rates and interest rates in the national money market, and how has that relationship changed in 
recent years? 
Theory 
The relationship between short- and long-term interest rates is central to the relationship 
between fann and money market rates. Economists have developed several theories over the 
decades to explain the term structure of interest rates. These theories include the expectations 
theory (Fisher; Lutz; and Meiselman), the market segmentation theory (Culbertson, Roll), and the 
liquidity preference theory (Hicks). The expectations theory of interest suggest that long-term rates 
are a function of current and expected short-term rates. Thus, when the spread between long-tenn 
rates and short-term rates moves, the market's forecast of the future interest rate path has 
changed. The market segmentation theory of interest is based on the assumption that securities of 
different maturities are imperfect substitutes for each other. The liquidity preference theory is based 
upon the risk aversion of the market participants. 
Current economic thought suggests an expectations theory which combines elements of the 
original expectations theory and the liquidity preference theory (Mankiw; Russell). The "normal" 
shape C?f the yield curve is upward sloping. The traditional expectations theory would suggest a flat 
yield curve on average. Factors which have been used to explain the slope of the yield curve , 
include risk of unanticipated changes in interest caused by factors such as unanticipated inflation. 
The unanticipated inflation can place the security holder at risk of a capital loss. Thus, the security 
holder will demand a premium to hold longer tenn securities instead of shorter term securities. This 
premium is referred to as a tenn premium. 
Economic theory suggests that the tenn structure of interest rates in national money 
markets should be closely related to the term structure of fann interest rates. Profit seeking activity 
of arbitragers who can borrow (or lend) in both the national money market and the farm loan 
market would maintain a steady relationship between money market and farm interest rates. But 
that relationship could change through time with changes in the relative riskiness of borrowing or 
lending in either market (default risk), changes in the relative costs of loan origination (transactions Lcost), and shifts in demand for credit in the farm sector and in other sectors of the economy. 
Other researchers have recently focused attention on the relationship between the national 
money market rates and farm interest rates. Babula, Duncan, and Vasavada found that farm 
interest rates tend to be somewhat "sticky" in responding to changes in the 3-month T-bills. Covey 
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and Babula that a one-to-one relationship between changes in nominal farm interest rates and 
expected inflation (the Fisher relationship) does not exist. Duncan and Singer found that the yield 
spread between Treasury and Farm Credit System securities widened when the Farm Credit 
System fell on hard times in the mid-1980s and then narrowed as the System recovered. 
The work described herein is unique from these previous efforts in tworespects. First, this 
study uses cointegration analysis to determine the dynamic long-run stability of farm and money 
market interest rates. Second, the study uses impulse analysis to determine the dynamic response 
if farm interest rates to changes in money market rates. 
Procedures and Methods 
The previous discussion of theory would suggested that farm lending rates and 
macroeconomic rates should have some stable long-run equilibrium. Multivariate cointegration tests 
have been recently introduced by Johansen; Engle and Granger; and Johansen and Juselius to 
examine long-run equilibrium relationships. These have been widely applied in the agricultural 
economics literature (Goodwin and Schroeder; Goodwin). 
Bivariate and Multivariate Cointegration Tests 
Cointegration tests are a means for evaluating the long-run stability of economic equilibrium 
conditions. These tests evaluate the long-run stability of linear combinations of two or more 
variables which are, when taken alone, nonstationary. If a linear combination of two or more 
nonstationary variables can be used to form a stable equilibrium, the variables are said to be 
cointegrated. Widespread recognition of the fact that many economic time series are nonstationary 
has led to increasingly frequent use of cointegration testing techniques. 
A number of different approaches to evaluating cointegration relationships have been 
developed. For bivariate comparisons, Engle and Granger offer a number of different tests. Of 
their tests, the augmented Dickey Fuller test is the most powerful over a wide range of empirical 
circumstances and has realized the greatest use. The augmented Dickey Fuller test considers the 
stationarity of the residuals et from the following regression: 
(1 ) 
where Yt and X. are the two nonstationary variables being considered. These residuals are 
estimated in a first stage and then the following Dickey-Fuller stationarity test is applied: 
(2) 
The augmented Dickey-Fuller test is given by the ratio of -~ to its standard error. If the test statistic 
exceeds the relevant critical value tabulated by Engle and Granger, the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration is rejected. 
More recent work by Johansen and Juselius has developed tests for examining 
cointegration relationships among several variables.2 Under Johansen and Juselius' multivariate 
approach, a fully-specified vector error correction model of the form: 
•
(3) 
Johansen and Juselius offer critical values for cointegration tests f()r up to five variables. 
Osterwald-Lenum extended Johansen and Juselius' tests to include critical values for 
testing cointegration in groups of up to 11 variables. 
2 
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is estimated using maximum likelihood procedures. Note that VI is a pxT dimensional matrix of 
data, (r" ... , r k." n, ~) are parameters to be estimated, and el is a random error term. Inferences 
regarding the number of cointegrating vectors that exist among the p variables are drawn from a 
consideration of the rank of the n matrix. If the rank of the n matrix is greater than zero (but less 
than p), a cointegrqtion relationship among the variables is implied. Specifically, if the rank of n is 
r, then there are r unique cointegrating vectors among the p variables. 
Johansen developed two tests for evaluating the number of cointegrating vectors that exist 
among a set of time series variables. Under Johansen's approach, the following vector 
autoregressive models are estimated: 
(4) 
The residual vectors VI and ul are then used to construct two likelihood ratio test statistics that can 
be used to determine the number of cointegrating vectors. The first test statistic, known as the 
trace test, evaluates the null hypothesis that there are at most r cointegrating vectors and is given 
by: 
(5) 
where 1.,+" ... , ", denotes the p-r smallest squared canonical correlations of VI with respect to lit. 
The second test is known as the maximal eigenvalue test. This test evaluates the null hypothesis 
that there are exactly r cointegrating vectors in VI and is given by: 
'tmax = -T In(1-,,-;) (6) 
Each test has, as its alternative, the case of 9 > r cointegrating vectors. 
Impulse Responses for Cointegrated Systems 
In applied time series analysis, it is often of interest to consider the time path responses of 
variables to exogenous shocks to anyone of the variables in the system. Such time path 
responses yield inferences regarding the dynamic adjustments in each of the variables that occur in 
response to unexpected shocks. These time path responses are referred to as impulse responses. 
Calculation of impulse responses for a cointegrated system of variables follows much the same 
approach as what is used to obtain impulse responses in a standard VAR system. However, the 
fact that cointegration implies an error correction model alters the usual procedures for calculating 
and interpreting impulse responses. If the variables are cointegrated, shocks to the system should 
move the time path of the system to a new equilibrium rather than dying out in the long run. This 
reflects the error correction properties of cointegrated variables. The error shock brings about a 
correction to a new equilibrium. 
LOtkepohl and Reimers discuss the correct approach to calculating impulse responses from 
cointegrated systems. Under their approach, the error correction model represented by equation 
(3) is estimated using maximum likelihood procedures. The following matrix is then constructed 
•from the error correction model's parameter estimates: 
[A" ~, ... , AJ = [r" ..., r k." ll]D + J (7) 
where: 
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D =	 r Ik -Ik 0 0 ... 0 
10 Ik -Ik 0 ... 0 (8) 
I .
 
I -Ik
 
L 0 ... Ik
 
J = [Ik , 0 , ..., 0]	 (9) 
where Ik is a k dimensional identity matrix. LOtkepohl and Reimers show that the impulse 
responses are then given by: 
(10) 
These adjustments recognize the fact that an error correction term (in levels) must be collected with 
like first differences for each variable. 
Money market interest rates used in the analysis include the yield on six-month T-bills, ten­
year T-bonds, and Federal Land Bank bonds. The quarterly yield on the Farm Credit System 
(FCS) bonds were calculated from the average of the yield on the Federal Land Bank bonds on the 
date nearest the fifteenth of the month. 
Farm rates used in the analysis are the annual rates charged on farm operating loans, 
feeder cattle loans, intermediate farm loans, and farm real estate loans in the Tenth (Kansas City) 
Federal Reserve District3• The farm interest rate data are collected quarterly in the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Kansas City's Agricultural Credit Survey, and reported in the Kansas City Fed's 
Regional Economic Digest. For each type of farm loan, the data are unweighted averages of 
interest rates charged on new loans at the end of each quarter by a panel of commercial 
agricultural banks4• The survey began in 1976 with a panel of 180 banks, which gradually eroded 
to 140 banks. In 1987, additional banks were added to the survey panel to boost the number of 
banks participating in the survey each quarter to about 330, a panel which includes roughly a third 
of the agricultural banks in each of the Tenth District's seven states (Barkema and Stanley). 
Results 
Unit Root Tests 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests were used to determine the number of unit roots that exist in 
each series. Cointegration tests cannot be done unless each series is non-stationary or has at 
least one unit root. The first step in the Dickey-Fuller tests is to determine the lag length. We 
determined the lag length using the Schwartz Bayesian Criteria (Judge, Griffiths, Hill, and Lee p. 
245-46). The Schwartz Bayesian criteria is a trade off between additional fit from adding additional 
parameters and the number of parameters. The minimum of the test statistic is chosen to be the 
appropriate lag length. Table 1 presents the Schwartz Bayesian test for different lag lengths and 
the augmented Dickey Fuller tests for at least one unit root for each of the seven interest rate 
-
3	 The Tenth Federal Reserve District includes all or part of seven states: Colorado, Kansas, ...-­
western Missouri, Nebraska, northern New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Wyoming. 
4	 The survey defines an agricultural bank as one with at least 25 percent of its loans to
 
farmers.
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series. A lag length of three was optimum for the Feeder Cattle and Operating interest series, 
while a lag length of one was optimal for the other interest rate series. The Dickey-Fuller test 
statistic is determined by the t-value on the lagged value in a regression consisting of a constant, a 
lagged value and lagged values of the differences. The critical values for the unit root test are 
-2.60, -2.93, and -3.58 for the 10, five, and one percent level of significance, respectively (Fuller, 
p. 373). The results of the Augmented Dickey Fuller tests suggests that the null hypothesis that at 
least one unit root exists cannot be rejected at the 10, the five, or the one percent level of 
confidence. 
Table 1. Schwartz Bayesian Criteria for Lag Length and the 
Dickey Fuller Test for at Least One Unh Root 
Lag Feeder Inter- Real 6-Month 10-Year FCS 
Length Cattle Operating mediate Estate T-BIII T-Bond Bonds 
0 
-.36648 -.39018 -.44360* -.45975* .14294* -.72198 -.71327* 
2 -.27311 -.29981 -.34747 -.36285 .18082 -.62616 -.62371 
3 -.39460* -.52897* -.38970 -.44899 .18786 -.58224 -.56318 
4 -.29583 -.43584 -.28929 -.35567 .28792 -.48095 -.46829 
5 -.29915 -.44650 -.23377 -.26352 .30789 -.39752 -.38534 
6 -.19594 -.34523 -.15219 -.18409 .41068 -.29404 -.28116 
T-testa -1.9819 -2.1196 -1.3640 -1.1322 -1.4984 -1.5263 -1.5556 
a No star indicates that the H is not rejected. This indicates that there is at least one unit root. o 
* Indicates the lag length at which the augmented Dickey Fuller test is performed. 
After testing for at least one unit root, the second step is to test for whether at least two unit 
roots exist. The results of the Augmented Dickey Fuller test for at least two unit roots (using the 
same critical values as in the test for at least one unit root on first differenced data) is rejected at 
the five percent level of significance for feeder cattle, intermediate, and real estate interest rates 
(Table 2). The test for at least two unit roots is rejected at the one percent level of significance for 
interest rates for the 6-month T-bill, the 10-year T-bond, and the FCS bonds. The test for at least 
two unit roots is rejected at the 10 percent level for operating interest rates. The results of the tests 
suggest that the data series contain one unit root (are nonstationary). The practical significance of 
the Dickey Fuller tests is that cointegration tests cannot be performed on data series which have 
different numbers of unit roots. 
Multivariate Cointegration Tests 
After determining that the series contain 1 unit root, the next step is to determine the 
appropriate order for the multivariate VAR. The Schwartz Bayesian criteria is again used to 
determine the appropriate lag length. The minimum test statistic is chosen to be the appropriate 
lag length of three lags for the system consisting of 6-month T-bill, 10-year T-bond, FCS bond, 
feeder cattle, operating, intermediate, and real estate rates. 
Johansen's Trace test and the Maximum Eigenvalue test are used to determine the number 
of cointegrating vectors in the seven interest rate system. The results of the cointegration tests and 
•
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the critical values are presented in Table 3. The critical values are derived by Osterwald-Lenum. 
The multivariate cointegration tests suggest that three or more cointegrating vectors exist in the set 
of the seven interest rates. Zero cointegrating vectors would indicate that a stable long-run solution 
does not exist among the seven series. Thus, the results confirm that a stable long-run solution 
exists for the seven interest rates. 
Table 2. Schwartz Bayesian Criteria for Lag Length and the 
Dickey Fuller Test for at Least Two Unit Roots 
Lag Feeder Inter- Real 6-Month 1o-Year FCS 
Length cattle Operating mediate Estate T-BIII T-Bond Bonds 
0 
-.32384 -.35180 -.40019 -.42310 .11688* -.67055* -.59467* 
2 -.41194* -.53737* -.41835* -.48263* .14813 -.60332 -.51452 
3 -.31881 -.45626 -.31755 -.38289 .23490 -.50735 -.41352 
4 -.28189 -.42342 -.23976 -.28134 .28842 -.44062 -.34525 
5 -.17807 -.33336 -.13842 -.18256 .37862 -.33448 -.23929 
6 -.07445 -.22415 -.04907 -.08443 .42609 -.26068 -.13862 
T-test -3.0337 -2.7715 -3.2719 -3.0791 -6.9026 -5.0292 -4.9550 
* Indicates the lag length at which the augmented Dickey Fuller test is performed. 
Table 3. Co-Integration Tests for the Seven Variable 
Kansas City Farm Interest Rate Series 
Co-Integrating Eigenvalue Eigenvalue Trace Test 
Vectors Calculated Value Critical Value Calculated Value 
0 83.54* 46.45 228.54* 
1 59.51* 40.30 145.00* 
2 44.48* 34.40 85.49* 
3 20.50 28.14 41.01 
4 10.97 22.00 20.51 
5 9.33 15.67 9.54 
6 0.21 9.24 0.21 
Trace Test
 
Critical Level
 
131.71 
102.14 
76.07 
53.12 
34.91 
19.96 
9.24 
* Indicates that the null hypothesis of the number of co-integrating vectors is rejected. 
• 
Johansen's multivariate cointegration tests were redone eliminating two of the following 
interest rate series; the 10-year T-bond, the 6-month T-bill, and the FCS bond rates. 
The results of these tests are summarized in Tables 4-6. Table 4 contains the results from the 
multivariate cointegration test of the 6-month T-bill, feeder cattle, operating, intermediate, and real 
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estate rates. The results indicate that no cointegrating vector exists for this system of interest 
rates. A stable long-run equilibrium does not exist for these five interest rates. Table 5 contains 
the results of Johansen's cointegration tests for the 1O-year T-bond, feeder cattle, operating, 
intermediate, and real estate interest rate series. The results indicate that a stable long-run 
solution exists for this series of interest rates. In fact, the Eigenvalue test indicates that more than 
two cointegrating vectors exists for this series of interest rates. Table 6 contains the results from 
the cointegration test of the FCS bond, feeder cattle, operating, intermediate, and real estate rates. 
The results indicate that a long run stable solution exists for this series of interest rates with more 
than one cointegrating vectors existing for this series of interest rates. It appears that the most 
stable equilibrium exists for the Kansas City interest rates and the 10-year T-bond rate then the 
FCS bond rate. The 6-month T-bill rates and the Kansas City interest rates do not have a long-run 
stable equilibrium. An implication of the cointegration results is that shorter maturity 
macroeconomic rates are not an appropriate interest rates to use as proxies for farm lending rates. 
In addition, when looking to determine future changes in farm interest rate series it is more 
appropriate to focus on longer term macroeconomic rates than shorter term rates. 
Table 4. Co-Integration Tests for the Five Variable 
Kansas City Farm Interest Rate Series 
(1D-Year T-Bonds and FCS Bonds Eliminated) 
Co-Integrating Eigenvalue Eigenvalue Trace Test Trace Test 
Vectors Calculated Value Critical Value Calculated Value Critical Level 
o 30.75 34.40 66.93 76.07 
21.91 28.14 36.18 53.12 
2 10.78 22.00 14.27 34.91 
3 3.16 15.67 3.49 19.96 
4 0.33 9.24 0.33 9.24 
* Indicates that the null hypothesis of the number of co-integrating vectors is rejected. 
Table 5. Co-Integration Tests for the Five Variable 
Kansas City Farm Interest Rate Series 
(6-Month T-Bllls and FCS Bonds Eliminated) 
Co-Integrating Eigenvalue Eigenvalue Trace Test 
Vectors Calculated Value Critical Value Calculated Value 
0 66.12* 34.40 117.78* 
1 28.90* 28.14 51.66 
2 13.27 22.00 22.76 
3 8.62 15.67 9.49 
4 0.87 9.24 0.87 
* Indicates that the null hypothesis of the number of co-integrating vectors is rejected. 
Trace Test 
Critical Level 
76.07 
53.12 
34.91 
19.96 
9.24 
• 
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The results of the Engle and Granger cointegration tests for the 19'7.6 through 1992 indicate 
that the farm spread and the treasury spread are not cointegrated at a 10 percent level of 
significance with a test statistic of -1.82. The results from the cointegration tests for the 1976 to 
1984 period also indicated that the vectors were not cointegrated at the 10 percent level of 
significance with a test statistic of -2.05. The results from the cointegration tests for the 1984 to 
1992 period were also not significant with a test statistic of -1.47. Comparing the calculated test 
statistics of the pre-1984 period with the post-1984 period lends support to the hypothesis that the 
relationship between the treasury spread and the farm spread was stronger in the pre-1984 period 
than In the post-1984 period. 
Impulse Responses from the Cointegration Results 
The impulse response functions measure the effect of a shock to a system of variables on 
the rest of the variables in the system. When calculating the impulse functions, it is necessary to 
determine a variable ordering for the system. The more exogenous the interest rate, the higher in 
the ordering that variable is placed. The interest rates were ordered as follows: 6-rnonth T-bill, 10­
year T-bond, FCS bond, feeder cattle, operating, intermediate, and real estate rates. In contrast to 
a VAR system, a shock to a system may result in a permanent or a transitory effect in a 
cointegrated system. In a VAR system, the shocks will eventually die out. A one time shock is 
defined as transitory if it returns to its previoUS equilibrium after some period of time. A shock is 
defined as permanent if it settles at an equilibrium different from zero. 
Figure 2 examines the time path of the Kansas City interest rates to a shock in the 6-month 
T-bill rates. A shock in the 6-rnonth T-bill results initially in a movement of about 35 basis points in 
that interest rate. The shock continues to increase before starting a general downward trend. In 
response to this shock in the T-bill rate, the four farm rates respond immediately to that shock on 
an order of about one-half. The farm lending rates continue to increase for another four quarters 
until they begin to follow the Treasury bill rate. After 20 periods, the real estate and the 
intermediate lending rate begin to diverge. This likely reflects the fact that the Kansas City rates 
are not cointegrated with the 6-rnonth T-bill rate. 
Figure.2. Response of Kansas City Farm Lending
 
Rates to a ShOCk in the 6-Month T-Bill Rate
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Figure 3 examines the time path of the Kansas City farm lending rates to a shock in the 10­
year T-bond rate. The Kansas City rates do not respond rnJch in the short-run to a shock in the 
long-run interest rate. However, after a year, the Kansas City lending rates move fairly closely with 
the 10-year T-bond rate. The Kansas City rates do not begin to diverge from the long-term 
govemment rate as they did in Figure 2. 
Figure 3. Response of Kansas City Farm Lending
 
Rates to a Shock In the 10-Year T-Bond Rate
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Figure 4 examines the time path of the Kansas City farm lending rates to a shock in the 
Farm Credit lending rate. The longer-term movement of the farm rates is not as closely aligned 
with the FCS rate as they are with the 1O-year Treasury rate. However, it is more aligned than is 
the 6-month Treasury bill rate. 
Figure 4. Response of Kansas City Farm Lending 
Rates to a Shock In the Farm Credit Bond Rate 
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Conclusions 
This study has examined the relationship between money market interest rates and farm 
lending rates. The results from this study suggest that a system of 6-month Treasury bills, 10-year 
Treasury bonds, FCS bonds, and Kansas City feeder cattle, operating, intermediate, and real estate 
lending rates does have a stable long-run equilibrium. However, as macroeconomic rates are 
dropped from the system, we find that a system of 6-month T-bills and the four Kansas City interest 
rates are do not have a long-run equilibrium relationship. Two alternative five variable systems 
consisting of the four Kansas City lending rates and alternatively the 10-year T-bond and the FCS 
bond yield do have long-run stable relationships. One of the implications of these results is that 
short-term Treasury bill rates are not a good proxy for farm lending rates. 
A second implication from this study was found by examining the relationship between the 
farm yield curve, as defined by subtracting the Kansas City real estate rate from the operating rate, 
and the treasury yield curve, as defined as the difference between the 1O-year T-bond rate and the 
6-month T-bill rate. The strength of the relationship between the farm yield curve and the treasury 
yield curve has weakened in the 1984-1992 period from the 1976-1984 period. This weakening 
coincides with an inversion of the farm yield curve. During every quarter except one since 1984 
operating lending rates have been higher than real estate lending rates in the Kansas City Federal 
Reserve District. This phenomena has persisted in other regions as well as can be seen by 
examining lending rates for other Federal Reserve Districts (Walraven, Ott, and Rosine). An 
explanation of this difference may rest in a shifting in the perceived default characteristics or the 
cost structure associated with shorter versus longer maturity loans. 
Finally, the paper examined the effect of shocks in money market interest rates on Kansas 
City farm lending rates. In all cases, the response of the farm lending rates to a shock in a 
macroeconomic rate is not highly aligned for at least four quarters. After that period of time, the 
rates begin to move together. Developing a plausible explanation for the weakening of the 
relationship between the farm spread and the treasury spread is an issue the needs further 
investigation. 
•
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MEASURING ECONOMIES OF SCALE AND SCOPE 
IN AGRICULTURAL BANKING 
Allen M. Featherstone and Charles B. Moss1 
The efficient size of agricultural banks is an issue that will remain important for the rest of 
the 1990s. The consolidation that is occurring in the rest of the financial services industry has 
spilled over into agricultural banks. This consolidation has raised concern among the general 
populous as to whether the consolidated banks will continue to lend to agriculture as has been in 
the past. In addition, major concerns rest in whether consolidation is moving agricultural banks 
down their cost curves to achieve greater efficiency, or whether consolidation is resulting in greater 
market power without achieving cost savings. The study of the production technology of financial 
institutions can determine whether and to what degree economies of size exist and how agricultural 
lending will fit into the overall business plans of consolidated banks. 
Generally, empirical studies have used either duality theory with the estimation of cost 
functions or nonparametric estimation methods to assess efficiency in the financial services 
industry. The purpose of this study' is to estimate an indirect multi-product cost function to examine 
the cost structure of agricultural banks. The uniqueness of this study, when compared to previous 
studies of efficiency of the financial services industry, is the disaggregation of the outputs so that 
agricultural lending can be studied. 
Clark reviewed 13 studies that measured economies of scope for commercial banks, credit 
unions, and savings and loan associations. Clark found that these studies offered four broad 
conclusions: 1) overall economies of scale exist at low levels of input, 2) no consistent evidence of 
economies of scope, 3) some evidence of cost complementarities. and 4) the results seem to be 
robust among financial institutions. 
Humphery also reviewed studies which examine the issue of bank economies of scale. 
Humphery found that little cost savings exist for increases in size alone. He found that significant 
benefits accrue from loan diversification. Humphery also found that the differences in cost structure 
within the same size category is large compared to measured cost economies. 
Featherstone recently examined studies of multiproduct cost bank structure. He found most 
studies had rejected the hypothesis of homothetic production technologies. Thus, the aggregation 
of output into a single commodity is inappropriate. Another common finding in the studies is that 
some evidence of economies of scale does exist for low levels of output, while diseconomies of 
scale exist for high levels of output. However, the statistical significance of these results is not all 
that strong. Each of these studies also find that global economies of scale are positive and exist, 
however, the estimates are not statistically significant. 
The paper will be organized in the following manner. First, multiproduct cost concepts will 
be briefly discussed. A discussion of the empirical model used to estimate the cost structure will 
follow. The data and procedures used in the estimation of agricultural bank's indirect multi-product 
cost curves is discussed next. The paper will summarize the empirical findings. Finally, the paper 
will conclude with an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of this study and provide 
comments on future research needs for those interested in agricultural banks. 
• 
.' 
Allen Featherstone is an associate professor in the Department of Agricultural Economics, 
Kansas State University, and Charles B. Moss is an associate professor in the Food and 
Resource Economics Department at the University of Florida. 
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Multiproduct Cost Concepts 
Multiproduct cost concepts did not arise until the early 1980s (Baumol, Panzar, and Willig). 
In a multiproduct framework, economies of scale can arise from two sources: product-specific 
economies and/or economies of scope. Product specific economies are present if the per unit cost 
of producing an output declines as the output increases. In a multiproduct framework, product 
specific economies are measured by defining what is known as incremental cost. The incremental 
cost for the ith output (ICj) is defined as the cost of producing the entire multiproduct output bundle 
(C(Y)) minus the cost of producing all of the outputs except the ith output (C(YN.j))' Formally: 
(1 ) 
Product-specific economies of scale (Sj) are then determined by taking the average incremental 
cost of producing the ith output (ICIYj) divided by the marginal incremental cost of producing the ith 
output ('dClaYj). Formally: 
Sj = 1.!.Qffi. (2) 
('dClaYj) 
If Sj is greater than one than product specific economies of scale are said to exist. Product specific 
economies of scale are most analogous to the single output case of scale economies. This 
measure can be expanded to include subsets of products if desired. 
Economies of scope (diversification) arise from cost savings obtained from the 
simultaneous production of several outputs together. Economies of scope (SCj(Y)) exist if the cost 
of producing the optimal level of outputs in "individual firms" is greater than the cost of producing 
the same optimal output levels in a multiproduct firm. Formally for a two product firm, if 
C(Y1) + C(Y2) > C(Y) (3) 
then economies of scope exist, where C(Y1) is the cost of producing output 1 in a single product 
firm and C(Y2) is the cost of producing output 2 in a single product firm. For 2 outputs, economies 
of scope (SCN(Y)) are defined as: 
(4) 
If SCN(Y) is greater than zero than economies of scope are said to exist. This indicates the relative 
increase in cost from a splintering of production into separate groups or the relative cost savings of 
multiproduct production. 
Both economies of scope (SCN(Y)) and product-specific economies (Sj) can be combined to 
give an overall measure of the returns to scale for an individual finn. These are also referred to as 
scale economies (SN)' Formally, the measure of economies of scale for a two output firm is: 
(5) 
where a, is the first firm's output time the marginal cost as a proportion of the sum of all outputs 
multiplied individually by their marginal cost. 
• 
Economies of scale can then arise under multiple scenarios. If economies of scope are 
equal to zero, then economies of scale will exist if one of the outputs has constant returns to scale 
and the other output has increasing returns to scale. Economies of scale can also arise if both 
outputs have constant retums to scale if economies of scope exist. . 
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Empirical Model 
MultiprodUct cost concepts were able to develop only after the development and application 
of duality theory. Rigorous treatment of duality originated in 1953 with a book by Ronald Shephard. 
This allowed a rapid expansion of the classes of functional forms available for empirical estimation 
of production relationships. The class of flexible functional forms, which are based on 2nd-order 
Taylor series approximations, include the translog, generalized Leontief, and the quadratic. The 
translog is the most commonly applied functional form used in multiproduct cost analysis of the 
banking industry. A problem encountered with the use of the translog cost function is that outputs 
are logged in the estimation process. If a financial institution does not produce an output, the log of 
that output quantity (zero) is undefined. This problem becomes important when calculating 
incremental costs. A commonly accepted technique is to replace zero outputs with a sufficiently 
small nonzero value. Cowing and Holtmann; Akridge and Hertel; and Schroeder set zero output 
values equal to 10 percent of the geometric mean. A drawback of this procedure is that bias may 
be introduced into the parameter estimates. 
A functional form that has been used to avoid this problem encountered with the translog 
functional form is the normalized quadratic. The normalized quadratic is expressed as: 
(6) 
m n 
+ E E a.w/Y.
. 1 . 1 lj }I: J:m+ 
where C' is the normalized cost, (cost divided by the Oth input price), w; is the ith normalized price, 
and Yi is the ith output quantity. The cost function is assumed to be twice-continuously 
differentiable, and linear homogeneous in input prices. Homogeneity is imposed by the 
normalization process. To satisfy economic theory, the cost function is also concave in input prices 
and convex in outputs. 
Using Shepherd's lemma, the first derivative of the cost function is the compensated input 
demand functions. 
ac' m, n . 
__:x;:Q.;+ E aijwj + E aij~ for l:l, ...m-1. (7)
awl j:l j:m+l 
Symmetry is imposed by restricting <X;j=~i in the estimation procedure. 
Data and Procedures 
The normalized quadratic cost function consists of six outputs and four inputs. The value­
added approach was used to define the inputs and outputs. The source of the data was the 1990 
Federal Reserve Call Report data. A sample of 7,140 rural or agricultural banks were selected if at 
least 50 percent if the deposits of branches are not located in a metropolitan service area (MSA) or 
if the bank had an agricultural loan ratio of 25 percent or higher. The outputs consisted of quarterly ­
averages of transaction deposits (y4), nontransaction deposits (Y5), nonagricultural real estate 
loans (Y2), nonagricultural nonreal estate loans (y3), agricultural real estate and nonreal estate 
loans (Yl), and other bank output (Y6). The inputs consist of the number of employees (X2), fixed 
assets (><3), total assets (XO), and total deposits (Xl). 
92 
The sample size was reduced by 32 banks when price variables were calculated due to the 
division by zero. The definition of outputs was straight forward except for other outputs. Other 
outputs consisted of federal funds and total securities. The price for labor was determined by 
dividing employee expense by the number of employees. The occupancy price was determined by 
dividing the occupancy expense divided by the fixed asset value (Mester). The interest expense 
was determined by dividing the interest paid divided by total loans. The other input price was 
determined by dividing other expense by total assets. The price on which the quadratic function 
was normalized was other operating expenses. Summary statistics for data are found in Table 1. 
Results 
The parameter estimates of the cost function and three input demand functions: total 
deposits, labor, and fixed assets are found in Table 2. The inputs carry the subscript 1 to 3 
whereas the outputs carry the subscripts 4 to 9. The estimation procedure was iterative seemingly 
unrelated regression. The adjusted R-square for the cost function was .9947, .9976 for the deposit 
equation, .9457 for the employee equation, and .8097 for the fixed asset equation. The t-statistics 
were significant on 89.1 percent of the parameter estimates which is higher than reported in other 
studies (Akridge and Hertel, SChroeder, Cowing and Holtmann). 
Table 3 presents the price elasticity estimates for deposits, labor, and premises. The 
elasticity estimates are calculated at the mean of the price and output variables. The own-price 
elasticities for deposits and labor are negative and close to zero. The own-price elasticity on the 
premises is positive. This indicates that the curvature properties do not hold and thus estimation 
needs to take place with curvature properties imposed. Caution must be used when interpreting 
the results. 
Table 4 presents the marginal cost estimates and the product specific economies of scale 
for each of the outputs. If product specific economies of scale are greater than one, that product is 
said to be produced in a region of increasing returns. All outputs except other bank output have 
product specific economies nearly equal to one, indicating constant returns to scale at the mean 
output. Other bank output has an estimate of 1.33 indicating returns of scale exist at the mean 
level. 
Table 5 presents the economies of scope measure for each of the output products. The 
economies of scope measures presented in Table 5 represent production splintered into two 
groups: the product being produced alone and the other five products being produced. Each of 
the measures is slightly negative indicating the that no economies of scope exist or slight 
diseconomies. This indicates that the production of these outputs will reduce costs on the order of 
4.5 to 8.0 percent. Another economies of scope measure was calculated by splintering production 
into 6 single product firms. The results indicate that the splintering of outputs into single firms 
would reduce costs by 27.1 percent. 
Finally, a measure of the overall economies of scale for the firm at the mean levels of 
output was calculated. The results indicate that at mean output levels the overall returns to scale 
measure is .954. The indicates that for this sample of banks, the outputs are being produced in a 
region of nearly constant returns to scale or a region of slight diseconomies of scale. 
• 
.' 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics of Sample Banks (7,108) Observations 
Standard 
Variable Minimum Maximum Average Deviation 
Y1-Agricultural real estate and nonreal estate loans ($000,000) 0.0 270.2 4.7 7.1 
Y2-Nonagricultural real estate loans ($000,000) 0.0 1608.7 14.8 41.1 
Y3-Nonagricultural nonreal estate loans ($000,000) 0.0 1317.1 13.0 . 44.0 
Y4-Transactions deposits ($000,000) 0.0 1085.0 12.8 29.4 
Y5-Nontransaction deposits ($000,000) 0.0 2690.0 40.0 82.5 
Y6-Other bank output ($000,000) 0.0 1215.1 21.5 37.6 
XO-Total assets ($000) 1446 4451466 59916 132625 
X1-Total deposits ($000) 1866 4591859 59964 136720 
X2-Number of employees 1.8 3630.8 32.9 81.2 
X3-Fixed assets ($000) 1.0 141910 1187 3119 
PO-(XO/total assets) 0.0005 0.1452 0.0113 0.0055 
P1-(X1/total deposits) 0.0001 0.1479 0.0487 0.0083 
P2-Average salary ($000) 1.5 76.2 27.4 6.4 
P3-(X3/fixed assets) 0.002 94.0 0.353 1.505 
Cost ($000) 110 389308 4791 11476 
l' I 
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Table 2. Parameter Estimates for the 1990 Agricultural Bank Data 
Parameter Estimate T·Ratlo 
<Xo -7050.41 -9.27· 
(x, -1695.93 -11.56· 
~ 0.6448 1.70 
Cl:l -132.49 -18.81· 
(X4 2770.18 18.59· 
as 2339.78 24.77· 
Os 2598.05 28.69· 
~ -647.91 -6.22· 
as -1626.70 -15.96· 
ag 2522.95 26.80· 
(X, I -440.74 -10.02· 
(X12 0.2462 4.14· 
(X'3 6.642 15.32· 
~ -.0014 -11.34· 
~3 .0169 16.89· 
Cl:l3 .0232 14.80· 
(X44 -69.05 -10.08· 
(X45 -18.96 -4.33· 
(X46 4.52 1.34 
(X47 15.67 3.86· 
(X48 5.41 1.06 
(X49 -9.67 -1.99· 
(X55 -3.91 -1.54 
CXss -7.89 -3.41· 
as7 25.30 7.97· 
<Xse 3.88 1.51 
• Significant at the five percent level. 
-
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95 
Table 2. (can't) Parameter Estimates for the 1990 Agrlcuhural Bank Data 
Parameter Estimate T-Ratio 
~9 
~ 
~7 
~ 
~ 
fJ..n 
~B 
~ 
CXas 
<Xe9 
Ogg 
0.14 
0.15 
0.16 
0.17 
alB 
0.19 
~4 
~5 
~ 
~7 
~B 
~ 
~ 
<X:3s 
CX:3s 
~7 
~ 
~9 
* Significant at the five percent level. 
-18.90 
-17.27 
16.35 
13.70 
-21.44 
4.63 
-28.16 
18.38 
-6.47 
22.57 
-22.98 
666.04 
-.763 
-40.23 
629.92 
-.536 
-12.84 
712.43 
-.772 
-14.29 
1269.91 
2.76 
103.03 
284.01 
1.06 
28.12 
643.94 
-1.07 
-45.22 
-7.06* 
-7.38* 
5.95* 
5.83* 
-9.15* 
1.55 
-8.98* 
6.40* 
-2.29* 
7.81* 
-8.29* 
44.53* 
-20.60* 
-20.84* 
54.03* 
-17.98* 
-7.39* 
69.34* 
-29.30* 
-9.40* 
107.93* 
93.21* 
56.20* 
23.26* 
34.04* 
16.42* 
57.21* 
-37.75* 
-28.50* 
"",, 
-
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Table 3. 
Quantity 
Input Demand Price Elasticities 
Price 
Deposits Labor Premises 
Deposits -.0373 .0118 .0044 
Labor .0399 -.1321 .0212 
Premises .0395 .0568 .0011 
Table 4. Marginal Costs and Product Specific Economies of Scale for Bank Outputs 
Product Specific 
Output Marginal Cost Economies of Scale 
Agricultural loans $ 2039.4 1.0789 
Nonag real estate 3317.3 1.0087 
Other nonag loans 3411.2 1.0328 
Transactions deposits 17797.4 0.9983 
Nontransactions deposits 4090.9 1.0316 
Other bank output 890.1 1.3254 
Table 5. Economies of Scope for Bank Output 
Output Economies of Scope 
Agricultural loans -.0486 
Nonag real estate -.0452 
Other nonag loans -.0541 
Transactions deposits -.0469 
Nontransactions deposits -.0802 
Other bank output -.0722 
•Conclusions and Implications 
The implications from this study will focus along economics implications for agricultural 
banking and technical issues that still need to be resolved in the banking literature. Any economic 
implications from this study must be interpreted with care because concavity of input prices and 
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convexity of outputs does not hold globally. The curvature conditions are derived from economic 
theory and are just as important as conditions which are easily imposed such as symmetry and 
homogeneity. 
Given the results of this study, at the mean size of the banks examined in this study, $60 
million, economies of scale are not present. In fact, at the mean bank size, the economies of scale 
measure is slightly negative. Thus, economies of scale seem to be exhausted at this size of bank 
output. A second implication is that economies of scope do not exist for any of the individual 
outputs. Thus, combining agricultural lending into an institution which currently does not have 
agricultural lending will not lead to economies of diversification. Thus, the results from this study 
suggest that cost advantages to increasing bank size do not exist at the mean of $60 million in 
assets. 
More technical issues still remain in the agricultural banking literature. The first issue is 
that studies which examine the relative efficiency of various financial institutions must be cautiously 
interpreted. If the cost function does not adhere to conditions derived from economic theory, how 
trustworthy are the estimates reported in this paper or other papers? The results suggest that 
curvature properties may not hold in the estimation process. A second technical point deals with 
the determination of input prices in many studies of banking. For example, using total deposits as 
a measure of quantity to determine more than one price ratio for different commodities is 
inappropriate. This can be seen by examining equation (7). In actuality, the dependent variable on 
each of the input demand equations is total deposits. This fact is often masked by the use of the 
translog cost function. The definition of input quantities in a service institution is an area that 
continues to need much input. Future research will focus on the imposition of curvature properties 
and the definition of input quantities. 
-

,..-.". 
98 
References 
Akridge, J.A. and T.W. Hertel. "Measuring Productive Efficiency in Multiple Product Agribusiness 
Firms: A Dual Approach." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 68(1986):928-38. 
Baumol, W.J., J.C. Panzar, and R.D. Willig. Contestable Markets and Industry Structure. Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, Inc., New York. 1982. 
Clark, J.A. "Economies of Scale and Scope at Depository Financial Institutions: A Review of 
Literature." Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review 73(September/OCtober 
1988):16-33. 
Cowing, T.G. and A.G. Holtmann. "Multiproduct Short-Run Hospital Cost Functions: Empirical 
Evidence and Policy Implications from Cross-Section Data." Southern Economic Journal 
49(1983):637-53. 
Featherstone, A.M. "Efficiency Analysis of Financial Institutions: A Review of Empirical Studies." 
Regulatory, Efficiency and Management Issues Affecting Rural Financial Markets. 
Proceedings of NC-207, Food & Resource Economics Department, University of Florida, 
SP93-22, September 1993. 
Humphery, D.B. "Why Do Estimates of Bank Scale Economies Differ?" Federal Reserve Bank of 
Richmond Economic Review 76(September/October 1990):38-50. 
Mester, L.J. "A Multiproduct Cost Study of Savings and Loans." Journal of Finance 42(1987): 
423-45. 
Schroeder, T.C. "Economics of Scale and Scope for Agricultural Supply and Marketing 
Cooperatives." Review of Agricultural Economics 14(1992):93-1 04. 
Shephard, R.W. Cost and Production Functions. Princeton University Press: Princeton, New 
Jersey, 1953. 
-~-------------------~----_!
 
MEASURING INEFFICIENCIES OF INDIVIDUAL AGRICULTURAL BANKS 
David 1-. Neff, Bruce L. Dixon, Paul N. Ellinger and Suzhan zhd 
Introduction 
In a presentation at the 1992 NC-207 regional committee meeting in Minneapolis, Ellinger 
and Neff examined issues and approaches of efficiency analysis of commercial banks. Ten major 
issues in estimating bank efficiencies were discussed. These included: 
1. Bank data sources 6.	 Bank entity to evaluate 
2. Bank cost definition 7.	 Time period used 
3. Bank output definition 8.	 Economies of scale/scope issues 
4. Empirical technique 9.	 Incorporation of risk 
5.	 Functional form 10. Incorporation of environmental variables into cost
 
equations
 
This presentation, and a subsequent Agricultural Finance Review article, examined issues 
2., 3., and 4. -- bank cost and output definition and empirical technique - using a sample of 500 
agricultural banks and quarterly call report data from March 1987 - December 1990. To examine 
bank cost and output definition, four cost functions were estimated, each with alternative input and 
output specifications. The alternative output specifications compared the value-added and 
intermediation approaches while the alternative input specifications measured the effect of inclUding 
interest expense as a bank cost. Efficiency analyses of the sample banks were conducted using 
two empirical techniques and the four alternative models. These techniques were the stochastic 
parametric and the nonparametric cost frontiers. Summary statistics, histograms and correlation 
analyses were used to compare efficiency results among the eight models. 
The results of this analysis indicated that nonparametric models resulted in larger and more 
disperse measures of bank inefficiency than the stochastic cost frontier. Inefficiency estimates were 
50-87 percent inefficient on average for the nonparametric models and 3-28 percent inefficient on 
average for the stochastic models. Given that all of the sample banks had been operating for at 
least a three year period and many of the estimated inefficiency ratios were over 100 percent for 
the sample banks, it seems unlikely that these banks could have survived at such high cost levels 
relative to other banks. The nonparametric technique does not allow for random disturbances away 
from the efficient cost frontier, and hence a portion of the measured inefficiency could have been 
caused by such occurrences. 
In terms of bank cost definition, the inclusion of interest expenses was more desirable. 
Because noninterest costs can differ substantially based upon the types of funds use, the exclusion 
of interest costs may rank banks which use funding sources with higher operating costs (e.g., 
transactions deposits) as less efficient than banks using funding sources with relatively lower 
operating costs (e.g., federal funds purchased). 
-
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student at Texas A&M University. This research was partially funded and conducted at The
 
Center for Farm and Rural Business Finance, which is jointly sponsored by the University of
 
Arkansas and the University of Illinois.
 
100 
When alternative bank output definitions were compared, the value-added approach {which 
includes demand. savings and time deposits as outputs} was the preferred approach. Deposits are 
responsible for a high proportion of value-added by commercial banks and a considerable amount 
of labor, physical capital and interest expense inputs are employed in producing these services. 
Given these earlier results, this analysis employs a translog functional form to estimate a 
stochastic cost frontier for a much larger sample of U.S. banks {7.140}. The value-added approach 
to output definition is used and bank interest expenses are included as an input. This study 
focuses on evaluating bank inefficiency results from a given model and method rather than 
comparing inefficiency results between alternative models and methods. Summary statistics; 
histograms; graphical examinations of average inefficiency ratios by bank size. Federal Reserve 
Bank region, agricultural loan-to-deposit ratio and holding company affiliation; and a regression 
analysis which correlates inefficiency estimates with bank environmental variables are employed to 
examine inefficiency estimates. 
Methods 
Bank inefficiency is estimated using the translog cost function system originated by 
Christensen and Greene and adapted to commercial bank data by Ferrier and Lovell. This 
specification incorporates both technical and allocative inefficiencies. The translog cost function 
system is composed of a cost function and input share equations: 
Cost function: {1 } 
m n 
In{w'x)s={CXo+E aJnYis+E ~,lnwis+
.., .., 
1 m m 1 n n 
-EE aJnYjsln)js+-EE ~Jnwisln~s + 
2 .., ;-' 2 .., ;-' 
m n 
E E l)JnY;sln~s +Ts+As+Vs
.., ;-' 
Input share equations: {2} 
n 
where, w'x"E {Wi x Xi}' s=1, ... ,S, indexes banks, j=1 .....n. indexes inputs. x is the vector of 
.., 
inputs. w is a vector of input prices. y is a vector of outputs, T is the technical inefficiency, A is the 
allocative inefficiency and u and v are statistical noise. It is assumed that T is distributed half­
normally and u and v are distributed normally. Furthermore. Bjs=bj+ujs and Bjs-N{bj, (JBj2). 
The decomposition of error terms, technical inefficiency and allocative inefficiency can be 
achieved through methods outlined by Schmidt. He suggests that the decompositions should have 
two characteristics. These include: 
• 
______..----1  
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1.	 A ~ 0, with A = 0 if and only if all elements of B are zero; 
2.	 A and lb. + u.1 are positively correlated, and A and the variances of the composed 
errors (b. + u.) are correlated. 
In this study. allocative inefficiencies are estimated as: 
where n is the number of inputs. F is 1xn vector with Fli >0. Fli represents the relative effect of 
allocative inefficiencies from input j on the increasing production cost. The allocative inefficiencies 
defined in this way reflect the weighted average effect of allocative distortion on each of the share 
equations. The Fjj are estimated with the cost system. 
This specification of the linkage of allocative inefficiencies between cost function and share 
equations not only meets the two requirements recommended by Schmidt, but also provides 
information on the level of allocative inefficiency for each firm. The estimation of technical 
inefficiencies in this analysis is similar to the mode of the conditional distribution derived by 
Jondrow, Lovell, Materov and SChmidt. 
Data 
The selection of sample banks was based on two criteria: 
1.	 At least 50 percent of the deposits of branches are not located in a metropolitan service 
area (MSA), or 
2.	 The bank has an agricultural loan ratio of 25 percent or higher. 
Criteria #1 selects rural (nonMSA) banks. Criteria #2 allows banks to be selected in MSAs if their 
agricultural loan ratio is greater than 25 percent. These criteria resulted in a sample of 7,140 
banks. Four-quarter averages from 1990 are used for the explanatory input, output, price and cost 
data. 
The translog cost function includes six outputs and four inputs: 
Outputs	 Inputs 
Transaction deposits Number of employees
 
Nontransaction deposits Occupancy expenses
 
Nonagricultural real estate loans Other operating expenses
 
Nonagricultural nonreal estate loans Interest expense on deposits
 
Agricultural real estate and nonreal estate loans
 
Other bank output
 
• 
This model, with imposed homogeneity and symmetry restrictions. consists of four share 
equations and the translog cost function. To avoid singularity. the last share equation is omitted. 
Maximum likelihood is used to jointly estimate the cost function and share equations. 
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Tables 1 and 2 provide summary statistics and the bank size distribution of the sample 
banks. Approximately seven percent of the sample consists of very small banks (total assets < $10 
million) and two percent are large banks (total assets ~ $250 million) (the average size of the banks 
is $59,762,600 total assets). The average number of bank employees is 33 and the average 
annual salary per employee is $27,367. The mean agricultural loan ratio is 26 percent, indicating 
that 26 percent of the loans made by the sample banks on average is for agricultural purposes or 
secured by agricultural assets. On average, the banks have about 2.2 branches, a market share of 
20 percent and a 9.3 percent rate-of-return on equity capital. 
Results 
Table 3 presents summary statistics of technical, allocative and overall inefficiency 
estimates by bank asset size class and for the total sample. On average, the banks exhibited four 
percent technical inefficiency, two percent allocative inefficiency and six percent total inefficiency. 
The average total inefficiency of the sample is slightly higher than Ellinger and Neff find using a 
similar model (approximately 3.3 percent). It is substantially lower, however, than Ferrier and 
Lovell's estimate of eight percent technical, 17 percent allocative and 26 percent total cost 
inefficiency for a sample of 575 banks who participated in the Federal Reserve System's Functional 
Cost Analysis (FCA) program in 1984. One explanation for the difference between the results of 
Ferrier and Lovell and this study may be due to the data employed (FCA versus Call Report). The 
outputs used in the Ferrier and Lovell stUdy consist of the number of deposits and loans, rather 
than their values. In addition, Ferrier and Lovell estimate an average allocative inefficiency level for 
the total sample, rather than individual estimates for each bank. 
Figure 1 provides a histogram of total inefficiency measures for the sample banks. Nearly 
6,400 of the 7,140 banks have total inefficiency estimates between zero and ten percent. About 
600 banks have total inefficiency between ten and 15 percent and fewer numbers of banks have 
inefficiency ratios in higher categories. These results are consistent with Ellinger and Neff, who find 
similarly narrow inefficiency distributions for agricultural banks using the stochastic parametric 
method. 
Technical, allocative and total inefficiency measures decrease somewhat as bank size 
increases (Table 3). The largest difference is between the smallest size category of banks and the 
rest of the size classes. Small banks are approximately two percent, one percent and three percent 
more technically, allocatively and totally inefficient, respectively, on average than larger banks. This 
results is in contrast to Ferrier and Lovell, who find no apparent relationship between cost 
inefficiency and bank size using bank deposit size classes. 
Figures 2-4 present average technical, allocative and total inefficiency of the agricultural 
sample banks by Federal Reserve District. The largest average technical inefficiency was 6.6 
percent for the San Francisco District banks. The New York District banks also had a relatively 
large average inefficiency estimate of 5.4 percent. These areas are dominated by branches of 
large banks located in major metropolitan areas (Los Angeles. San Francisco, New York City, etc.). 
The competitive forces of these branches may result in higher inefficiencies for other banks. The 
average allocative inefficiency by Federal Reserve District is fairly uniform at about two percent 
except for Philadelphia District banks, who have an average allocative inefficiency of 3.0 percent. 
The average total inefficiency is highest for the San Francisco District banks, at 8.5 percent cost 
inefficient. The Dallas District exhibited the lowest average cost inefficiency (5.2 percent). 
Figure 5 presents average total inefficiency estimates by bank agricultural loan ratio (ALR). • 
Over a wide range of ALRs, the average total inefficiency is fair1y constant at approximately six 
percent. This is nearly the same as the average total inefficiency of the full sample of 7,140 
agricultural banks. However, average total inefficiency increases for banks with ALRs of greater 
than 70 percent with average measures of 7.1, 8.3 and 20.8 percent for banks in the 70-80, 80-90 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics of Sample Banks (7,140 Observations) 
Standard 
Variable Minimum Maximum Average Deviation 
Y1·Transactions deposits ($000) 0.1000 1,084,966 12,724 29,350 
Y2-Nontransaction deposits ($000) 0.1000 2,690,038 39,828 82,359 
Y3-Nonagricultural real estate loans ($000) 0.1000 1,608,725 14,691 40,970 
Y4-Nonagricultural nonreal estate loans ($000) 0.1000 270,222 4,652 7,117 
Y5-Agricultural real estate and nonreal estate loans ($000) 0.1000 1,404,112 13,606 47,255 
Y6-Other bank output ($000) 0.1000 74,209 220 1,382 
X1-Number of employees 0.5000 3,631 33 81 
X2-Expenses of fixed assets &premises ($000) 0.1000 258,616 3,329 7,480 
X3-Other noninterest oper. expenses ($000) 0.1000 26,996 233 653 
X4-lnterest expense on deposits ($000) 0.1000 121,092 686 2,297 
P1-Average salary ($000) 0.0000 101.0000 27.3673 6.4575 
P2-(X2Itotal deposits) 0.0000 0.5020 0.0613 0.0093 
P3-(X3/total deposits) 0.0000 0.0359 0.0045 0.0024 
P4-(X4Itotal deposits) 0.0000 0.3336 0.0128 0.0076 
Agricultural loan ratio 0.0000 0.9514 0.2599 0.2322 
Loan to deposit ratio 0.0061 4.7314 0.5703 0.1694 
Number of branches 1 302 2.24 5.50 
Real estate to total loans ratio 0.0000 1.0015 0.4444 0.1806 
Market share 0.0003 1.0000 0.1979 0.1875 
ROA -0.0790 0.0681 0.0086 0.0078 
ROE -8.7941 22.3648 0.0927 0.3613 
I 
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Table 2.	 Bank Size Distribution of sample 
Number Percent 
Asset Size Class of Banks of Sample 
Assets < $10M 491 6.9% 
$10M ~ Assets < $25M 2,029 28.4% 
$25M ~ Assets < $SOM 2,093 29.3% 
$50M ~ Assets < $100M 1,577 22.1% 
$100M ~ Assets < $250M 807 11.3% 
$250M ~ Assets 143 2.0% 
Total Sample 7,140 100.0% 
and ~90 ALR categories, respectively. These results, however. are being influenced by two things. 
First, there were only five banks with ALR ~ 90 percent. Hence, the average inefficiency measure 
may be being influenced by one or two particularly inefficient banks. Secondly, bank size is 
inversely related to the ALA. Smaller banks (particularly those with assets of less than $10 million), 
previously shown (Table 3) to be more inefficient, may be dominating the larger ALR categories. 
Table 3. Technical, Allocatlve and Overall Efficiency by Bank Size 
Standard
 
Asset Size Class Obs. Efficiency Minimum Maximum Mean Deviation
 
Assets < $10M 491	 Technical 0.000 1.040 0.060 0.081
 
Allocative 0.002 1.125 0.033 0.101
 
Overall 0.002 1.125 0.093 0.125
 
$1 OM ~ Assets < $25M 2,029	 Technical 0.000 0.479 0.044 0.040
 
Allocative 0.002 0.189 0.020 0.009
 
Overall 0.002 0.493 0.064 0.041
 
$25M ~ Assets < $SOM 2.093	 Technical 0.000 0.647 0.038 0.030
 
Allocative 0.004 0.224 0.020 0.008
 
Overall 0.005 0.663 0.058 0.031
 
$50M ~ Assets < $100M 1,577	 Technical 0.000 0.270 0.039 0.027
 
Allocative 0.003 0.366 0.020 0.011
 
Overall 0.005 0.366 0.059 0.030
 
$100M ~ Assets < $250M 807	 Technical 0.000 0.237 0.036 0.029
 
Allocative 0.005 0.198 0.020 0.008
 
Overall 0.006 0.273 0.056 0.031
 
$250M ~ Assets 143	 Technical 0.000 0.348 0.035 0.052
 
Allocative 0.005 0.669 0.024 0.055
 
Overall 0.007 0.818 0.059 0.085
 
• 
Total Sample 7,140	 Technical 0.000 1.040 0.041 0.039 ~ 
Allocative 0.002 1.125 0.021 0.029 
Overall 0.002 1.125 0.062 0.049 
---
--
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Figure 2. Average Technical Inefficiency by Federal Reserve Bank District 
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Figure 4. Average Total Inefficiency by Federal Reserve Bank District 
To examine this issue in more detail, average total inefficiency by ALR is presented in 
Figure 6 for only those banks in the $10 million - $25 million total assets size category. Average 
inefficiency is greater both for banks with very low and very high ALRs. Banks with ALRs of 
approximately 20 to 70 percent are less cost inefficient than other banks. Hence, the inclusion of 
agricultural loans in a bank's total loan portfolio may provide some efficiency improvement, provided 
the ALR does not rise above 70 percent. The limited results of this analysis, however, do not 
provide strong evidence in support of this argument and further research is clearly necessary to 
isolate the effect of the agricultural to nonagricultural loan portfolio mix on total bank cost 
inefficiency. 
Figures 7-9 examine bank inefficiency by bank holding company affiliation and size class. 
In Figure 7, banks that are affiliated with a single- or no-bank holding company (5,499 banks) are 
more technically and slightly more allocatively inefficient, on average, than those banks that are 
affiliated with a multi-bank holding company (1,641 banks). Again, the effect of bank size on 
inefficiency may be influencing the results, since banks which are affiliated with multi-bank holding 
companies are larger, with average assets of approximately $89 million versus $51 million for 
single- or no-bank holding company banks. 
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Figure 9, Average Total Inefficiency by Bank Size Class - Multl·BHC Banks 
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When average total inefficiency is examined by bank size class for the single- or no-bank 
holding company banks (Figure 8), small banks have approximately 10 percent total inefficiency. 
Larger banks are about six percent inefficient, or about the same as the sample average. Banks 
that are affiliated with a multi-bank holding company (Figure 9) exhibit similar average total 
inefficiency measures across the $10 million - $250 million size classes. There are no multi-bank 
holding company banks with assets less than $10 million. However, large banks, those with total 
assets of greater than $250 million, are somewhat less inefficient, on average, (about five percent) 
if they are affiliated with a multi-bank holding company than if they are not (Figure 8, about seven 
percent). 
In order to isolate the influences of bank size and holding company affiliation on bank 
inefficiency, the results of a regression which correlates bank total inefficiency with these variables 
and several bank environmental variables are presented in Table 4. Bank size (measured as the 
natural log of assets) is inversely related to inefficiency, which confirms results from the various 
graphical presentations discussed previously. Affiliation with a multi-bank holding company also 
decreases inefficiency, supporting the results in Figure 7. 
Table 4. Reg resslon Results of Total Inefficiency as a Function
 
of Bank Environmental Characteristics
 
Variable Parameter Estimate P-value 
Intercept 0.1324 0.0001 
Log Assets -0.0070 0.0001 
Holding Company Affiliation -0.0104 0.0001 
Loans-to-Deposits Ratio 0.0180 0.0001 
Real Estate-to-Total Loan Ratio -0.0074 0.0283 
Market Share -0.0079 0.0131 
F Value 51.812 0.0001 
Adjusted R-square 0.0344 
Holding a greater proportion of real estate in a bank's loan portfolio also decreases total 
cost inefficiency. These types of loans typically require less annual servicing than operating and/or 
shorter-term loans, thus decreasing cost inefficiency (or increasing cost efficiency). Banks which 
have a .relatively greater market share also are less inefficient on average. Lastly, a larger Ioan-to­
deposit ratio increases bank cost inefficiency. Banks with a greater than average loan-to-deposit 
ratio may be experiencing larger cost inefficiencies because of the greater servicing requirements 
associated with loans versus deposits. 
Summary and Conclusions 
ThiS analysis estimates technical, allocative and total cost inefficiency for a sample of 7,140 
U.S. agricultural or rural banks using 1990 quarterly Call Report data. A stochastic parametric 
translog cost frontier with input share equations incorporating six outputs and four inputs is 
employed to obtain individual estimates of bank inefficiency. 
On average, total bank inefficiency is approximately six percent. Approximately two-thirds 
of the total inefficiency is caused by technical reasons and one-third is associated with allocative ­
inefficiencies. Average inefficiency is the highest for small banks, those with total assets less than 
$10 million. Inefficiency is relatively constant across other bank size categories, except for 
extremely large banks (total assets ~ $250 million). Here, bank inefficiency decreases if the bank is 
affiliated with a multi-bank holding company but increases if it is not. 
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Inefficiency is examined by FRS District, but no clear differences are present in the results. 
Total cost inefficiency is higher for banks with low (less than 20 percent) and high (greater than 70 
percent) agricultural loan ratios when banks in the $10 million - $25 million total asset category are 
examined. This result provides evidence that banks with agricultural loan ratios in the 20 - 70 
percent range tend to have lower cost inefficiency. but more research is needed before this 
hypothesis can be supported with a high degree of certainty. 
•
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AN ANALYSIS OF THE COST EFFICIENCY
 
IN THE FARM CREDIT SYSTEM FOR DIRECT LENDING ASSOCIATIONS
 
Ming-Che Chien and David J. Leatham' 
The cooperative Farm Credit System (FCS) in the United States is a network of borrower­
owned lending institutions. Its primary economic and political function is to provide reliable, low­
cost credit to its owner-borrowers (Collender, Nehring, and Somwaru). For the last few years, the 
FCS has been undergoing substantial structural changes. Two important factors in these changes 
are the passage of the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 (ACA87) and the increasing competition from 
the commercial banking industry. 
The ACA87 contains an extensive set of provisions. Among these, the call for several 
mergers, with financial incentives involving the repayment of any government federal aid provided, 
has significant impacts on the organizational structure of the FCS. For example, the Federal Land 
Bank (FLB) and Federal Intermediate Credit Bank (FICB) in each district, except the FLB of 
Jackson in receivership, have merged to form the Farm Credit Bank (FCB). Also, 10 of the 12 
district Banks for Cooperatives (BCs) voted to merge into the Central Bank for Cooperatives 
(CoBank). Furthermore, Production Credit Associations (PCAs) and Federal Land Bank 
Associations (FLBAs) in several districts have merged voluntarily to form Agricultural Credit 
Associations (ACAs). As direct-lending authority was granted to certain FLBAs, these FLBAs 
became Federal Land Credit Associations (FLCAs). The organizational changes in the FCS 
institutions from January 1, 1988 to January 1,1993 are presented in Table 1. 
The increasing competition from the commercial bank industry is shown by the increased 
outstanding agricultural loans by the commercial banks, both in loan volume and in percentage of 
market share. As shown in Table 2, total loan volume for the FCS has decreased from about $61.6 
million (33.8 percent of total loans) in 1981 to about $35.2 million (25.2 percent of total loans) in 
1992. However, total outstanding agricultural loans for the commercial banks have increased from 
about $38.8 million (21.3 percent of total loans) to about $52.1 million (37.3 percent of total loans) 
during the same period. The increase in competition puts FCS institutions in a situation where their 
success depends on their ability to adapt and operate more efficiently in the new environment. 
In the past few years, many studies have concentrated on analyzing commercial bank 
productive efficiency (Evanoff and Israilevich; Ferrier and Lovell; Bauer, Berger, and Humphrey; 
Berger and Humphrey; Berger, Hancock, and Humphrey). However, comparatively few studies 
have focused on the efficiency analysis of FCS institutions (Collender; Collender, Nehring, and 
Somwaru). Furthermore, most studies in bank efficiency used data on a single cross-section of 
firms. and the separation of technical inefficiency from random noise required strong assumptions 
about their distributions. Schmidt (1986) advocated the use of panel data to remedy certain serious 
problems of efficiency analyses, including the one mentioned above. 
Productive efficiency literature commonly uses the single equation approach. This method 
assumes no persistent allocative inefficiency exists. A cost or production function is estimated and 
the inefficiency is obtained. Alternatively, a system of equations consisting of the cost or production 
function with the share equations or equations representing the first order conditions for cost 
­minimization can be estimated. This approach is argued to be more appropriate for the internal 
consistency of the model and to increase the efficiency of the parameter estimates. However, the 
model will be more complicated and the estimation is intensive, especially for the MLE estimation. 
Ming-Che Chien is a graduate assistant in the Department of Agricultural Economics, Texas 
A&M University. David J. Leatham is an associate professor in the Department of 
Agricultural Economics, Texas A&M University. 
113 
Table 1. Numbers for Each Farm Creelh Institution, 1988Q1 • 1992Q4. 
FLB FICB BC PCA FLBA FCB ACA FLCA SC Total 
198801 12 12 13 150 230 12 4 433 
198802 12 12 13 148 229 12 4 430 
198803 1 1 13 143 224 11 4 397 
198804 1 1 13 142 224 11 6 398 
198901 1 1 3 101 148 11 34 4 6 309 
198902 1 1 3 96 143 11 39 2 6 302 
198903 3 95 142 11 40 2 6 301 
198904 1 1 3 95 148 11 39 2 6 306 
199001 1 1 3 94 146 11 40 2 6 304 
199002 1 1 3 93 145 11 40 3 6 303 
199003 3 112 144 11 40 4 6 322 
199004 1 1 3 112 141 11 40 7 6 322 
199101 1 1 3 117 121 11 44 18 5 321 
199102 1 3 91 96 11 66 19 5 293 
199103 1 3 87 90 11 70 22 5 290 
199104 1 3 87 87 11 70 25 5 290 
199201 1 1 3 82 84 10 70 24 5 280 
199202 1 1 3 75 84 10 70 24 5 273 
199203 1 3 73 80 10 70 26 5 269 
199204 1 1 3 72 78 10 70 27 4 266 
Source: FCS Call Reports, 198801-199204, Farm Credit Administration 
Note: FLB-Federal Land Bank, FICB-Federal Intermediate Credit Bank, BC-Bank for Cooperatives, 
PCA-Production Credit Association, FLBA-Federal Land Bank Association, FCB-Farm Credit 
Banks, ACA-Agricultural Credit Association, FLCA-Federal Land Credit Association, and SC-
Service Corporation. 
The objective of this study is to estimate and compare the cost efficiency for the Farm 
Credit System direct lending institutions using a stochastic frontier approach in the context of the 
panel data analysis. The maximum likelihood estimation technique (MLE) of the single equation 
approach is used to obtain the efficiency measurements for each institution. Specific objectives 
are: 1) Use the MLE of the single equation approach to estimate the cost efficiencies for the FCS 
direct lending institutions, 2) Compare and contrast efficiencies among districts where institutions • 
are highly, moderately, and not yet consolidated and among different types of institutions. 
~ 
In the next section, the theoretical background of the measurement of cost efficiency will be 
presented. The estimation procedures for the cost efficiencies of the FCS direct lending 
associations for the single equation approach in the context of the cost frontier model are detailed 
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Table 2. Total Fann Debt, Excluding Households, December 31, 1981·92 
Debt Owed to Reporting Institutions 
Farm Farmers Life 
Credit Commercial Home Insurance Individuals Total 
Year System Banks Administration Companies Total and Others Debt 
Million Dollars 
1981 61,566 38,799 20,802 12,150 133,317 49,064 182,381 
1982 64,219 41,890 21,275 11,829 139,213 49,592 188,805 
1983 63,708 45,422 21,427 11,666 142,223 48,840 191,064 
1984 64,686 47,245 23,262 11,889 147,082 46,690 193,782 
1985 56,168 44,470 24,534 11,270 136,442 41,150 177,592 
1986 45,906 41,620 24,137 10,374 122,037 34,923 156,960 
1987 40,026 41,130 23,552 9,352 114,060 30,338 144,399 
1988 37,138 42,706 21,852 9,018 110,714 28,654 139,368 
1989 36,164 44,794 18,973 9,051 108,982 28.202 137,185 
1990 34,954 47,432 16.954 9,641 108,981 27,801 136,782 
1991 35,356 50,169 15,212 9,495 110,232 28,522 138,754 
1992 35,234 52,132 13,594 9,467 110,427 29,236 139,663 
Percentage Distribution of Total Debt 
1981 33.8 21.3 11.4 6.7 73.1 26.9 100.00 
1982 34.0 22.2 11.3 6.3 73.3 26.3 100.00 
1983 33.3 23.8 11.2 6.1 74.4 25.6 100.00 
1984 33.4 24.4 12.0 6.1 75.9 24.1 100.00 
1985 31.6 25.0 13.8 6.3 76.8 23.2 100.00 
1986 29.2 26.5 15.4 6.6 77.8 22.2 100.00 
1987 27.7 28.5 16.3 6.5 79.0 21.0 100.00 
1988 26.6 30.6 15.7 6.5 79.4 20.6 100.00 
1989 26.4 32.7 13.8 6.6 79.4 20.6 100.00 
1990 25.6 34.7 12.4 7.0 79.7 20.3 100.00 
1991 25.5 36.2 11.0 6.8 79.4 20.6 100.00 
1992 25.2 37.3 9.7 6.8 79.1 20.9 100.00 
Source: Agricultural Income and Finance, Situation and Outlook Report, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Feb. 
1993. 
"! I 
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in the following section. The data needed in this study obtained from the FCA call reports are also 
discussed, followed by the section of results from empirical estimation of the efficiency 
measurements for each institution. The concluding section summarizes the major findings and 
results of this study. Efficiency differences between jointly and nonjointly managed institutions, 
currently active and dechartered institutions, and acquired and acquiring institutions also will be 
examined. 
The Measurement of Cost Efficiency 
The economic theory of the firm assumes production takes place in an environment in 
which managers attempt to maximize profits by operating in the most efficient manner possible. 
The possibility that producers might operate inefficiently is typically ignored in modern neoclassical 
production theory. Early efforts in the investigation of efficiency and its measurement were made 
by Koopmans (1951, 1957) and Debreu. Koopmans defines a feasible input-output vector to be 
technically efficient if it is technologically impossible to increase any output and/or to reduce any 
input without simultaneously reducing at least one other output and/or increasing at least one other 
input. 
While Koopmans offered a definition and characterization of technical efficiency, it was 
Debreu who first provided a measure or an index of the degree of technical efficiency with his 
"coefficient of resource utilization." This coefficient is computed as one minus the maximum 
equiproprotionate reduction in all inputs consistent with continued production of existing outputs, 
and from it Debreu obtained measures of the magnitude and the cost of technical inefficiency. 
Farrell (1957) first obtained a partial decomposition of private efficiency into technical and allocative 
components. Farrell also proposed indexes of technical, allocative, and overall private efficiency, 
the first being a direct descendent of Debreu's coefficient of resource utilization. 
After Farrell's efficiency measures were developed, which were defined over a fairly 
restrictive technology, SUbsequent studies have extended or generalized the measures to cover a 
wide range of technologies (Fare; Fare and Lovell; Fare, Lovell, and Zieschang; Fare and 
Grosskopf). In this study, we consider the radial, input-induced measures of efficiency like those 
originally introduced by Farrell. The input-induced measures quantify the efficiency of an input 
vector in the production of a specified vector of outputs. Because only proportional contractions of 
the observed input vector are considered in the search for an efficient input vector, they are said to 
be radial. 
The input vector x is called technically efficient for y if and only if x E Eff L(y). A technically 
efficient input vector x E Eff L(y) is called allocatively efficient for (y, w) if and only if wTx = C(y, w). 
Thus, a firm whose input vector is technically efficient for y and allocatively efficient for (y, w) 
minimizes the cost of producing its output, and is called cost efficient for (y, w). Note, however, 
there is no guarantee that the correct output mix is being chosen, given output prices. As a result, 
efficiency measurement with respect to the input correspondence L(y) is most reasonable in cases 
in which the output vector y is exogenous to the production unit. 
Given these definitions of productive efficiency, the problem is to devise a framework for 
measuring each type of efficiency. Following Farrell, the technical efficiency (TE) of input vector x 
E L(y) is given by 
TE(x; y) • min (/..: Ax E L(y), ~O}. (1 ) 
• 
The cost efficiency (CE) of input vector x E L(y) is given by 
.. 
CE(x; y, w) • C(y, w)/wTx (2) 
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and the allocative efficiency (AE) of input vector x E L(y) is given by 
AE(x; y, w) • CE(x; y. w)rrE(x; y). (3) 
The notion!) of cost, technical, and allocative input inefficiencies are illustrated in Figure 1. 
Assume that a firm uses two inputs. available at fixed prices, x, and x2 to produce a single output, 
y. Let QQ' be the isoquant depicting various efficient combinations of two inputs which can be 
used to produce a specific level of output, Yo' The isoquant further to the right (left) corresponds to 
higher (lower) levels of output. For a given set of input prices, the isocost line, WW', represents the 
various combinations of inputs which generate the same level of expenditures. Isocost lines further 
to the right (left) correspond to higher (lower) level of expenditures on inputs. 
x, 
Q 
W 
Q' 
::::-----..-------------------~ 
W' 
o x: x, 
Figure 1. Farrell Efficiency Measurement Using the Input Correspondence 
For a firm to produce Yo at minimum cost, the optimal input combination is at point E. That 
is, given factor prices, output Yo can be optimally produced by employing x,· units of inputs x, and 
~. units of input x2• Any other combination of the inputs along the WW' isocost line would generate 
less output for the same cost. Alternatively, the production of Yo using any combination of inputs 
except for that corresponding to point E would cost more. Therefore, at Point E, input efficiency 
-
exists. Suppose that the observed input usage of a firm to produce Yo is at point A. Clearly, the 
........
 
firm is inefficient because it operates above the isoquant for its observed level of output. The firm 
could contract its input usage along the ray OA to the point B and still produce Yo units of output. 
Point B represents the minimum input vector that retains the input mix and output level associated 
with the firm at point A. Thus, the firm could contract its input vector by a factor OB/OA and suffer 
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no loss of output while realizing a cost savings. The measure OB/OA, which gives the fraction of 
observed level of output, provides an index of technical efficiency as: 
TE(x, y) =OB/OA. (1 ') 
Technical efficiency ranges from 0 to 1. A firm observed operating on the isoquant would have a 
technical efficiency score of 1. Values less than 1 reflect technical inefficiency. 
For this sample example. we also can depict allocative inefficiency resulting from producing 
at point A. Scaling its inputs back to point B would make the observed firm technically efficient. but 
its costs would still be above the cost minimizing level given by the optimal input mix at point E. 
Point C represents a level of costs equal to that of the efficient production process at point E 
because it is on line WW'. Point B corresponds to an output level equal to Yo because it is on 
isoquant QQ'. Therefore. the distance CB corresponds to additional production expenses resulting 
from the suboptimal allocation of inputs. That is. allocative inefficiency exists because we are not 
on the isocost line, WW'. Formally, OC/OB is a measure of allocative efficiency as: 
AE(x, y, w) =OC/OB. (3') 
OC/OB shows the fraction by which the firm could reduce input usage and, thus, cost to achieve 
minimum cost. Allocative efficiency also ranges from 0 to 1. A firm observed operating at point of 
tangency between the isoquant and the isocost curve would have an allocative efficiency score of 
1. Values less than 1 reflect allocative inefficiency. Also note that the greater the curvature of the 
isoquant is (Le., the less substitutable inputs are), the greater the gap between point Band C would 
be, and hence the more costly would be any given deviation from the optimal input mix. 
Given that the isocost line depicts total expenditures used in production, distance CA is a 
less than optimal usage of all inputs and corresponds to additional production expenses. 
Therefore, cost input efficiency is measured as OC/OA. It is the ratio of the minimum possible cost 
and the observed cost of producing a given level of output and is the product of the two 
SUbcomponents, technical and allocative efficiency: 
CE(x, y, w) = OC/OA = OB/OA • OC/OB. (2') 
Estimation Procedures and Data 
Based on economic theory, the cost function or the production function uniquely defines the 
technology. Thus, either the cost function or the production function can be incorporated into the 
productive efficiency analysis and is normally called the cost frontier and production frontier 
approach, respectively. However. as pointed out by Kumbhakar (1989), estimation of the 
production function directly poses two possible problems. First, estimation of the production 
function directly is appropriate only when inputs can be treated as exogenous. Thus, input demand 
functions are assumed to be independent to the technical inefficiency of the firm. If outputs are 
exogenous and inputs are endogenous, direct estimation of the production function using output as 
the dependent variable is inappropriate. Second, direct estimation of the production function 
considers only technical inefficiency. Inferences about the overall economic efficiency can not be 
made unless allocative efficiency is considered. 
One of the major advantages of the cost function approach is consistent estimates of the • 
parameters can be obtained if output is exogenous, which is one of the basic behavioral 
assumptions behind cost minimization. As mentioned before. only the single cost function approach 
will be considered in this study. Single equation approach has been used by Murray and White; 
Gilligan and Smirlock; Kim; Goldstein, McNulty. and Verbrugge; Shaffer arid David; Goldberg, 
Hanweck, Keenan, and Young; Ellinger and Neff; and Mester. The cost function used in this study 
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is the translog cost function that can be viewed as a local, second-order approximation to an 
arbitrary cost function and has been used extensively in the literature. 
We will start the specification of the translog cost function as follows by suppressing the 
firm and time subscripts: 
Z n Z z';" RZ I Z 1 i-- i-- _1. Z ZIn TC Z ~ <Xo + E ai In Wi + L t'k n Yk + - L L lij In Wi In Wji.' k.' 2 i-, j.1 
m1 ,;.. Z Z Z nm Z Z Z Z 
+ - E L Old In Yk In YI + E E 9ik In Wi In Yk + e , (4) 
2 k.' I.' j., k.' 
where, a's, Ws, 'is, o's, and 9's are parameters to be estimated with 'Vij = 'Yji and o.u = ~k' the TC is 
the total production costs, the Wi'S are the n input prices, and Yk'S are the m outputs, and Z is the 
type of association representing PCA, ACA, and FLCA. The restrictions of the linear homogeneity 
in factor prices for the cost function are imposed as: 
L ex; =1, L "iij =0, and L 9ik =O. (5) 
Following Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt; and Meeusen and van den Broeck, the error term, tit, is 
composed of two different types of disturbances: 
(6) 
where lit is one-sided distributed, u~O, which represents inefficiency and vlt is a stochastic variable 
that represents uncontrolled random shocks in the production process. 
The MLE will be used to estimate equation (4) to obtain the cost frontier and the associated 
inefficiency measurement for each institution. To estimate equation (4) by the MLE technique, we 
need to derive the probability density function (pdf) of the composed error term, t1t =lit + vlt ' first. 
The distributional assumptions on the composed error are: u, is Li.d. one-sided distributed with half­
normal density function 
h(u) ~ 2 exp {-~}, u~O; (7)
.f2itau 2a~ 
vft is Li.d. with mean zero and variance a/, lit and vft are independent. 
Let g(v) be the density function of vfto Following Pitt and Lee; and Maddala (p.195), the 
joint pdf f(tit) of ftt can be defined as follows: 
f(£1,) ~ ! cH £1,)[ 1 - <1>( £1,A) J' (8) 
a a a 
where, a2 = a/ + a/, A = au lay, and cjI(.) and <1>(.) are the density function and distribution function 
of the standard normal, respectively. Then the log-likelihood function for the pooled data is 
In L ~ FT In ! - FT In a - ~ EE~ +EEIn [ <1>( £1,A) ] (9)0 
2 1t 2a ,., t.' '.1 t., a 
The above model can be estimated by the maximum likelihood techniques. After the model 
is estimated, the efficiency measurement for each institution can be obtained from the conditional 
-

mean or mode of u, given tit. Jondrow, Lovell, Materov, and Schmidt have shown that the 
distribution of u, conditional on tit is a normal distribution truncated at zero. The mean or mode of 
u, given t1t is then expressed as follows, respectively: 
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eA 
o 0 ~(-) eA 
E ( Uf lEtt ) "" (~)[ ~ + - ], (10) 
o cJ>(_ 0u,,), 
o 
2 
M( UdEll) ""	 ~ Ett' if ~ ~ 0; otherwise zero. (11 ) 
Ov 
Given the availability of panel data, Kumbhakar has shown that the mean or mode of Ut l~, a point 
estimator of ut• is unbiased and consistent as t ~ 00. In this study, we choose the conditional mean 
of uf given ~ as the inefficiency estimate for each FCS institution by evaluating equation (10) at the 
estimates of 0/ and 0/. 
The Data 
Data needed in estimating the cost function and, thus, the cost efficiency include total costs, 
outputs, and input prices for each institution at each time period. In bank efficiency analysis, two 
approaches exist for defining inputs, outputs, and costs. The production approach views banks as 
production units. Loans and deposits are treated as outputs using labor, capital, and other inputs 
to produce them. Operating cost is the only cost considered. Intermediation approach, on the 
other hand, views banks as the institutions that intermediate funds into loans. It views the dollar 
volume of loan and deposits as the outputs, while the costs included are operating costs and 
interest costs. For cooperative FCS institution. the intermediation approach seems to be more 
appropriate than the production approach because one of the major functions of the FCS 
institutions is to channel lower cost of credit to members of the association. 
Following Collender, outputs considered in this study are accrual and nonaccrual loans. 
Inputs include labor, physical capital, other operating expenses, and interest costs of borrowed 
funds. The price of labor is approximated by dividing total labor expenses (salary and benefit 
expense, director expense) by total liabilities for each institution. The price of physical capital is 
approximated by dividing occupancy and equipment expenses by the average book value of fixed 
assets. The price of other operating expenses is approximated by dividing total other operating 
expenses by the total liabilities. The price of interest expenses is approximated by dividing interest 
expenses by total liabilities. These data are obtained from the FCA call reports by each institution. 
To account for the seasonality characteristic of agricultural loans, especially those short-term 
operating loans, quarterly data with time series running from 198801 through 199204 are used in 
this study. The end-user computer package, TSP, is used to perform the MLE. 
Empirical Results 
Parameter and Efficiency Estimates 
The MLE parameter estimates for PCA, ACA, and FLCA are presented in Table 3. As 
shown, more than half of the parameter estimates for the PCA are significant at one percent level, 
while slightly less than half of the MLE estimates for the ACA are significant at one percent level. 
Most parameter estimates for the FLCA are surprisingly not significant at five percent level. 
Because of its lengthy report, the efficiency estimate for each association and its associated ranking 
will not be presented here but are available from the authors. However, some general findings are 
summarized as follows. First, the efficiency measurement for individual PCA ranges widely from 
• 
0.5807 of one PCA to 0.9714 of another PCA both in the Texas District. The PCA with the 0.5807 
efficiency measurement is the least efficient because it is now in liquidation. Second, the efficiency 
measurement for each ACA also ranges widely, from 0.6432 of one ACA in the St. Paul District to 
0.9934 of an ACA in the Baltimore District. The ACA with the efficiency measurement of 0.6432 is 
not currently active. The efficiency measurement for each FLCA ranges from 0.8065 for a FLCA in 
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Table 3, MLE Parameter Estimates of the Translog Cost Function 
PCA ACA FLCA 
Parameter Standard Parameter Standard Parameter Standard 
Variable Estlmater Error Estimate Error Estimate Error 
LY1 0.4011 0.0685* 0.6527 0.1282* -0.2967 0.5755 
LY2 0.2187 0.0350* 0.2790 0.0681* 0.2639 0.1868 
LW1 -0.5106 0.1642* -1.7201 0.1658* 1.5854 1.2591 
LW2 0.5576 0.0625 -0.5417 0.1316* 0.3029 0.3943 
LW3 0.2396 0.1632 0.2259 0.1847 -0.9023 1.3118 
LW4 0.3947 0.2647 -0.5245 0.4127 1.0745 0.9413 
LY1W1 0.0744 0.0101* 0.0179 0.0156 -0.0692 0.0937 
LY1W2 -0.0134 0.0036* -0.0207 0.0122*** -0.0146 0.0334 
LY1W3 0.0173 0.0074* -0.0100 0.0135 -0.0260 0.1224 
LY1W4 0.0129 0.0144 -0.0349 0.0235 0.0538 0.0622 
LY2W1 -0.0442 0.0055* 0.0094 0.0093 0.0005 0.0247 
LY2W2 -0.0004 0.0016 0.0049 0.0055 0.0041 0.0079 
LY2W3 -0.0033 0.0041 0.0061 0.0054 -0.0107 0.0309 
LY2W4 0.0128 0.0067*** 0.0348 0.0114* 0.0067 0.0246 
LY1Y1 0.1329 0.0030* 0.0184 0.0149 0.0906 0.0903 
LY1Y2 -0.0522 0.0017* -0.0064 0.0055 -0.0263 0.0129~ 
LY2Y2 0.0267 0.0012* 0.0085 0.0014* 0.0038 0.0102 
LW1W1 -0.0562 0.0273** -0.0576 0.0294*** 0.1212 0.2206 
LW1W2 0.0016 0.0106 -0.0987 0.0168* 0.0230 0.0549 
LW1W3 0.0599 0.0171* 0.0038 0.0271 -0.0294 0.2274 
LW1W4 -0.0385 0.0292 -0.2340 0.0367* 0.0080 0.1764 
LW2W2 -0.0056 0.0035 -0.0017 0.0157 0.0041 0.0232 
LW2W3 -0.0044 0.0080 0.0064 0.0153 -0.0036 0.0743 
LW2W4 -0.0079 0.0133 -0.0518 0.0253** 0.0087 0.0532 
LW3W3 0.0626 0.0123* 0.0321 0.0269 -0.1291 0.2618 
LW3W4 -0.1028 0.0352* -0.0448 0.0368 -0.0705 0.1850 
LW4W4 0.1974 0.0541* 0.0889 0.0827 0.3034 0.1347~ 
1Ia 7.1273 0.2082* 11.3642 0.2488* 8.7960 1.0716' 
A 1.9588 0.2064* 5.0205 0.7292* 1.8347 0.7476' 
Constant 0.8696 0.6771 -6.8608 1.1405* 9.5693 3.8077' 
-
a 2 v 0.0041 0.0003 0.0030 
.. 
a 2 u 0.0156 0.0074 0.0100 
Log of 
Likelihood Function 1621.95 1273.92 220.76 
* Statistically significant at one percent level, ** Statistically significant at five percent level, 
*** Statistically significant at 10 percent level. 
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the St. Paul District to 0.9741 for a FLCA in the St. Louis District. Both of them are currently 
located in the Agribank District, a result of the mergers of St. Paul and St. Louis Districts in 1992. 
Efficiency Comparisons 
While the efficiency estimate of each association above helps us understand the efficiency 
performance of each firm relative to those of the others, it also provides us a basis to conduct 
several efficiency comparisons of interest. In this section, the efficiency differences among types of 
associations, among districts, and between associations with different characteristics are compared 
and contrasted using the efficiency estimates of the MLE. 
Efficiency Differences Among TyPes of Associations 
The PCAs are authorized to make short term loans directly to association members, while 
those FLBAs authorized to make the long term loans directly to members of the associations will 
become the FLCAs. The ACAs are the combined services of the PCAs and the FLCAs in which 
both long and short term loans are made directly to members of the associations. It may be of 
interest to see if efficiency differences exist between or among PCA, ACA, and FLCA. 
Table 4 presents the average cost efficiency estimates of the MLE by each farm credit 
district and type of association. As shown, the total average efficiency estimates of the ACA are 
higher than those of the PCA and FLCA using either all sample associations or currently active 
associations. The all sample associations include all chartered or dechartered associations during 
198801 to 199204, while the currently active associations are those currently chartered 
associations only. By examining average cost efficiency estimates for each district, we found that 
only ACA efficiency estimates for St. Paul and Spokane and Western districts are lower than those 
of PCA or FLCA using all sample associations and currently active associations, respectively. Both 
total and district average efficiency estimates of the MLE suggest that FLCA is more efficient than 
PCA using all samples or currently active associations. 
Efficiency Differences Among Districts 
While the restructuring of the farm credit associations is still under way, each farm credit 
district has been experiencing different impact and structural change. As of January 1, 1993, PCAs 
are active in the Omaha, Wichita, and Texas districts only, while ACAs are active in the Springfield, 
Baltimore, Columbia, Louisville, and Spokane districts only. Loans made by the above districts are 
highly specialized through single type of association. Two districts, Western and Agribank districts, 
are diversified in loan services in which the PCAs, ACAs, and FLCAs are all active in both districts. 
Thus, in terms of channelling loans to members of the associations, three groups are categorized: 
districts with PCAs only, districts with ACAs only, and districts with PCAs, ACAs, and FLCAs. In 
this section. the district efficiency differences within and between groups will be compared and 
contrasted first. 
As shown in the lower panel of Table 4, for districts that channel loans to members directly 
through PCAs only, MLE efficiency estimates show little difference in the cost efficiency for all four 
districts, with Texas being the least efficient. For districts that channel loans through ACAs only, 
Springfield and Baltimore are most efficient, followed by Columbia, Louisville, and Spokane districts. 
For districts with all types of associations being active, PCAs in the Westem district are found to be 
more efficient than Agribank district. ACAs in the Agribank district are found to be more efficient 
•than those of Western, while results of the FLCA show little difference between these two districts. 
.. 
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Table 4. Average Cost Efficiency Estimates for Each Farm CredltDlstrlct 
District PCA ACA FLCA 
All Sample Associations:
• 
Springfield 0.9110 0.9601 
Baltimore 0.9124 0.9567 
Columbia 0.8272 0.9449 
Louisville 0.9122 0.9396 0.9340 
Jackson 0.9202 
St. Louis 0.8732 0.9158 
St. Paul 0.8803 0.8762 0.8823 
Omaha 0.9231 
Wichita 0.9177 
Texas 0.9133 
Western 0.9144 0.8923 0.9383 
Spokane 0.8103 0.7659 
Agribank 0.8922 0.9433 0.9398 
Total Average 0.8950 0.9345 0.9267 
Currently Active Associations Only: 
Springfield 0.9604 (N=11) 
Baltimore 0.9522 (N=16) 
Columbia 0.9450 (N=19) 
Louisville 0.9390 (N=5) 
Jackson 0.9202 (N=2) 
St. Louis 
St. Paul 
Omaha 0.9231 (N=1) 
Wichita 0.9200 (N=11) 
Texas 0.9112 (N=16) 
Western 0.9122 (N=13) 0.8904 (N=4) 0.9382 (N=9) 
Spokane 0.7659 (N=1) 
Agribank 0.8902 (N=20) 0.9433 (N=10) 0.9399 (N=18) 
Total Average 0.9082 (N=63) 0.9431 (N=66) 0.9393 (N=27) 
-
Comparing efficiency estimates between groups of districts, in general, we find that PCAs in 
those districts with multHoan-channels such as Western and Agribank districts are less efficient 
than those districts with single-loan-channel such as Wichita, Texas, Omaha, and Jackson districts. 
ACAs in those districts with single loan channel are also found to be more efficient than those with 
... 
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several loan channels, with a few exceptions. Results above suggest that districts specializing in 
loan services are more efficient than districts with diversified loan services. 
Second, the degree of the consolidation between associations is different in each district. 
For example, PCAs in the Omaha and Jackson districts have been highly consolidated into one and 
two associations, respectively. PCAs in the Wichita, Westem, Texas, and Agribank districts are 
moderately or less consolidated in which numbers of PCAs are 11, 13, 16, and 20. respectively. 
Districts with highly consolidated ACAs include Spokane, Western, and Louisville with one, four, 
and five ACAs. respectively. Districts with moderately or less consolidated ACAs are Agribank, 
Springfield, Baltimore, and Columbia districts with 10. 11. 16. and 19 ACAs, respectively. Western 
district FLCAs are moderately consolidated in which nine are active currently. while Agribank district 
has 18 FLCAs and is considered less consolidated. The efficiency difference between districts with 
different degrees of consolidation is examined next. 
As shown in the lower panel of Table 4, in general, districts with highly consolidated PCAs 
such as Omaha and Jackson are more efficient than districts with moderately or less consolidated 
PCAs. Districts with highly consolidated ACAs are less efficient than moderately or less 
consolidated districts. With FLCAs being moderately consolidated, cost efficiency of the Western 
district is found to be little different from the Agribank district with less consolidated FLCAs. 
Efficiency Differences Between Associations with Different Characteristics 
Other than the efficiency differences among types of associations and among districts, 
comparisons of efficiencies for associations with different management characteristics also may be 
of interest. For example. it may be interesting to see if associations currently active are more 
efficient than associations already dechartered. We should expect that associations currently active 
are more efficient than those already dechartered. Several associations are authorized by the FCA 
to be jointly managed such that they are at the same office and building and share the incurred 
operating costs. It may be of interest to see if the associations with joint management status are 
more efficient then those without nonjoint management. Last, the mergers between or among farm 
credit associations have been ongoing for years, it is of major concern to association managers and 
policy makers to see if mergers between or among associations have resulted in efficiency gains. 
Thus, the efficiency differences between acquired and acquiring associations also will be examined 
in this section. 
As shown in Table 5. as expected, currently active PCAs. ACAs, and FLCAs are found to 
be more efficient than those already dechartered. However. jointly managed PCAs and FLCAs are 
not found to be more efficient than nonjointly managed PCAs and FLCAs. The efficiency gains or 
losses of mergers are not obvious. As shown, the cost efficiencies of the acquired and acquiring 
PCAs are not much different with the acquired PCAs slightly higher than that of the acquiring PCAs. 
The cost efficiency of the acquired and acquiring ACAs also show little difference with acquiring 
ACAs slightly higher than acquired PCAs. 
Conclusions 
The cooperative FCS has been undergoing substantial structural changes for years. The 
Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 and the increasing competition from the commercial banks are the 
major contributions to these changes. As a result. the FCS institutions are in a situation where their 
success depends on their ability to adapt and operate more efficiently in the new environment. In 
this study, the cost efficiency of each FCS direct lending institution is estimated using the single • 
equation stochastic cost frontier approach. Efficiency differences among types of associations, 
.. 
among districts, and between associations with different characteristics are compared and 
contrasted. 
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Table 5. Efficiency COmparisons Between Associations with Different Characteristics 
Number of Observations Average Efficiency 
PCA: 
All Sample Associations 
Currently Active Associations 
Dechartered Associations 
Jointly Managed Associations 
NonJointly Managed Associations 
Acquired Associations 
Acquiring Associations 
ACA: 
All Sample Associations 
Currently Active Associations 
Dechartered Associations 
Jointly Managed Associations 
Nonjointly Managed Associations 
Acquired Associations 
Acquiring Associations 
FLCA: 
All Sample Associations 
Currently Active Associations 
Dechartered Associations 
Jointly Managed Associations 
Nonjointly Managed Associations 
Acquired Associations 
Acquiring Associations 
210 0.8950 
63 0.9082 
147 0.8884 
37 0.9009 
33 0.9164 
23 0.9171 
14 0.9162 
90 0.9345 
66 0.9431 
24 0.9044 
5 0.9711 
2 0.9781 
47 0.9267 
27 0.9393 
20 0.9096 
22 0.9399 
5 0.9635 
Results show that, first, the efficiency estimates for PCAs and ACAs range widely. The 
least efficient PCA is only 58.07 percent efficiency of the efficiency of the best practice firm, while 
the least efficient ACA is only 64.32 percent efficiency of the efficiency of the best practice firm. 
Second, comparisons among different types of associations show that ACA providing both long­
and short-term loan services are, in general, more efficient than PCA and FLCA providing only 
short- and long-term loan service, respectively. The result above suggests that associations 
providing a complete and coordinated set of short· and long-term credit services to members may 
be the direction for the future restructuring. On average, FLCA is found to be more efficient than 
PCA. Third, cost efficiencies are not much different for districts channelling loans to members ­
directly through PCAs only. Springfield and Baltimore districts are the most efficient for districts 
channelling loans through ACAs only. For districts with all types of associations active, PCAs in the 
Western district are found to be more efficient than those in the Agribank district, while ACAs in the 
Agribank district are found to be more efficient than those of Western district. 
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Fourth, districts specializing in loan services are found to be more efficient than districts 
with diversified loan services. Districts with highly consolidated PCAs are more efficient than 
districts with moderately or less consolidated PCAs. This result supports the recent movement of 
most or all of PCAs in several districts being restructured into a single district-wide PCA. However, 
districts with highly consolidated ACAs are not found to be more efficient than moderately or less 
consolidated districts. The unexpected result above suggests that the operations of the newly 
created ACAs may not have adjusted to be as effective as those of PCAs whose operations have 
been in existence since the establishment of the FCS. Last, efficiency comparisons between 
different characteristics show that, as expected, currently active associations are more efficient than 
those already dechartered associations. Jointly managed PCAs and FLCAs are not found to be 
more efficient than those of nonjointly managed. The impact of association mergers on efficiency 
show undetermined results in which acquired PCAs are slightly more efficient than acquiring PCAs, 
while acquiring ACAs are slightly more efficient than acquired ACAs. 
• 
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FDICIA: ITS POTENTIAL TO IMPACT REGiONAL 
FINANCIAL STABILITY 
Catharine M. Lemieui 
On December 19, 1991, after almost a year of debate on banking reform, Congress passed 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA). Its primary purpose was to 
provide additional resources to help the industry refinance its own insurance fund. FDICIA also 
instituted supervisory practices intended to reduce the drain on the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF) so 
that, with the additional financial support provided by Congress, problems in the industry could be 
resolved. 
Ironically, current economic conditions - specifically, low interest rates, improved asset 
quality, and high bank liquidity - have reduced the number of bank failures and their overall cost to 
the insurance fund. The FDIC reported that, as of first quarter 1993, the insurance fund balance 
was a positive $1.2 billion. In spite of this improved outlook, the industry must still deal with the 
legislated changes in bank supervision and resolution intended to reduce the cost of bank failures. 
One fundamental change brought about by FDICIA is a movement toward depositor 
discipline, while at the same time changing part of the safety net that promotes stability. FDICIA 
cuts back or eliminates several tools that provided much of the financial stability in banking during 
the problems of the 1980s. This article explores the FDICIA provisions that have the most potential 
for affecting financial stability. Three of these are highlighted: prompt corrective action, liquidity 
support, and least-cost resolution. The following sections address the origins of the provisions, 
what they contain, and how they could accentuate liquidity pressures. 
Where Old h Come From? 
Why did Congress feel that it was necessary to impose strict regulation on banking? The 
short answer is, to reduce the cost of bank failures to the insurance fund and ultimately taxpayers. 
According to FDIC statistics, the balance in the insurance fund was a negative $7 billion (net of 
reserves) as of year-end 1991. 
The ongoing savings and loan bailout heightened Congress' sensitivity to the issue of 
providing taxpayer assistance to failed financial institutions. Practices identified as factors 
contributing to the high cost of the savings and loan clean-up were targeted for tight regulation by 
FDICIA. Regulatory forbearance, regulatory accounting, lax capital standards, rapid loan growth, 
and high interest rates on brokered deposits were some of the factors identified by the General 
Accounting Office (GAO) as contributing to thrift industry losses. 
Banking regulators were criticized for allowing institutions to remain open long after unsafe 
and unsound conditions had been identified. Barth, Brumbaugh, and Utan reported that the 
average length of time a failed bank had been on the regulators' problem list increased from 15 
months in 1980 to 28 months in 1989. Meanwhile. FDIC resolution costs increased from 12 
percent of failed bank assets in mid-decade to 22 percent in 1989. Forbearance was costly. 
-

Catharine Lemieux is an economist for Division of Bank Supervision and Structure at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. The views expressed in this paper are those of the 
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Reserve System. 
129 
Bank resolution policies, particularly "Too Big to Fail" which provided 100 percent coverage 
for uninsured depositors at large banks, came under fire. In 1991. the Treasury estimated that the 
cost of the "Too Big To Fail" policy for six large bank resolutions that occurred prior to 1991 2 was 
approximately $3 billion.3 When the FDIC began raising insurance premiums to replenish the 
insurance fund, banks objected to the policy of paying off uninsured depositors at these large 
institutions. 
In 1991, Congress was faced with yet another appropriations request for the savings and 
loan bailout as well as a request for funding for the bank insurance fund. In an effort to contain 
industry losses bome by the taxpayers, Congress passed FDICIA with the intention of minimizing 
the taxpayers' future liability for failed banks. FDICIA contains significant changes in Federal 
Reserve discount window lending, the bank supervision process, and bank resolution practices. 
The following section describes these changes and analyzes the potential implications for the 
banking system. 
Overview of FDICIA 
FDICIA contains many sections, but this article will concentrate on changes in the bank 
supervision process, liquidity support for troubled banks, and requirements for ensuring the least­
cost resolution of failing institutions. These sections contain the essence of the "new order" for 
bank depositors. The following sections briefly review each of these provisions. 
Bank Supervision 
FDICIA initiates a capital-based supervisory system known as prompt corrective action. This 
framework consists of mandatory and discretionary supervisory actions that become increasingly 
severe as institutions reach specified capital "tripwires", eventually resulting in closure if a bank's 
tangible equity becomes two percent or less of total assets. The prompt corrective action 
framework makes three major changes to regulators' traditional approach to bank supervision. 
First. capital is singled out as the primary indicator of a bank's condition; second, supervisory 
actions are mandated as a bank's capital declines; and third, early closure is instituted. Capital 
ratios that define each "tripwire" are presented in Table 1. 
The combination of capital requirements and activity restrictions is not a new approach to 
bank supervision. The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 tied 
these two approaches by limiting certain activities such as asset growth and holdings of brokered 
deposits based on bank capital levels. FDICIA expands this approach by combining mandatory 
activity restrictions and capital requirements in the prompt corrective action framework. The 
mandatory and discretionary supervisory actions associated with each capital level are detailed in 
Table 2. 
The activity restrictions contained in FDICIA center around curtailing risk-taking and 
preventing management from depleting an undercapitalized institution's equity capital. FDICIA 
limits potentially risky activities of undercapitalized banks by restricting asset growth; requiring 
divestiture of any subsidiary that poses a significant risk to the insured institution, or is likely to 
cause a dissipation of its assets or eamings; and limiting access to high cost deposits by limiting 
• 
2	 The resolution of BancTexas, First City (the first time), First Republic. MCorp, Texas American 
Bancshares, and National Bancshares Corporation were six of the largest bank resolutions that .. 
occurred from 1987 through 1990. 
3	 The figures on the cost of "Too Big to Fail" are gross figures and do not include such things as
 
offsets against loan balances that would have reduced depositor losses. Thus, the cost should
 
be viewed as a maximum estimate.
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interest rates to prevailing rates and prohibiting brokered deposits. Restrictions on the payment of 
management fees. dividends. inter-affiliate transactions, capital distributions. and bonuses and 
raises to senior executive officers, are some of the restrictions that curtail management's ability to 
deplete the equity of undercapitalized institutions. 
Table 1. capital Zones for Prompt Corrective Action 
Capital Zone 
Total 
Risk-Based 
Ratio· 
Tier 1 
Risk-Based 
Ratlob 
Leverage 
RatloC 
Well Capitalized 10 or above and 6 or above and 5 or above 
Adequately 
Capitalized 8 or above and 4 or above and 4 or aboved 
Undercapitalized Under 8 or Under 4 or Under 4­
Significantly 
Undercapitalized Under 6 
or Under 3 or Under 3 
Critically 
Undercapitalized! 
a Ratio of qualifying total capital to weighted risk assets. 
b Ratio of Tier 1 capital to weighted risk assets. 
Ratio of Tier 1 capital to average total consolidated assets. 
d The standard is three percent or above for a bank with a composite CAMEL rating of one in its 
most recent report of examination. 
- The standard is under three percent for a bank with a composite CAMEL rating of one in its most 
recent report of examination 
t The only criteria is a tangible equity to assets ratio that is equal to or less than two percent. 
Tangible equity includes core capital. plus cumulative perpetual preferred stock, minus all 
intangible assets except purchased mortgage servicing rights (up to a specified limitation). The 
denominator is quarterly average total assets minus the deductions made in the numerator. 
Table 2. Supervisory Actions Applicable to Institutions 
In Various Capital Categories 
Well Capitalized 
Mandatory Actions 
May not make any capital distribution or pay a management fee to a controlling person that would 
leave the institution undercapitalized. 
Discretionary Actions 
• 
None 
Adequately Capitalized 
Mandatory Actions 
May not make any capital distribution or pay a management fee to a controlling person that would 
leave the institution undercapitalized. 
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Must obtain a waiver from the FDIC to accept brokered deposits. The rates paid for such deposits 
cannot significantly exceed the rate paid on deposits of similar maturity in the institution's normal 
market area or the national rate for deposits accepted outside the institution's normal market area.­
May not provide insurance on pass through deposits unless the bank has permission to offer 
brokered deposits.b 
Discretionary Actions 
None 
Mandatory Actions 
Undercapitalized 
May not make any capital distribution or pay a management fee to a controlling person that would 
leave the institution undercapitalized. 
Must cease paying dividends. 
Subject to increased monitoring. 
May not accept brokered deposits or offer pass through insurance.c 
May not solicit deposits by offering rates of interest that are significantly higher than the prevailing 
rates of interest on insured deposits (1) in the institution's normal market areas; or (2) in the market 
area in which such deposits would otherwise be accepted.d 
Must submit an acceptable capital restoration plan within 45 days and implement the plan. 
Growth of total assets must be restricted. 
Approval from the appropriate agency is required prior to acquisitions, branching, and new lines of 
business. 
Discretionary Actions 
The agency may, if it determines that such action is necessary to carry out the purposes of prompt 
corrective action, take any of the following additional actions: 
Order the institution to recapitalize by issuing equity or debt (including voting stock) or 
acceding to acquisition or merger. 
Restrict inter-affiliate transactions. 
Restrict the interest rates the institution pays on deposits. 
Order a new election of the board of directors, dismissal of certain senior executive officers. 
or hiring of new officers. 
Prohibit acceptance of deposits from correspondent depository institutions. 
Require a company that controls the institution to obtain its regulator's approval before 
making any capital distribution. 
• 
.. 
Require the institution to divest or liquidate any subsidiary that poses a significant risk to 
the institution, or is likely to cause dissipation of its assets or earnings. 
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Require any controlling company to divest any affiliate that is in danger of insolvency and 
poses significant risk to the institution, or is likely to cause dissipation of its assets or 
eamings. 
Require any controlling company to divest the institution. 
Require the institution to take any other action that would carry out the purposes of prompt 
corrective action more effectively than the above actions. 
Significantly Undercapitalized 
Mandatory Actions
 
Subject to all provisions applicable to undercapitalized institutions.
 
Bonuses and raises to senior executive officers prohibited without prior written approval.
 
The agency will take the following actions unless it determines that doing so will not further the
 
purposes of prompt corrective action: 
Must raise additional capital or arrange to be merged with another institution. 
Transactions with affiliates must be restricted by requiring compliance with section 23A of 
the Federal Reserve Act as if exemptions of that section did not apply. 
Interest rates paid on deposits must be restricted to prevailing rates in the region. 
Subject to at least one of the discretionary actions for undercapitalized institutions. 
Discretionary Actions 
Subject to additional discretionary actions for undercapitalized institutions if they will better carry out 
the purpose of prompt corrective action. 
Subject to any of the supervisory restrictions for critically undercapitalized banks if such action is 
necessary to carry out the purposes of prompt corrective action. 
Subject to conservatorship or receivership if the institution fails to submit or implement a capital 
restoration plan or to raise capital pursuant to agency order, if such action is necessary to carry out 
the purposes of prompt corrective action. 
Critically Undercapitalized 
Mandatory Actions 
Must be placed in receivership within 90 days unless the appropriate agency and the FDIC concur 
that other action would better achieve the purposes of prompt corrective action. 
Must be placed in receivership if it continues to be critically undercapitalized on average during the 
fourth calendar quarter after it initially became critically undercapitalized, unless the primary 
regulator and the FDIC certify that the institution is still viable and determine that it has a positive 
•net worth, is in substantial compliance with its capital restoration plan, and is profitable or has a 
sustainable upward trend in earnings. 
Within 60 days, must stop making any principal or interest payments on subordinated debt. 
If not closed, the institution's activities must be restricted. At a minimum, it may not do the 
following without the prior written approval of the FDIC: 
C 
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Enter into any material transaction other than in the usual course of business. 
Extend credit for any highly leveraged transactions. 
Amend the institution's charter or bylaws. 
Make any material change in accounting methods. 
Engage in any "covered transactions" as defined in section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 
which concerns affiliate transactions. 
Pay excessive compensation or bonuses. 
Pay interest on new or renewed liabilities at a rate that would cause the weighted average 
cost of funds to significantly exceed the prevailing rate in the institution's market area. 
Discretionary Actions 
Additional restrictions (other than those mandated) may be placed on activities. 
a This provision of FDICIA is in section 301, Limitations on Brokered Deposits and Deposit 
Solicitations, rather than section 131, Prompt Corrective Action. 
b This provision of FDICIA is in section 301, Limitations on Brokered Deposits and Deposit 
Solicitations, rather than section 131, Prompt Corrective Action. 
This provision of FDICIA is in section 301, Limitations on Brokered Deposits and Deposit 
Solicitations, rather than section 131, Prompt Corrective Action. 
d Included in the FDIC's final rule on brokered deposits which implements section 301, Limitations 
on Brokered Deposits and Deposit Solicitations. of FDICIA effective June 16, 1992. 
The ultimate activity restriction is closure. For the first time, FDICIA allows regulators to 
close banks before equity capital reaches zero. Closing banks when they hit the two percent 
capital tripwire concentrates more of the risk of failure on equity holders. 
The important difference between previous supervisory efforts and the provisions contained 
in FDICIA is that supervisory discretion is reduced. FDICIA grants few new powers for federal 
banking supervisors; however, Congress has now mandated when supervisory powers are to be 
exercised. This contrasts with the pre-FDICIA concept of reliance on internal supervisory guidelines 
that could be adapted to meet particular situations. 
Prompt corrective action is intended to limit losses to the bank insurance fund by (1) 
increasing the "cushion" available to absorb losses at problem institutions, (2) reducing the time 
problem institutions remain open, thereby limiting the flight of uninsured depositors, and (3) 
restricting risk-taking by undercapitalized banks. 
Liquidity SupPOrt 
Traditionally, the Federal Reserve discount window has served as a source of emergency 
liquidity for banks because of its role as a lender of last resort. However, a report prepared by the 
•House Committee on Banking, Finance. and Urban Affairs argued that during the 1980s, discount 
window credit funded the flight of uninsured depositors and allowed problem banks to remain open 
longer, increasing losses to the Bank Insurance Fund. Because discount window loans are 
collateralized, their position in the event of closure is equal to that of insured depositors. When 
discount window loans are used to replace uninsured deposits, the effect on resolution is to leave 
fewer creditors to share in the losses and less collateral available for recovery. FDICIA provisions 
affecting the discount window are detailed in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Discount Window Provisions 
Undercapitalized Institutions· 
To avoid liability, lending is limited to GO days in any 120-day period. 
If the Federal Reserve Board or the appropriate federal regulator determines, with due regard to 
economic conditions and market circumstances, that the institution is viable, the GO-day limitation 
may be extended for additional GO-day periods upon receipt of a written certification. 
Critically Undercapitalized 
If any discount window borrowings remain outstanding 5 days after the institution becomes critically 
undercapitalized, the Federal Reserve Board will be liable for any "increased loss" to the FDIC. 
The Federal Reserve Board's liability for increased losses is limited to the lesser of (1) the amount 
that the Board or a Federal Reserve Bank would have lost on any increases in the amount of 
advances after the expiration of the applicable lending period if those advances had been 
unsecured, or (2) the amount of interest received on the increased amount of the advances. 
• In this section only, FDICIA defines undercapitalized institutions to include any institution so 
classified on the basis of the capital ratios presented in Table 1 or any institution having a 
composite CAMEL rating of five under the Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System as of the 
most recent examination. 
In addition to limiting discount window funds, FDICIA also prevents troubled banks from 
shifting to volatile funds to meet liquidity needs. Adequately Capitalized banks may only accept 
brokered deposits4 or offer pass-through insurances if they obtain a waiver from the FDIC. 
Undercapitalized banks may not accept brokered or pass-through deposits and cannot offer 
interest rates on any deposit that exceed prevailing market rates. 
FDICIA has reigned in the "lender of last resort" function served by the discount window 
and bank participation in the brokered deposit market with the intention of reducing insurance fund 
losses. It is argued that losses will be reduced for two reasons: (1) the flight of uninsured 
depositors increases the likelihood that these depositors will not be around to share in BIF losses, 
and (2) problem banks will no longer be able to avoid the consequences of depositor discipline by 
offering high interest rates on, or even accepting, brokered deposits. 
Least-Cost Resolution 
Traditionally, the FDIC covered all uninsured depositors. The Treasury described pre­
FDICIA resolution policies as follows: 
"One would expect a policy that protects only insured depositors, with an 
occasional extension of coverage in rare circumstances to uninsured depositors. 
• 
4 Brokered deposits are funds received by depository institutions through third party 
intermediaries. 
.. 
S Pass-through insurance occurs when a fiduciary such as a pension fund deposits funds for a 
large number of beneficiaries, with $100,000 of deposit insurance "passing through" to each of 
the beneficiaries. 
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Instead, the policy has been to protect uninsured depositors whenever possible, 
with exceptions occurring only in those few instances when the FDIC cannot find an 
acquirer for the failed institution." (pg. 18)6 
In contrast, FDICIA now requires that the resolution alternative chosen must result in the 
least cost to the Bank Insurance Fund. The cost of transferring insured deposits must now be 
compared with the cost of transferring all deposits and any other resolution alternatives available. 
Costs must be compared on a present-value basis using a realistic discount rate to account for the 
time it takes to dispose of the assets and payoff the liabilities. Already this has led to a drop in the 
number of bank resolutions where all deposits are "assumed" or covered from 83 percent in 1991 
to approximately 13 percent during the first eight months of 1993. 
FDICIA also specifies that the least-cost evaluation be calculated as of the date the bank 
first enters receivership or conservatorship, regardless of when the resolution takes place. The cost 
of liquidation may not exceed the difference between insured deposits and the present value of the 
net recovery the FDIC reasonably expects as its share on the disposition of the bank's assets. As 
a result, the FDIC is limited in the steps it can take to protect uninsured depositors. To further 
reinforce the fact that resolution methods must consider the cost to the insurance fund, FDICIA 
states that after December 31, 1994, the FDIC may not take any action that would increase losses 
to the insurance fund by protecting uninsured depositors or creditors other than depositors. 
An exception to the least-cost alternative is permitted only if it is determined that (1) 
liquidation of a troubled bank could cause serious adverse effects on economic conditions or 
financial stability, and (2) FDIC actions could mitigate these adverse effects. Invoking this 
exception requires written recommendations from two-thirds of the Board of Directors of the FDIC, 
two-thirds of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Secretary of the 
Treasury in consultation with the President of the United States. The cost of these actions must be 
repaid by a special assessment on all members of the insurance fund. So, although FDICIA does 
provide a legal basis for "Too Big to Fail", it appears unlikely that these requirements would be met 
except in the most dire circumstances. 
This section of FDICIA spells out to the FDIC that its first priority is to resolve problem 
banks at the least cost to the insurance fund. Peripheral considerations such as the impact on 
other financial institutions are secondary and can only be factored into the resolution decision under 
specified circumstances.7 These provisions put uninsured depositors on notice that they can no 
longer expect full restitution from the insurance fund. 
Where Will It Take Us? 
Will this piece of legislation accomplish the intended objective of reducing the cost of bank 
resolutions? Experts are certainly divided on this issue. Limitations on the "Too Big to Fail" 
doctrine, promptly closing critically undercapitalized banks, and requiring failed banks to be resolved 
in the manner that results in the least cost to the fund should accomplish this purpose. However, 
FDICIA has altered the supervisory system, the liquidity support available for troubled banks, and 
the traditional system of bank resolution. Changes of this magnitude will alter the way depositors, 
6	 During this time period, the FDIC's preferred resolution method was a purchase and
 
assumption where the purchasing bank acquired all deposit liabilities of the failed institution.
 • 
This method of resolution was less costly than liquidation, as required by law. However, 
existing regUlations did not require the FDIC to request bids on only the insured deposits and 
compare them to the bids for all deposits. 
7	 FDICIA requires the FDIC to evaluate the impact of the means of resolution on the viability of
 
other insured depository institutions in the same community. They must then ''take such
 
evaluation into account" when deciding which resolution method to use.
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investors, and bank management operate. The remainder of the paper will explore the potential 
impact of these changes. 
Bank Supervision 
Lawmakers adopted capital-based regulation as an answer to the increased cost of bank 
resolutions because of both the number of bank failures and the cost of resolving these failures. 
Without a doubt, capital reduces the likelihood of failure. This is true for any business, but has 
special implications for banks. In a world where there is deposit insurance, the more capital a bank 
has, the greater the bank's potential to absorb losses and the lower insurance fund losses in the 
event of failure. The concept of capital-based supervision presumes that: 
banks will engage in more risky behavior as capital declines, contributing to bank 
failures, and 
reported capital ratios are leading indicators that accurately reflect a bank's 
condition. Ear1y supervisory intervention based on these leading indicators can 
reduce the number of bank failures. 
The following sections discuss these assumptions and examine the potential effectiveness of these 
new regulations. 
Capital as an incentive to reduce risky behavior. Business owners with little equity have an 
incentive to engage in risky investments that offer high returns. As equity declines, owners have 
less to lose and more to gain on high-risk, high-yield investments. For banks, the existence of 
deposit insurance limits the downside risk of failure. If investments turn sour, the insurance fund 
pays off the insured depositors and bank owners lose their equity. If the investment succeeds, 
bank owners will have generated a high return on their investment. As their "at risk" equity in the 
bank declines, management's incentive to take risks increases. 
But the "real world" is not this simple. If bank supervision is effective, undercapitalized 
banks will be prevented from engaging in risky activities, even if deposit insurance provides 
incentives for such behavior. FDICIA addresses the risk-taking incentives inherent in deposit 
insurance by imposing mandatory supervisory restrictions on bank activities as bank capital 
declines. But the question is, will mandatory restrictions be superior to the historical discretionary 
approach in curtailing risky behavior of undercapitalized banks? 
The GAO contended that if capital-based regulation with mandatory restrictions and higher 
capital standards had been in effect in the 1980s, the banks comprising the Bank of New England 
Corporation would have had restrictions on asset growth in the mid-1980s and formal enforcement 
actions by 1986 or 1987. They concluded that "such interventions could have compelled the banks 
to correct problems before they adversely affected earnings and capital." (pg. 20) 
While supervisory intervention based on capital levels may have been warranted in the 
case of the Bank of New England Corporation, studies that looked at a large number of bank 
failures over several years did not find evidence that supervisory intervention based on capital 
levels would have altered the outcome for these institutions. Gilbert (1992) focused on two risky 
behaviors, rapid asset growth and excessive dividend payments, and did not find that these 
activities occurred to any great extent. None of the banks in his 854-bank sample that had equity 
capital below five percent for five or more consecutive quarters before failure had asset growth or ­
dividend payments in their last year. Additionally, banks in the sample that were responsible for 
disproportionately high losses to the insurance fund did not have above average asset growth or 
dividend payouts. 
In another stUdy, Gilbert (1993) found that supervisors were effective in slowing the asset 
growth and reducing the dividends of problem banks. Also, banks that were examined in the 12 
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months prior to failure had significantly lower insurance fund losses as a percent of total bank 
assets when compared to banks that were not examined. These results demonstrate that, at least 
during the second half of the 1980s, bank supervisors were effective in constraining the activities of 
undercapitalized banks and mandatory supervisory restraints would most probably not have 
changed the outcome for these institutions. 
Capital as a leading indicator. For capital-based regulation to be effective in reducing 
insurance fund losses, declining capital must serve as an accurate and ear1y indicator of bank 
problems. Clearly, declining capital is indicative of problems. But, studies of capital levels at failed 
banks have found that deteriorating conditions were often times not signaled by a decline in capital 
ratios. In a sample of 206 banks that failed in 1989, the Treasury found that only 41 percent had 
capital ratios below regulatory minimums as of June 30, 1988, and only 48 percent had capital 
ratios below regulatory minimums by year-end 1988. These numbers indicate that, at least for a 
majority of the banks that failed in 1989, reported capital levels gave no warning of impending 
failure less than four quarters prior to failure. Similar results were reported by Gilbert (1991). In his 
study, only 44 percent of his sample of 854 banks that failed between 1985 and 1990 had capital 
consistently below regulatory minimums for five or more quarters prior to failure. These results 
illustrate the problem with relying on capital ratios to identify troubled banks. 
Traditional regulatory supervision, which focuses on asset quality, management, earnings, 
and liquidity, in addition to capital, has historically had a better record for identifying problem banks 
than the results reported above. For example, in Gilbert's 1993 study 66 percent of the 854 failed 
banks would have been identified as troubled banks using the composite CAM EL rating, the 
traditional supervisory tool which reflects all five aspects of a bank's condition, at the examination 
prior to failure. This compares favorably with the 44 percent that would have been identified by 
capital ratios alone. 
Similar conclusions can be drawn from comparing the number of banks on the FDIC 
problem bank list with the number of banks subject to prompt corrective action based on capital 
ratios alone. According to December 31, 1992, Reports of Condition, less than 1.4 percent of all 
U.S. banks were undercapitalized. The FDIC classified more than seven percent of U.S. banks as 
problem banks in need of close supervision as of year-end 1992. If it is argued that mandatory 
supervisory actions are the major changes contained in prompt corrective action, then only a small 
percent of U.S. banks will be affected by this provision. Traditional supervisory methods - focusing 
on capital, asset quality, management, earnings and liquidity - identified more than five times the 
number of institutions needing close supervision. Therefore, it is not obvious that focusing on 
capital as an indicator of bank soundness will provide additional insights over what is already 
covered in the supervisory process.s 
Part of the drawback to relying on capital measures alone is the difficulty in accurately 
measuring capital. A bank's reported capital can be significantly overstated if the loan loss reserve 
has not been adequately funded. For example, Lemieux described what would have happened to 
the capital ratios of banks that failed during the 1980s if they had funded reserves to cover average 
loan losses. Based on unadjusted reported capital, only 24 percent of sample banks would have 
had capital below the early closure 'lripwire" in FDICIA, at the examination prior to failure. 
However, when capital measures were adjusted for losses inherent in the loan portfolio, 83 percent 
would have hit the early closure tripwire at the examination prior to failure. This study 
demonstrates that accurate measurement of capital is critical to the identification of troubled banks 
under capital-based supervision. 
• 
S FDICIA does not ignore the traditional supervisory process. Procedures were included in the
 
law that allow a regulator to downgrade a bank's capital zone for a less than satisfactory
 
supervisory rating on asset quality, management, earnings, or liquidity.
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An added complication of accurately measuring capital is the magnifying effect of regional 
economic downturns on loan losses. Economic downturns can cause capital shortfalls when 
declining loan performance and/or declining collateral values force banks to write down the value of 
their loan portfolio. In a review of loans classified substandard at a sample of Kansas and 
Oklahoma agricultural banks, Lemieux and Spong found that loss rates on these loans reached 52 
percent of substandard loans in 1983 when real per farm income in Kansas and Oklahoma 
bottomed out.1I By 1989, agricultural income had improved, and losses on substandard 
classifications dropped to 22 percent of substandard loans. Over a ten-year period, charge-offs on 
substandard loans averaged 36 percent for these sample banks. This actual loss rate was 
significantly higher than the 20-percent rate traditionally used as a "rule of thumb". 
Given the impact of the economy on loan values, reserve allocations should be increased 
when economic conditions deteriorate. Results of the previous study suggest that this is not done 
as aggressively as it should be. The banks in the study were healthy and not in danger of failing. 
However, if their reserves had been adjusted in line with the sample's average historical loss rate, 
their reported capital ratios would have fallen at least two percentage points during the height of the 
farm crisis. By the end of the decade when the agricultural economy improved, there was little 
difference between reported capital and capital measures that were adjusted for the sample's 
average historical losses. 
The accuracy of the loan loss reserve, and consequently capital, could improve with more 
frequent examinations and more consistent policies on valuation reserves for impaired loans. 
However, the impact of loan loss provisions on earnings, and in turn capital, will still provide an 
incentive to minimize the recognition of loan losses. 
The write-down of a loan portfolio sufficient to affect bank capital will likely occur only after asset 
quality problems become severe. For this reason, bank capital is more likely to serve as a lagging 
indicator of bank performance rather than a leading indicator. 
Liquidity SupPOrt 
FDICIA increases the economic incentive depositors have to monitor the soundness of their 
banks. If more uninsured depositors consistently suffer losses, they will place their funds in banks 
that are better capitalized. In this way, liquidity could constrain a weakened bank before capital 
levels cause regulators to consider closure. 
,ThiS has already been proven. The Wall Street Journal, in reporting on the January 29, 
1993 failure of First National Bank of Vermont, Springfield, Vermont said, "... because of publicity 
about the tough new rules taking effect Dec. 19 [the prompt corrective action provisions of FDICIA], 
the bank was hit by waves of withdrawals." The Merchants Bank, Kansas City, Missouri, 
experienced deposit outflows after negative publicity about the bank's owners and the closing of its 
sister bank.10 Both of these banks ended up being closed because of liquidity problems - not 
capital insolvency.'1 If uninsured depositors are to share in the losses of troubled institutions, 
banks must be closed when these depositors are still around. 
II These states are partiCUlarly relevant because more than 55 percent of the banks that failed 
during the 1980s were located in Texas, Oklahoma. Kansas, or Louisiana, states affected by 
regional economic downturns in the agriculture and energy sectors. 
-
... 
10 For more information see the Appendix. 
11 The First National Bank of Vermont was closed January 29, 1993, and The Merchants Bank 
was closed November 20, 1992. 
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In addition, liquidity problems could affect BIF losses. For example, limitations on discount 
window assistance could force troubled banks to sell assets to meet liquidity needs. If the 
proceeds from asset sales are used to fund uninsured depositor flight, FDIC resolution costs will 
increase because fewer uninsured depositors will be left to share losses with the FDIC and the 
volume of quality assets passing to the FDIC will be less. 
Moreover, what will be the impact on the financial system when many institutions in the 
same geographic area are experiencing troubles? During periods of regional economic problems, 
improvement in bank performance may not be possible until the economy improves. Enforcing 
certain FDICIA provisions during adverse economic conditions could increase BIF losses rather 
than reduce them. Mandatory early closure rules could increase the number of bank failures during 
an economic downtum if economic conditions erode bank capital to the point that viable banks hit 
early closure tripwires. In addition, closing banks during a recession is more costly. If banks are 
closed that could have survived, BIF losses ~i11 increase. 
It should be noted that FDICIA does contain some provisions that serve to limit or alleviate 
system-wide liquidity pressures. For example, provisions that restrict interbank liabilities reduce the 
interdependence among banks. This limits the likelihood that isolated bank problems could roll 
through the financial system. However, restriction of correspondent deposits may further weaken 
an undercapitalized bank and contribute to a liquidity crisis. 
"Too Big To Fail" is another example of a FDICIA provision intended to alleviate system­
wide liquidity pressures. If a widespread loss of depositor confidence leads to contagious depositor 
runs, if a deterioration of correspondent banking relationships causes widespread bank failures, or if 
there is a breakdown in the payments mechanism, "Too Big to Fail" would allow the FDIC to cover 
all uninsured depositors. However, the approval process required to invoke "Too Big to Fail", 
reduces the likelihood that this provision will ever be used. It appears that these built-in safeguards 
to preserve financial stability might be found lacking under certain circumstances. 
Least-Cost Resolution 
While requiring the FDIC to resolve problem banks in the least costly manner will reduce 
losses to the BIF, least-cost resolution in conjunction with early closure could have some 
unintended effects during an economic downtum. The pool of potential buyers with the necessary 
capital to acquire troubled banks ebbs with the economy. A reduced pool of potential buyers can 
reduce the bid price offered to the FDIC or force the FDIC to liquidate rather than transfer the 
assets of a troubled bank. Either of these altematives increases the cost of bank resolution for the 
FDIC. In fact, FDIC statistics show that losses on bank resolutions were 13 percent of assets in 
1988 when the economy was relatively strong but jumped to 22 percent of assets in 1989 and 1990 
when the economic downtum began. 
Conclusion 
So far the FDIC has been able to handle bank failures and impose losses on uninsured 
depositors without serious repercussions for other banks. Falling interest rates have boosted bank 
profitability and liquidity, and failures have declined. However, FDICIA regulations have yet to be 
tested in an environment similar to that of the Midwest during the mid-1980s or the East Coast 
during the late 1980s, when many banks in the same geographic region experienced problems. 
The question then becomes, can the banking system under FDICIA withstand similar economic 
stress without a taxpayer bailout? Or has it produced a system that will be vulnerable to economic • 
downtums? 
The costs of adjusting to this new order may be significant. FDICIA has altered the liquidity
 
support for troubled banks and the traditional system of bank resolution. Changes of this
 
magnitUde will alter the way depositors, investors, and bank management operate. There will be
 
more liquidity insolvent banks. Viability and liquidity support decisions will have to be made at an
 
------------------------------------------------"
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ear1ier stage in a bank's deterioration. This increases the difficulty in gauging when individual bank 
problems could spread to other parts of the banking system, especially during economic downturns. 
In addition, historical data does not clearly support that supervisory intervention based 
solely on capital lev,els will be more effective than traditional supervisory methods in curtailing risky 
activities at undercapitalized banks. There is also the question that capital ratios alone may not be 
the best indicator of a bank's condition. Historical studies show that capital tends to be a lagging ­
not a leading - indicator of bank problems. Further, the complexities of adequately assessing loan 
losses can significantly impact the accuracy of reported capital, particular1y for troubled banks or 
banks impacted by regional economic downturns. In light of the difficulty in accurately measuring 
bank capital and reserving for expected losses and the accompanying reporting burden for the 
banking industry, capital-based regulation may not provide enough benefits to outweigh its costs. 
However, overall, FDICIA may offer some benefits in encouraging banks to maintain adequate 
capital and promptly correct problems. 
A repeat of the economic conditions of the last decade could raise questions about the 
ability of FDICIA to promote financial stability. There are no easy answers to bank reform, but 
recognition of potential problems will help policymakers in their efforts to create a financial system 
that contains the economic incentives necessary to promote safety and soundness in the banking 
system. 
-
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Appendix 1 
Chronicle of the Merchants Bank 
During the 1980s, The Merchants Bank developed its niche as a real estate lender in the 
Kansas City metropolitan area and subsequently expanded into the national market. Merchants' 
strategy was one of growth driven by aggressive lending practices, including the purchase of loans 
originated at affiliated banks.12 To fund these loans, the bank competed aggressively for deposits, 
both locally and through deposit brokers. The bank operated with limited liqUidity in its balance 
sheet: its loan-to-deposit ratio remained above 85 percent from 1986 through 1990 and often 
exceeded 100 percent for short periods of time. 
In the three years from 1983 through 1986, Merchants increased its asset base by a factor 
of eight primarily through loan growth.13 This growth was due in part to the boom in real estate 
development resulting from the favorable tax treatment available for real estate investment under 
the 1981 tax act. Merchants' rapid growth and concentration in real estate lending contributed to its 
operating risk. However, this high risk strategy also initially generated high returns: the bank's 
return-on-assets averaged 1.7 percent from 1984 through 1986, placing it among the top 
performers in the industry. Capital growth was also favorable during this period and actually 
exceeded asset growth. 
However, the strategies that were so effective for Merchants in the mid-1980s, were 
disastrous in the changed environment of the late 1980s. Chart 1 presents selected financial ratios 
that illustrate Merchants' financial condition from 1987 through the third quarter of 1992. Real 
estate overbuilding and the tax law changes in 1986, followed by a recession in the early 1990s, 
radically altered the profitability of real estate lending. Merchants' net loan losses mounted, 
increasing from $12 million in 1986 to over $42 million in 1990. The continued decline in the health 
of the real estate industry increased Merchants' need for capital. In an effort to maintain capital 
ratios, Merchants' asset base steadily shrank after 1989. 
The passage of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) in 
December 1991 made several changes that were to significantly affect Merchant's ability to survive. 
First, changes in the brokered deposit regulations impacted Merchants' ability to continue to 
aggressively acquire the deposits that were essential to its funding structure. In anticipation of 
becoming subject to the brokered deposit restrictions, Merchants began to reduce its reliance on 
these deposits. In 1989. brokered deposits accounted for eight percent of total deposits, yet by 
year-end 1992 brokered deposits were down to four percent of deposits. To replace these funds, 
Merchants offered higher rates on its insured deposits. This strategy worked until June 16, 1992, 
when the brokered deposit regulations became effective. In addition to limiting the banks that could 
accept brokered deposits, the new FDIC regulations clarified the fact that undercapitalized banks 
were subject to interest rate caps on all deposits not just brokered deposits. With Merchants' 
weakened capital position, its ability to compete for deposits by offering high interest rates was 
curtailed. 
12	 Merchants' affiliated depository institutions included Metro North State Bank in Kansas City, 
MO.; Bank of St. Joseph in St. Joseph, MO.; Citizens Bank & Trust 'in Smithville. MO.; First • 
Bank of Gladstone, MO.; Home Savings Association in Kansas City. MO.; Valley View State 
Bank in Overland Park, KS.; Industrial State Bank in Kansas City, KS.; The Mission Bank in 
Mission, KS.; and Security Bank of Kansas City, KS. The entire banking chain controlled 
approximately $8 billion in assets as of year-end 1989. 
13	 Total assets were $157 million at year-end 1983. By year-end 1986 total assets had reached 
$1367 million. Acquisitions of other banks accounted for 30 percent of the growth in assets. 
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Chan 1. The Merchants Bank 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992­
Real Estate Loans to 
Total Loans (%) .43 .43 .48 .46 .50 .50 
Loan Losses to Total 
Loans (%) .01 .01 .02 .03 .02 .04 
Brokered Deposits to 
Total Deposits (%) .10 .08 .08 .06 .02 .04 
Loans to Deposits 
(%) .99 .96 .89 .87 .82 .80 
Return on Average 
Assets (%) 1.25 1.74 1.40 .10 -1.10 -4.62 
Total Capital to 
Average Assets (%) 7.24 8.35 8.74 9.11 8.46 5.97 
Asset Growth (%) .07 .13 .11 -.10 -.01 -.12 
EqUity Growth (%) .27 .29 .17 -.04 -.17 -.56 
a As of September 30, 1992. 
Source: Reports of Income and Condition. 
Second, FDICIA put uninsured depositors on notice that the Bank Insurance Fund could not 
be expected to cover losses on uninsured deposits anymore. The change in Merchants' deposit 
structure, in addition to its continued high loan-to-deposit ratio, increased its vulnerability to a loss 
of depositor confidence. From mid-1992 on, negative publicity concerning fraud charges against 
some of the principal stockholders; publication of Merchants' losses during 1991; and the closing of 
Home Savings, an affiliated thrift, heightened depositors' concerns about Merchants' soundness. 
When the affiliated Metro North State Bank failed on November 13, 1992 and uninsured depositors 
were offered 50 cents on the dollar, depositors' concerns about Merchants escalated into a silent 
run. Although long lines never developed in the bank lobby, wire transfers drained the bank of 
most of its large deposits. In total, over $200 million left the bank during its last month, with over 
50 percent of that leaving in the last week after the failure of Metro North. When the bank closed 
on November 20, 1992, few uninsured depositors remained. 
Merchants' whole strategy had been based on the ready access to liquidity from the deposit 
market and a continuation of high returns on real estate. FDICIA's changes to coverage of 
uninsured deposits and limitations on brokered deposits eliminated the deposit market as a source 
of liquidity for Merchants. 
In a last ditch effort to meet its liquidity needs, Merchants began to market its assets. Loan 
sales to competitors allowed the bank to meet deposit outflows for the three days prior to closing. 
But on November 20, 1992, the bank was unable to meet the continued deposit outflow. As 
reported in the Kansas City Business Journal, the bank was ineligible for discount window 
assistance because regulators, "didn't see Merchants continuing as a viable bank because of its ­
non-performing loans, its low capital levels and the run." As a result, the bank was closed. In a 
news release, Earl Manning, Commissioner of Finance for the State of Missouri, identified liqUidity 
problems as the critical factor in the failure of the bank: 
"It was the result of a higher than normal level of deposit withdrawals where too 
many customers demanded their money. The Merchants Bank simply ran out of 
cash." 
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FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND INVESTMENT COORDINATION:
 
EVIDENCE FROM THE BANKS FOR COOPERA1"IVES
 
Laura M. Geis1 
During the last several years, farmer cooperatives in the United States have struggled to 
adapt to changing market conditions through restructurings and joint ventures. Cooperatives in the 
1980s faced their most serious financial stress in fifty years. Many cooperatives have been saddled 
with excess productive capacity, particularly in grain storage, feed manufacturing, fertilizer mixing 
and application, farm input retailing, and many other lines of business. Despite consolidations and 
closings, excess capacity persists in many areas, particularly among local grain and farm supply 
cooperatives. 
It has been estimated that excess capacity in retail fertilizer operations in a 24 county area 
of Missouri results in farmers paying as much as 25 percent more than if cooperatives' capacity 
were matched with demand (Van Dyne and Rhodes). A survey of cooperative unit train grain 
loading facilities found them to be operating at 17 percent of total capacity in Iowa, two percent in 
Nebraska, and 43 percent in North Dakota (Cobia, Wilson, Gunn, and Coon). 
As further evidence of financial difficulties from excess capacity, between 1970 and 1985, 
the total number of cooperatives in the United States declined by more than 2,000. Half of these 
went out of business', and the rest merged or were acquired (National Society of Accountants for 
Cooperatives). Although more recently cooperative financial performance has improved, reflecting 
the healthier agricultural economy and the streamlining of operations, excess capacity remains a 
problem in many areas. This research explores whether the Banks for Cooperatives (BCs), as 
dominant lenders to the cooperative sector, can prevent overinvestment by their borrowers or assist 
them in rationalizing excess capacity. 
In general, excess capacity occurs when there is overinvestment relative to future demand 
for a product, or when demand conditions change so that existing capacity is underutilized. The 
current problems with excess capacity may be explained in part by the following demand-related 
factors: a less-than-anticipated demand for farm inputs due to the farm debt crisis, govemment 
commodity programs (for example, the PIK program. conservation reserve, ARP, etc.), or changes 
in transportation systems. On the other hand, the excess capacity problem may also be explained 
in part by supply-related factors. Overinvestment in productive capacity may have at its root 
govemment policies promoting cooperatives, or a lack of effective mechanisms available to 
cooperatives for signalling investment plans to other firms in the industry. 
The response of agricultural economists to conditions of excess capacity in agribusiness 
industries has been focused on ways to mitigate the problem. Chambonnet and Schrader; and Van 
Dyne and Rhodes addressed how to optimize local grain and fertilizer capacity relative to a given 
demand density in a specific geographic area. Van Dyne constructed a model to determine what 
size, location, and prodUct mix would provide service to farmers at a minimum cost, given the 
existing facilities. Taylor and Vogler addressed how regional cooperatives could minimize costs to 
members by consolidating retail facilities and product lines. Gunn and Cobia surveyed cooperative 
managers about their responses to excess capacity problems. • 
Economist, Rural Development Programs Office of Budget and Program Analysis, USDA. This
 
research was conducted at Michigan State University and the Economic Research Service,
 
USDA. Financial support was provided by the Agricultural Cooperative Service and the
 
Economic Research Service at USDA, as well as the Michigan Agricultural Experiment Station.
 
145 
The research thus far has focused on measuring or dealing with the consequences of 
excess capacity, but little emphasis has been placed on the decision making structures which 
allowed the problem to occur in the first place. Although excess capacity has many causes, one 
thing seems to be apparent: both as the dominant lenders to farmer cooperatives and as 
cooperatives themselves, the three Banks for Cooperatives (BCs) have a key role to play in 
coordinating investments in productive capacity with anticipated future demand for that capacity. 
The three Banks for Cooperatives are located in St. Paul, MN, Springfield, MA, and Denver, 
CO. Part of the cooperatively owned Farm Credit System, the BCs provide loans and financial 
services to agricultural cooperatives, as well as to rural electric, water and telecommunications 
systems. The BCs also make loans to foreign buyers of U.S. cooperative-sourced agricultural 
commodities. Combined, the BCs currently serve about 2,700 borrowers and hold over $12 billion 
in outstanding loans. They provide a very large share of the debt financing used by farmer 
cooperatives, many of which have had more limited access to alternative sources of credit than 
their investor-owned competitors. Moreover, because the benefits of cooperative membership can 
be gained only by patronizing the cooperative, there is no secondary market for the equities of 
cooperatively owned firms. Because of these limits on the ability of cooperatives to access many 
sources of both debt and equity financing, the BCs are well-positioned to coordinate investments in 
some agribusiness industries by extending or denying credit or influencing the expansion decisions 
of their borrowers. 
This research asked whether the BCs would be able to ''turn off the tap" of credit flowing 
into a market or industry when the sum of planned and existing capacity is fairly well-matched with 
projected demand. Three conditions are necessary for the BCs to successfully coordinate 
investments through their credit decisions: 1) they must provide a large share of the credit used by 
cooperatives, 2) their cooperative borrowers must have a large market share, and 3) the BCs must 
effectively use the information they receive from monitoring borrower accounts to guide the 
investment decisions of other borrowers wishing to expand. This study explored the extent to which 
each of these conditions is met for particular agribusiness industries. 
Data was obtained from two surveys: a census of the 290 largest agricultural cooperatives 
and a series of face-to-face interviews with senior members of the BC credit staff. Survey results 
indicate that the BCs have had a significant impact on the match of industry capacity and long-run 
demand among local farm supply and grain cooperatives, where they have the largest market share 
among lenders and the greatest influence over borrowers. In some parts of the country, the banks 
have played a very active role in rationalizing excess capacity by initiating mergers and joint 
ventures among their borrowers based on their analysis of borrower financial data. However, as 
discussed below, several factors limit the BCs' influence over their borrowers. 
Conceptual Framework 
The activities of thousands of people may contribute to the production of a single good. 
Economic agents scattered over thousands of miles make decisions and act based on imperfect 
information and rules of thumb. A central economic problem is how to coordinate their 
contributions across space and time in an efficient manner, given that information and control 
mechanisms are imperfect (Shaffer). 
"Coordination" refers to the matching of the supply of a good with the demand for it at 
every step of the vertical production sequence, at prices consistent with costs of production (Shaffer 
•and Staatz, 1988). Neoclassical economic theory tells us that when supply of a good is precisely 
matched with demand at prices equal to the marginal cost of production, resources are efficiently 
allocated. Much of the study of economics is concerned with how prices perform this coordinating 
function. However, markets are only one of several ways of coordinating supply and demand. 
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Investment coordination, or the matching of the capacity to produce a good with the long­
run demand for it, is accomplished by a mix of institutions including mar1<ets for goods and services, 
as well as bond and equity mar1<ets and financial institutions. Although some periods of excess 
capacity may signal the transition of an industry to a new technology or new demand conditions, 
the presence of persistent excess capacity may also be an indication that some part of this system 
of coordinating institutions has failed for a particular industry. 
In general, coordinating mechanisms can be classified into three categories (mar1<ets, 
cooperatives, and integration), which refer to the type of transaction whereby the task of 
coordinating the actions of economic agents is accomplished. The value of this categorization is 
that it can assist the economist in diagnosing the sources of coordination failures, as well as the 
factors contributing to effective coordination of investments. The investment of farm supply 
cooperatives in capacity to produce and distribute far more fertilizer than is demanded by farmers 
(resulting in either higher prices than necessary or lower or even negative patronage dividends to 
cover the investment error) is an example of a coordination failure. 
Investment coordination has both a vertical and a horizontal dimension. Vertical 
coordination takes place with respect to complementary investments, i.e., it determines whether the 
investments of an input industry are sufficient to allow firms in the next stage of the vertical 
production sequence to expand output as needed. Horizontal coordination takes place with respect 
to competitive investments in the same industry. The main focus of this research is on the 
horizontal coordination of investments, although the BCs are important in both. 
The process of investment by firms in productive capacity is a particularly difficult 
coordination problem. It takes place in an environment of pervasive uncertainty. This uncertainty 
derives not only from the inability of the firm to predict events which will affect future demand 
(primary uncertainty), but also from its inability to predict the investments that will be undertaken by 
rival firms in the industry (secondary uncertainty). The degree of secondary or "game-theoretic 
uncertainty" is a function of the way in which the economic system is organized. The degree of 
game-theoretic uncertainty that a firm faces when undertaking an investment may be greater or 
lesser, depending on the effectiveness of the mix of coordinating institutions guiding the investment 
decision. The problem of investment coordination requires that the game-theoretic uncertainty 
imposed on one firm by another firm's actions be minimized. Since game-theoretic uncertainty is a 
function of how the economy is organized, it can only be reduced by appropriate mechanisms for 
influencing or at least signalling the investment plans of competing firms. 
According to neoclassical economic theory, the prices that result from peJ1ectly competitive 
mar1<ets are the ideal mechanism for allocating resources. However, critiques of neoclassical 
theory have centered on the inability of mar1<ets to allocate investment opportunities (Richardson). 
If demand for a good increases, prices rise, and many firms rush to expand capacity, some 
institution is needed to determine at what point the expansion of capacity should stop in order to 
avoid the waste of resources involved in unnecessary investments and subsequent bankruptcies. 
Because of game-theoretic uncertainty, a competitive system does not convey the appropriate 
information to effectively deal with the investment coordination problem. 
Game theory has been used to model the coordination of investments by firms competing 
in an industry. (See, for example, Porter and Spence; and Farrell). The capacity expansion 
process of an industry can be modelled as a noncooperative coordination game, in which the 
players (firms) cannot communicate with one another or make binding commitments to behave in a 
certain way. The payoff structure of this type of game is such that they can only achieve the ­
highest payoffs if they act in concert. The intellectual process of a player in a coordination game 
involves more than just predicting what other players will do. Tacit coordination involves predicting 
what they will predict about what you will predict they will do, etc. Complicating this process of 
coordination for common gain is the fact that there is rivalry among alternative common courses of 
action. In the capacity expansion process of an industry, competing firms do not communicate 
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investment plans to one another, each seeking to preempt its rivals' investments. If many firms 
respond to a general profit opportunity by rushing to expand capacity, overinvestment (and an 
unstable dynamic equilibrium) may result. 
In game theory, the only solution concept for a noncooperative game is the Nash 
equilibrium, at which each player's strategy is the best response he could make to the strategies 
chosen by each of his opponents. However, a game may have more than one equilibrium. When 
multiple Nash equilibria are possible, it is difficult to predict which equilibrium will result based only 
on a formal description of the game. Schelling argues that it is possible to predict the outcome of 
games of tacit coordination only if you have some understanding of the context of the game and 
the likely expectations of participants. He believes that players will settle on a Nash equilibrium that 
has some kind of salience or conspicuousness for the persons playing the game. Such solutions 
are called "focal points." An example of a focal point solution to an investment coordination 
problem would be for all the firms in an industry to expand enough to maintain historical market 
shares in an expanded market. 
Economic information plays a vital role in the creation of expectations of how other firms in 
a market will act. If all the firms in an industry obtain information about future demand prospects 
and rivals' investment plans from common sources, their expectations may converge on a common 
equilibrium. Common information sources often include the pool of prospective customers, the 
capital markets, public statements by industry participants, and actual decisions to commit 
resources. 
Capital markets play an extremely important role in the creation of expectations. Security 
analysts develop predictions of future demand that are published and widely read by the firms in an 
industry, contributing to a common set of expectations. However, because there is no secondary 
market for cooperative stock, the cooperative segment of agribusiness industries is lacking an 
important source of information for tacitly coordinating investment decisions. This stUdy 
hypothesizes that the BCs substitute for the missing stock market signals by using "inside" 
information gained from some borrowers to guide the investment decisions of others. 
According to Schelling,' in recurrent coordination games, players have an incentive to create 
institutions or rules to render the behavior of their cohorts more predictable. A particular type of 
institution for resolving coordination problems is a mediator. A mediator has the capacity to absorb 
and analyze huge amounts of complex information in a way that could not be handled by pre­
specified rules. As a source of credit for new investments, banks have a central role as mediators 
in the capacity expansion process. By interacting with investors who are prohibited by legal or 
competitive considerations from interacting with each other, bankers may filter information and use 
it to make lending decisions that lead to a stable expansion of industry capacity. A mediator may 
be converted into an arbitrator if the players irrevocably surrender authority to him to make binding 
decisions. A bank may become a de facto arbitrator with the power to coordinate investments 
when a large number of the firms in an expanding industry have few alternative sources of 
financing. 
A primary role of financial institutions in all economies is to serve as screening agents for 
the allocation of credit. Banking systems and financial (bond and equity) markets interact to 
determine which firms gain access to financing in order to undertake investments. The organization 
of a banking system may facilitate information flows which aid banks in their investment 
coordination role. In Japan and Germany, for example, banks have large shareholdings in the 
•major commercial and industrial firms, as well as interlocking directorates, which enable the banks 
to exert considerable influence over the investment decisions of their borrowers. Banks provide the 
majority of financing to industry, and stock markets are relatively weak. In the United States, in 
contrast, legal barriers exist which prevent banks from owning the stock of their borrowers, 
strengthening the role of the stock market as a source of discipline on the' investment decisions of 
firms. In general, countries which allow banks liberal powers tend to have weaker stock and bond 
markets, and those which restrict bank powers tend to have stronger stock and bond markets. 
------~/
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Interesting parallels can be drawn between the banking systems of Japan and Germany 
and the cooperative sector of the U.S. The signals of the stock market, a common source of 
discipline and convergent expectations for investor-owned firms, are missing for cooperatives as no 
secondary market exists for the stock of patron-owned firms. Therefore, this study hypothesizes 
that the role of the Banks for Cooperatives in monitoring and influencing their borrowers' decisions 
is enhanced. 
Research Methods 
Information on issues relevant to investment coordination was gathered from surveys of 
both borrowers and lenders. The survey of potential borrowers was a mail survey, and the survey 
of lenders was a series of face-to-face interviews with senior credit officers at each of the BCs. 
A census of cooperatives eligible to borrow from the BCs was undertaken, targeting the 
largest cooperatives in the country, which had sales ranging from $30 million in 1990 to almost $4 
billion. The total response rate for the survey was 61.4 percent, or 178 firms responding out of 290 
in the survey population. 
The 290 firms in the survey population are very representative of the U.S. cooperative 
sector as a whole and account for the majority of cooperative sales. Respondents reported levels 
of borrowing from the BCs that ranged from nothing to $400 million. The mean level of borrowing 
was $21.6 million. Table 1 shows the breakdown of respondents by commodity group. The largest 
category is farm supply cooperatives, comprising 20.8 percent of all respondents. 
Table 1. Breakdown of Respondents by Commodity Group 
How would you classify your cooperative by commodity group? (Choose one) 
Response Frequency Percent-
FruitsIVegetables 27 15.2 
Farm Supply 37 20.8 
Dairy 34 19.1 
Grain 27 15.2 
Sugar. 6 3.4 
Rice 2 1.1 
Cotton 8 4.5 
PoultrylLivestock 10 5.6 
Farm Supply and Grainb 20 11.2 
Other 7 3.9 
a Percentages based on 178 valid cases (i.e., no missing values). 
b A separate category was added for the cooperatives that reported their business was evenly 
divided between farm supply and grain. 
•The category "other" includes: seed marketing, honey, petroleum, catfish and dry beans. 
In addition to the survey of potential borrowers, senior representatives of the credit staff 
were interviewed at CoBank, the St. Paul BC and the Springfield BC. These people were generally 
C 
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at the senior vice president level in their respective banks and were in charge of credit decision 
making. They were identified by other BC officials as those playing a key role in loan decision 
making or the setting of loan policies. 
A total of nine BC credit officers were interviewed, including the senior credit officers in 
each of the three banks. They were initially approached for the interviews with a letter describing 
the research project and requesting an interview. This was followed up with telephone calls to 
make arrangements for meeting. Each person was interviewed individually, with the exception of 
two people at the St. Paul Bank, who requested a joint interview. The meetings with officials at 
CoBank and the St. Paul BC lasted approximately one hour, and were taped. The interview with a 
representative of the Springfield BC was conducted over the telephone, and was not taped. 
Research Findings 
Research findings in each of three areas are discussed below. The survey of cooperatives 
elicited information in two key areas: the investment decision making practices of cooperative 
firms, and the decision of cooperatives to obtain financing from a BC as opposed to an alternative 
credit source. The survey of lenders sought information to evaluate the effectiveness of the BCs in 
coordinating investments. 
Investment Decision Making by Cooperative Firms 
The survey of cooperatives disclosed that considerable excess capacity exists in many 
parts of the cooperative system, particularly in grain storage, feed manufacturing, fertilizer mixing 
and application, farm input retailing, and many other lines of business. Over a fourth of the 
respondents which are engaged in the assembly and handling of member products, a traditional 
economic role for cooperatives, were operating at less than half of their capacity. (See Table 2). 
Table 2. Number and Percent of Finns Utilizing 50 Percent
 
of Capacity or Less, by Enterprise
 
Line of Business Number of Finns 
Percent of Firms In that 
Line of Business 
Retailing of Farm Inputs 5 6.3 
Manufacturing of Farm Inputs 8 20.0 
Assembly and Handling of 
Member Products 19 25.3 
Processing of Member 
Products 9 12.7 
Othera 7 63.6 
a "Other" includes: bulk petroleum distribution, petroleum retailing, regional wholesale farm supply, 
and warehousing. 
Excess capacity appears to be widespread across many industries. To circumvent the 
­thorny problem of defining when capacity is "excess" for different industries, the assumption was 
made that those involved would know it when they see it. Cooperative managers were simply 
asked to report whether they were suffering from problems of excess capacity in any of their lines 
of business. Excess capacity was most often reported by grain, farm supply, rice, and fruit and 
vegetable cooperatives. (See Table 3). 
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Table 3. Cooperatives with Excess Capacity, by Commodity Group 
Are you suffering from serious problems of excess capacity In any of your lines of 
business? 
Commodity Group Percent Reporting Excess Capacity 
FruitsIVegetables 40.7 
Farm Supply 38.9 
Grain 63.0 
Farm Supply and Grain 50.0 
Dairy 27.3 
Sugar 33.3 
Rice 50.0 
Cotton o 
PoultrylLivestock 30.0 
Other 14.3 
Although the excess capacity in the cooperative system appears to be extensive, this study 
made no attempt to diagnose its causes, which undoubtedly vary from one industry to the next, or 
the role the BCs may have played in contributing to excess capacity in particular industries. This 
can only be done effectively in detailed case studies of individual industries. However, the research 
did explore a number of barriers to investment coordination which are unique to agribusiness 
industries, the cooperative form of business organization. and the attitudes of typical cooperative 
members and directors. 
First, the structural characteristics of agribusiness industries often make investment 
planning difficult. Farmer-owned cooperatives have traditionally participated in low value-added 
commodity industries adjacent to farming, which means that they often face highly volatile markets 
for their inputs and outputs. As one seasoned agribusiness lender commented. 
Agribusiness is so dynamic that you can't attempt to see what is coming next. 
When you are making major capital expenditure decisions, it is simply not possible 
to foresee accurately what government policies will be, what export markets will be 
like, and so forth. Instead, you just prepare for anything. 
The firms in these industries are primarily commodity businesses in low value-added and 
low differentiation markets, facing unstable demand and prices. They have little brand 
differentiation to insulate them from the effects of competitors' investment decisions. Many of these 
firms face significant barriers to exit. For example, it is not easy to sell a grain elevator when the 
local market will no longer support it. Because cooperatives are closely tied to farm production, 
their markets often have a strong spatial dimension. Therefore, coordination of investments takes 
on added importance as an efficient distribution system is needed to transport bulky commodities in 
­a cost-effective manner. 
Second, several characteristics of cooperatively owned firms complicate the investment 
planning process. The stockholders of cooperatives are the major patrons, the return on 
investment is gained through patronage of the firm, and the firm is under democratic control. 
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These characteristics of cooperatives have many implications for investment coordination, 
particularly in the areas of investment strategy, access to different types of financing, and 
governance of investment decisions (Staatz, 1984, 1987). 
Farmer-owned cooperatives pursue investment strategies that are often quite different from 
investor-owned firms in the same industries. There is a strong complementarity between 
investments at the farm level and those undertaken by cooperatives. Often the cooperative and 
members' farms are run as fairly integrated operations. rather than as completely separate profit 
centers. In addition, it is a common belief among cooperative managers that an important role for 
marketing cooperatives is to provide a marketing outlet for members' production, which may lead to 
a bias towards overinvestment by cooperatives if excess capacity exists at the farm level. The 
stockholder/patron identity results in a horizon problem for some cooperatives, in which older 
members may not want the cooperative to expand since they will not be around to reap the benefits 
of the investment. This can create difficulties for these firms in raising new equity capital for 
financing an investment. In addition, the democratic governance structure sometimes complicates 
the investment decision-making process, although most cooperatives do not feel the ownership 
structure of their firm greatly inhibits their ability to respond to investment opportunities. For the 
majority of cooperatives, management and the board take the lead in analyZing investments, with 
very little direct member involvement. Thus, management attitudes are of primary importance in 
matching industry capacity and demand. 
A third factor impacting on investment coordination is the attitudes and selective 
perceptions of cooperative members, directors and managers. Many cooperative members believe 
that competition among cooperatives is desirable and maintain membership in more than one 
cooperative, leading to redundant capacity from the point of view of the cooperative system as a 
whole. The majority of cooperative managers believe that large-scale preemptive capacity 
expansion is an appropriate strategy. Even though the majority of survey respondents had 
experienced competitors using such a strategy, few had reconsidered or abandoned expansion 
plans in response to a rival firm's preemptive strategy. When analyzing investments, most 
cooperative managers consider their competitors' expansion plans to some extent, relying mainly on 
customers for information about the capacity of their rivals as well as market growth. This common 
information source may contribute to convergent expectations among competing firms and 
contribute to a stable expansion of capacity. 
Cooperative managers in general seem to be fairly unsophisticated in their use of financial 
analysis techniques in feasibility studies for major expansion projects, although the larger 
cooperatives exhibit a greater degree of financial sophistication. Often cooperatives ignore the cost 
of equity capital (which is difficult to estimate for a patron-owned firm) and simply use the cost of 
debt as the discount rate when analyzing the feasibility of a proposed expansion, which has the 
effect of making projects appear more profitable than they may in fact be. This bias may contribute 
to overexpansion in cooperative-dominated industries. 
Cooperative managers' own analysis of their failed investments, as well as their failure to 
invest when opportunities were available, reveals that their selective perceptions may have a large 
impact on industry-wide investment coordination. They acknowledged that game-theoretic 
uncertainty contributed to the failure of some investments. Most firms that had experienced 
unprofitable investments blamed the failure on Iower-than-anticipated demand, although more than 
a third of them said that expansion by rivals was a factor in the failure of their investments to turn a 
profit. The most commonly cited reason that cooperatives fail to invest when an opportunity is 
available was that management was unaware of the opportunity. This indicates that the differential • 
responsiveness of management is an important factor in investment coordination. Denial of credit 
.. by lenders appears to be a much less important coordinating factor in the opinion of cooperative 
managers. 
-------------------------------------'(
 
152 
BC Market Share 
In order for the BCs to playa large role in coordinating investments, they must first have a 
large share of the credit market for farmer cooperatives, and second, cooperatives must in turn 
have a large market share relative to investor-owned firms in the industries they participate in. If 
these two conditions are met, the BCs will have access to the investment plans of many firms in an 
industry. This creates the information base necessary for the banks to have an impact on 
investment coordination. 
The survey of cooperatives eligible to borrow from the BCs, as well as interviews with the 
senior credit officers, revealed that the BCs' greatest potential for coordinating investments is with 
local (i.e., retail) grain and farm supply cooperatives. The BCs provide over 70 percent of the long­
term debt financing used by grain and farm supply cooperatives, and these firms in turn account for 
a large share of their local markets. Table 4 presents a breakdown of the BC percentage of 
cooperatives' long-term debt by commodity group among the survey respondents. Other sources of 
long-term debt for cooperatives are presented in Table 5. 
Table 4. Percent of Long-Term Debt Financing
 
Obtained from the Banks for Cooperatives
 
by Commodity Group
 
Standard Number 
Commodity Group Mean Deviation of Firms 
FruitsNegetables 52.9 43.9 24 
Farm Supply 70.5 37.6 36 
Dairy 40.1 42.2 32 
Grain 70.0 38.9 21 
Sugar 56.3 45.3 6 
Rice 42.5 46.0 2 
Cotton 64.3 47.6 7 
PoultryA..ivestock 46.1 41.9 8 
Other 65.0 44.8 7 
Farm Supply and Grain 73.4 31.5 19 
When the BCs' share of long-term financing for the industry groups noted above is matched 
up with the cooperatives' share of product markets, a more complete picture of the BCs' 
coordinating potential emerges. (See Table 6). The BCs provided 70 percent of the long-term debt 
used by grain cooperatives, and they in turn accounted for 57 percent of wheat, 40 percent of feed 
grains, and 46 percent of soybeans marketed in the U.S. at the first-handler level. The banks 
provided about 70 percent of long-term debt to farm supply cooperatives, and they accounted for 
about a third of the market for farm inputs. Dairy cooperatives, which have a 68 percent market 
share, get 40.1 percent of their debt financing from the BCs, on average. However, these figures • 
on cooperative market shares by industry may mask much higher or lower shares in particular local
 
markets, which may be more important than industry shares for purposes of investment ...
 
coordination.
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Table 5. Sources of Long-Term Debt Financing to Cooperatives 
Over the past five years, approximately wh~t percent of your firm's long-term debt 
financing was obtained from each of the following sources? 
Mean Standard 
Source Percent Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Banks for Cooperatives 59.6 41.2 0 100 
Bonds, notes or debt certificates 
issued to members 4.1 13.9 0 100 
Commercial Banks 14.9 31.6 0 100 
Insurance Companies 4.2 15.4 0 95 
Capital Lease Obligations 4.6 13.0 0 100 
Industrial Development Revenue 
Bonds 2.6 8.7 0 53 
Other" 4.6 19.1 0 100 
a Percentages based on 162 valid cases.
 
b "Other" includes: contract purchases with the seller of the assets, government programs, and the
 
National Cooperative Bank. 
The BCs are clearly the dominant lenders to the cooperative sector in the United States. 
Not only do they provide more long-term debt financing to cooperatives than any other lender, they 
are looked to by cooperatives as an important source of financial and management advice. They 
are well-positioned to influence the investments of their borrowers in an effort to avoid excess 
capacity. Whether they actually do so is addressed in the next section. 
Effectiveness of BCs in Coordinating Investments 
In the terminology of systems science, a stable dynamic equilibrium is only possible in a 
closed system, that is, one that is free of influences from the environment outside the system. By 
analogy, if the Banks for Cooperatives provided all of the credit to the cooperatives in an industry, 
and those cooperatives faced no competition from investor-owned firms, the BCs would be able to 
control the flow of credit into the industry, simply turning off the tap when investments in capacity 
are fairly well-matched with demand. In the real world, however, such control by a single institution 
is not possible (and, many would argue, not desirable). Cooperatives do not have a 100 percent 
market share in any industry, and the Banks for Cooperatives do not supply 100 percent of the 
credit used by cooperatives. Therefore, "control" becomes "influence." In the absence of a stock 
market-based coordinating mechanism, the BCs do have considerable influence on the capacity 
expansion decisions of their borrowers. This section explores the factors which contribute to and 
detract from the banks' ability to influence the match of industry capacity and long-run demand. 
The information presented is based on interviews with senior members of the credit staff at each of 
the BCs. 
•The BCs seem to be effectively organized to make good use of available information in 
their credit decisions. All three banks have electronic databases of borrower financial information 
which they are able to access in order to assess the financial performance of a borrower relative to 
its peers. These databases are unique to the BCs among agribusiness le.nders and are made 
economically feasible only by the concentration of the banks' loan portfolios in these industries. 
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Reliable information on the cooperative portion of many agribusiness industries exists only by virtue 
of it being gathered by the BCs from their borrowers for use in credit decisions. 
Table 6. Market Share of Cooperatives 
Commodity Cooperative Market Share 
Marketing Cooperatives 
Milk 68 
Broilers 12 
Eggs 2 
TUrkeys 18 
Hogs 17 
Fed Beef 10 
Wheat 57 
Rice 59 
Feed Grains 40 
Soybeans 46 
Cotton 30 
Fresh Vegetables 7 
Processing Vegetables 20 
Citrus Fruits 67 
Other Processing Fruit 65 
Other Fresh Fruit 40 
Farm Supply 
Feed . 16 
Fertilizer 44 
Petroleum 44 
Chemicals 29 
Seed 15 
Machinery 2 
Sources: Knutson, Penn and Boehm. 
• 
In many cases, the BCs have used information from their borrower databases to facilitate a 
more effective match between capacity and demand in particular markets. For example, the St. 
Paul BC was able to influence the consolidation of grain cooperatives into more economically viable 
units which optimized storage capacity and access to rail lines on a system-wide basis. In addition, 
by facilitating mergers to rationalize duplicative capacity in mature industries, the BCs have enabled 
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many cooperatives to adjust to changing economic conditions in a less costly manner than through 
bankruptcy. 
There are two broad factors which facilitate the coordination of investments by the BCs: 
their market share and the closeness of their relationships with their borrowers. 
The most important factor facilitating investment coordination is the BCs' share of the 
cooperative credit market. BC officials reported that their greatest market share, and thus their 
greatest potential for coordinating investments, is with local grain and farm supply cooperatives. 
They subjectively estimated their market share among these firms to be about 80 percent, only 
slightly higher than the figure obtained in the survey of the 290 largest cooperatives (see Table 4). 
Maintaining lending relationships with a large number of the firms in an industry enables the 
BCs to construct a database useful for analyzing various ways to optimize investments in 
productive capacity. During the period in which the former St. Louis BC actively encouraged its 
borrowers to consolidate (1984-86), it was lending to about 175 local farm supply and grain 
cooperatives across three states. All of the locals were being audited by the same firm (the Illinois 
Agricultural Auditing Association). A former loan officer with the St. Louis BC reported that it was 
exceedingly easy to set up a database of borrower financial information because, for the most part. 
these firms were in the same type of business and were audited by the same firm using the same 
reporting format to provide comparable information for each cooperative. He commented that once 
the database was established, the BC functioned in many ways like the finance department of a 
large firm with many locations. This financial coordination role was not adopted by the regional 
grain and farm supply cooperatives because they were dominated by people with marketing 
backgrounds who were more concerned with pushing the regional's products through the local 
outlets than with optimizing investments in ~he system as a whole. 
The closeness of relationships between the BC credit staff and their borrowers also gives 
the BCs greater influence over borrowers' decisions. Loyalty contributes to the BCs' coordinating 
ability. When loyalty to the BC is strong, loan officers have greater latitude to influence borrowers 
without worrying that they will alienate them and lose their business. Many borrowers reported that 
they only borrow from a BC and do not even "shop around" when seeking credit. 
The BCs are somewhat unique in their relationship orientation to banking, which has both 
positive and negative aspects. While other lenders to agribusiness may gain or lose customers 
fairly often based on the deals they are able to offer prospective borrowers, most of the BCs' 
borrowers are long-term customers with close personal relationships with the BC credit staff. A 
former BC loan officer who later worked for a major international agribusiness lender commented, 
"A lot of banks talk about 'relationship banking' and think they do business that way, but the BCs 
really do it." Another loan officer noted that BC lending differs from commercial bank lending in that 
BC loan officers are "more maternal" and do a lot more "hand-holding" with their borrowers. With 
regard to investment coordination, a potential negative aspect of the close relationship is that the 
borrowers as owners may also pressure the banks to make loans they might not otherwise have 
made. 
Although the BCs have been successful in coordinating investments in some areas, they 
have been less successful in others. A variety of forces, including competition from other lenders, 
conflicting pressure from other sources of discipline on cooperatives. the banks' concern with lender 
liability issues, and the cooperative nature of BC ownership, have limited the banks' influence over 
..their borrowers' investment decisions. 
Competition from other lenders is keenest for the business of large, financially successful 
cooperatives. These firms are courted by a wide variety of lending organizations, both international 
and domestic, and are more price-sensitive and likely to shop around than smaller customers. The 
BCs face much less competition for the business of smaller cooperatives, many of whom have 
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outgrown the capacity of local banks to serve their needs. They have much greater influence over 
the decisions of these firms than the larger ones with greater access to alternative sources of 
financing. 
The BCs are but one of many sources of discipline on cooperatives. Regional 
cooperatives, other lenders, members, and competing firms influence investment decisions and may 
be motivated toward different ends than the BCs, reducing their ability to coordinate investments. 
In some cases, particularly those involving stressed borrowers, BC management may be 
reluctant to exert a strong influence on borrowers' decisions for fear of being held liable if the 
borrower experiences losses and the bank is perceived as participating too closely in the 
management of the firm. 
The cooperative structure of BC ownership also places some limits on the extent to which 
BC management tries to influence borrowers' decisions. Because the borrowers own the banks, 
there may be a reluctance on the part of BC management to actively influence certain borrowers, 
particularly the larger ones. Because a few very large cooperatives make up a disproportionately 
large share of the BCs' loan portfolios, BC officials are less likely to influence their decisions, 
although many of these borrowers mentioned that they view the BCs as an important source of 
advice and information. 
The financial status of the borrower also affects whether or not a BC will make a loan to 
expand capacity when they have doubts about the success of the venture. As long as a borrower 
has the financial depth to repay a loan even if the venture proves to be unprofitable, the BC will 
probably make the loan. A senior credit official at CoBank commented, 
I think we have some influence, but does that mean this plant gets built even 
though it shouldn't be? Yes, it does. Because if the borrower has the ability to 
finance it, and we are comfortable that we'll get repaid, the plant gets built. We'll 
certainly encourage dialogue and communication to the extent that we don't violate 
confidentiality and those types of things, but in the end, the borrower gets to make 
the investment decision. That's not a decision we make. The issue really becomes 
one of "Does it impact our ability to get repaid?" If we have doubts about that, 
we're going to have a major say in it because we don't think it's feasible. 
In this regard, the behavior of the BCs is much like that of any other bank: getting their 
money back is the bottom line. 
Conclusions and Polley Implications 
This study addressed three separate but related questions: 1) Can the BCs coordinate 
investments? 2) Do the BCs coordinate investments? and 3) Should the BCs coordinate 
investments? 
The banks can coordinate investments in some industries, mostly where they have a large 
share of the cooperative credit market, and where that market consists mostly of a large number of 
smaller firms which, when combined, account for a large portion of the industry. These conditions 
characterize first handling of grain and farm supply retailing at the local level. The banks have 
much less influence on larger borrowers, such as Sunkist or Ocean Spray. 
-

Although the BCs can coordinate investments in some industries, whether they do so when 
possible is another story. BC officials revealed in interviews that they do attempt to coordinate 
investments, but they do it mostly through "moral suasion" rather than denial of credit. However, 
they also stressed that there are many factors which limit their ability to influence their borrowers' 
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investment decisions. They are often unwilling to take a very proactive role in encouraging mergers 
or joint ventures or in discouraging certain investments, in part because they do not feel it is the 
appropriate role of bankers, and in part because they fear alienating the borrowers/owners. 
There is a fear among bankers of being held liable for borrower losses if they intervene too 
closely in the management of a borrower, as well as losing the priority of their claims in any 
bankruptcy proceedings. This leads them to be cautious about trying to influence borrower 
investment decisions. Also. they sometimes face confidentiality problems in using inside 
information. Although the courts have ruled that banks are free to use internally, for example in 
credit decisions (Brick), any information obtained from borrower accounts, they are careful not to 
disclose information about one borrower to another. 
When asked what they would do if two competing, long-term borrowers requested financing 
for similar projects when the market would only support one of them, BC credit officials responded 
that, first of all, they would never disclose proprietary information of one borrower to another. If 
both cooperatives were committed to the project and had the necessary financial strength, they 
would both get loans. However, if each knew of the other's plans, BC officials might discuss the 
possibility of a joint venture with them: 
If we knew in fact that both knew that they were going after the same market with
 
basically the same expansion program, then we would not in that instance be
 
reserved about saying, "Maybe you all ought to be talking about how you'll work that out,
 
otherwise you're going to beat each other's brains out in the marketplace."
 
Even in instances when the banks are in a position to influence borrowers' decisions to 
prevent overinvestment, whether they should or not is debatable. The existence of excess capacity 
in many parts of the cooperative sector suggests that the BCs do have a role to play in 
encouraging mergers to rationalize excess capacity and trying to prevent investments that would 
lead to excess capacity from being undertaken. The lack of a secondary market for cooperative 
stock also points to the appropriateness of a more interventionist role for the BCs. 
Although cooperatives as a group could benefit from more active investment coordination 
by the BCs, the majority of those responding to the survey (57.9 percent) do not feel that the BCs 
should be more active than any other lender in trying to coordinate investments. Many 
cooperatives, failing to recognize their interdependence with others in the same Iir'le of business, 
view any attempts by the BCs to influence their decisions as undue interference. Those who do not 
want the BCs to actively coordinate investments cited the banks' lack of industry expertise as a 
primary reason for their opinions. While they generally welcome advice from the BCs, cooperative 
managers also feared losing autonomy in decision making if the banks were to more actively 
intervene. Cooperative managers who favored investment coordination by the BCs tended to focus 
on the interdependence of cooperatives, both as industry participants and as shareholders of a 
commonly owned bank. 
Many in the cooperative system have recognized a need for some kind of system-wide 
coordinating institution. In 1987. the Senate Agricultural Appropriations Subcommittee directed the 
Agricultural Cooperative Service to conduct a study on what cooperatives need to do to remain 
viable businesses. ACS enlisted the expertise of a wide range of cooperative leaders in identifying 
and analyzing strategies for helping cooperatives face future challenges (ACS). 
• 
One need identified in this report was for an institution to coordinate the resources of the 
existing cooperative system to allow it to compete more effectively with the extremely large and 
complex firms that dominate much of the food and fiber sector. The broad cooperative system 
designs they considered included: 1) a "National Cooperative System" involving complete 
horizontal integration of cooperative involvement in a given commodity, coupled with vertical 
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integration to move the product from farm to end-user in cooperative hands; 2) a "Cooperative 
Trading Bloc" approach, which would organize cooperatives into geographically defined blocs 
dealing with all commodities and inputs common to a specific region; and 3) a "Holding Company 
or Cooperative Umbrella" approach, allowing cooperatives to centralize under a holding company 
certain functions, such as accounting and financial management, that have significant economies of 
scale. 
In considering schemes for improving coordination among cooperatives and promoting the 
position of the cooperative system as a whole vis-a-vis investor-owned competitors, cooperative 
leaders completely ignored the existing role and potential contributions of the Banks for 
Cooperatives. This stUdy provides some analysis of how an existing set of institutions might and 
does coordinate the activities of hundreds of cooperatively owned firms. 
Given the lack of a secondary market for cooperative stock, the BCs assume a role of 
critical importance in coordinating the investments of the cooperative sector. Although they do 
perform a coordinating function, there are actions that could be taken to augment their coordination 
role. These include demanding of their borrowers more rigorous analysis of proposed investment 
projects, devoting more resources to gathering information to be used in credit analysis, and taking 
a more proactive stance in identifying and encouraging mergers or joint ventures among borrowers 
where they make economic sense. 
What will happen to the BCs if no actions are taken to augment their coordinating role? 
There is clearly excess capacity in many parts of the U.S. banking industry, a situation that is likely 
to continue over the next several years. Until the industry consolidates, competition among lenders 
will continue to be fierce, with different lenders seeking specialized market niches (Duncan, 1992). 
The credit staff of the Banks for Cooperatives, however, expects that the BCs will stay viable into 
the future. They cite several reasons for the banks' expected continued success. 
They anticipate being able to fill the market niche comprised of cooperatives partly because 
of their relationship orientation to banking. Most of their borrowers are long-term customers with 
strong personal relationships with the BC credit staff. Moreover, BC officials anticipate being able 
to continue their industry. specialization, which allows them to offer meaningful advice to their 
borrowers. They perceive this advice to be of primary importance to their ability to maintain sound 
long-term relationships with their customers. Moreover, they feel that the vast majority of their 
customers have a sense of ownership toward the BCs, which adds to their loyalty. 
However, the long-term survival of the BCs is directly dependent on the long-term survival 
of their borrowers. BC officials reported that, for the most part, cooperatives have weathered the 
financial difficulties they faced in the 1980s. Many have rid themselves of excess capacity through 
mergers and joint ventures (although more remains to be done in some areas), and have improved 
decision making, becoming more sophisticated and market-oriented. Because cooperatives and the 
BCs are dependent on each other for their survival, the BCs have played a key role in their 
borrowers' adjustments to changing economic conditions. One lender, however, remarked that it is 
hard to kill a cooperative, given their advantages in sourcing inputs, taxation, and financing. As 
long as the BCs continue to advise cooperatives in such a way to keep them competitive and 
maintain their market share relative to their investor-owned competitors, and especially if 
govemment policy remains favorable toward cooperatives, the banks will continue to exist and be 
profitable into the future. 
-
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BUSINESS PERFORMANCE BASED CREDIT SCORING MODELS:
 
A NEW APPROACH TO CREDIT EVALUATION
 
Madhab R. Khoju and Peter J. Barry1 
Credit evaluation basically involves making judgements about the future loan performance 
of a borrower. Such judgements should be contingent on future performance of the financed 
business, because other sources of the borrower's income (e.g., outside employment) may not be 
reliable. Credit scoring models, therefore, should focus on evaluating a borrower's future business 
performance. Similarly, the validity of these models should be based on the accuracy in predicting 
future business performance. 
As an example, one might test to see if the credit score corresponds closely with the 
borrower's eventual change in net worth, repayment ability or loan performance. Such an approach 
requires time series data for a sample of borrowers so that the data for the preceding years are 
used as the estimating sample while the data for the following year constitute the hold-out sample. 
The estimating and hold-out samples in past credit scoring studies in both commercial and 
agricultural lending (Dietrich and Kaplan; Lufburrow, Barry, and Dixon; Mortensen, Watt, and 
Leistritz; Ohlson; Scott; Barry and Ellinger; Srinivasan and Kim; Miller and LaDue; Turvey and 
Brown; Turvey) consist only of cross sectional observations on different borrowers. 
ThiS study proposes and develops a performance based credit scoring model (PBCSM) for 
credit evaluation based on a borrowers' potential business performance. Business performance is 
acceptable (problem) if the repayment ability of the financed business is higher (lower) than the 
repayment obligation. Accordingly, the borrower attributes related to the repayment ability are the 
potential predictors of business performance in estimating a PBCSM. 
The credit scores of borrowers computed from an estimated PBCSM serve as proxies for 
the repayment probabilities and are compared with an objectively predetermined standard (cut-off 
level) to distinguish acceptable (who would repay) from problem (who would default) borrowers. If 
the lender misclassifies an acceptable borrower as problem (type II error), the lender foregoes 
current interest earnings and potential earnings from a future relationship. On the other hand, if the 
lender misclassifies a problem as acceptable (type I error), the lender may lose both the principal 
and accrued interest. The lenders likely are more concerned about type I errors because of their 
immediate higher costs relative to type II errors. 
Depending on the weights used for the predictor variables, even a borrower with relatively 
undesirable levels of one or more predictor variables (e.g., very high level of leverage) may be 
evaluated as acceptable from the estimated PBCSM. A lender, may not want such a borrower in 
the loan portfolio because of the high cost of a potential type I error. To identify such borrowers, 
this study also develops a financial outlook index. 
The importance of the predictor variables in a credit scoring model estimated from cross 
sectional observations is conditional on the favorable or unfavorable economic environments that 
generated the estimating sample. Accordingly, the lenders must reestimate the credit scoring 
model each time the economic environment changes and it involves significant resources. 
•Changes in economic environments, however, may not be a problem for the PBCSM because it is 
The authors are research associate, Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural 
Sociology. and professor of agricultural finance. University of Illinois, respectively. This 
research was funded and conducted at the Center for Farm and Rural Business Finance. 
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estimated from a time-series of cross-section data. Moreover, the PBCSM may be updated using a 
simulated data base. For this, the business performance of a representative case farm business 
may be subjected to a stochastic set of output and output price levels for alternative tenure and 
solvency positions. Replicating this approach over time results in a data base that is analogous to 
cross section and time series. The predictive accuracy of a PBCSM estimated from simulated data 
may then be compared to that of the PBCSM estimated from actual data. 
The specific objectives of this paper are threefold - (1) assess the usefulness of a PBCSM 
in assessing the credit worthiness of agricultural borrowers, (2) use the financial outlook index to 
further screen borrowers evaluated as acceptable by the PBCSM, and (3) assess the usefulness of 
updating PBCSM using the simulated data. 
Theoretical Framework 
A. Performance Based Credit Scoring Model: 
Consider a loan of $L for one period at rate of interest, L The contractual revenue on this 
loan is R, = (1+i)L. Actual revenue, however, depends on V, the repayment ability from the 
financed business. Accordingly, the realized revenue as a function of V is given as: 
R, if V > R, 
Realized Revenue = -(R, • V) ifO<V<R, (1 ) 
- R, ifV<O 
In general, the contractual revenue R, is much smaller than M, the expected value of V. 
However, because of the probability that the repayment ability may be less than Rr, the lender may 
not receive the contractual revenue. For simplicity, the probability distribution of the realized 
revenue from the loan is represented by a Bernoulli trial: 
R, with repayment probability P 
Realized Revenue = (2) 
Rd with default probability (1-P) 
where, Rd is the product of q, the write-off rate of delinquent loans, and ~, the unpaid balance in 
the written-off loans. 
Assuming the riskless rate of earnings, ~, from investments like government securities as 
the opportunity cost of loanable funds, a risk neutral lender will approve loans to only those 
borrowers for whom the expected returns (represented by the left hand side of equation 3) exceed 
the opportunity cost of loanable funds (represented by the right hand side of equation 3) Le., 
P*L*i - (1-P)*~*q > P*L*i, + (1-P)*lo*~ (3) 
Moving the right hand side of equation 3 to the left hand side and with some algebra, the 
expected profit on the loan can be expressed as: 
P*L*(i-~) - (1-P)*LD*(q+~) > 0 (4) 
It is evident from (4) that the expected profit on the loan depends on both the probability of 
repayment and the pay-offs in the event of default or repayment. Following Boyes, Hoffman and • 
Low, (4) can be written as: 
(5) 
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The credit evaluation of a borrower depends on whether P is higher or lower than the cut­
off level given by the right hand side term in (5). Such a cut-off level can be approximated by the 
lender and. therefore. the credit evaluation hinges on the lender's judgement about P. For this. the 
lenders utilize the estimated credit score for the ith borrower as a proxy for ~, the estimated 
conditional mean of the repayment probability, Pi' i.e.• : 
(6) 
where, ej denotes the residual associated with this process. 
The repayment probability of a borrower in this study, is approximated by the credit score 
based on an estimated PBCSM. Formulation of a PBCSM. however. entails identification of 
borrower attributes affecting repayment ability of the business. Since the firm's solvency and 
liquidity positions at the beginning of the year and returns from the assets and operating expenses 
over the year determine repayment ability. these four variables serve as the potential predictors of 
business performance. 
In this study. a Iogit model is used because of its merit relative to other statistical methods 
for credit scoring (Collins and Green). Because the business performance is binary i.e .• takes a 
value of 1 if repayment ability is higher than the repayment obligation, and zero otherwise, a 
dichotomous logit model is specified as: 
log [P/(1-Pj)] =a. + 1:J3ij X;j (7) 
Where. Pi is the probability of acceptable business performance for the ith borrower, the dependent 
variable is the logarithm of the odds ratio, a. is the intercept, ~ij is the logistic regression coefficient, 
and ~ is the jth attribute of ith borrower related to business performance. By taking antilogs of 
both sides in (7). Pi is expressed as: 
(8)
 
The estimated Pi from (8) is compared with the cut-off level to distinguish acceptable from 
problem borrowers. Depending on the parameter estimates such an evaluation can classify a 
borrower as acceptable even if the lender may not like the levels of one or more borrower 
attributes. To identify such borrowers, the financial outlook index is discussed next. 
B. Financial Outlook Index: 
Assume the utility function of a lending officer from evaluating the ith borrower is 
represented as: 
(9) 
where, X;j is the level of the jth predictor of business performance for the ith borrower. Each 
predictor. j = 1.2•... ,k. is measured such that the higher the level of the jth predictor, the higher the 
level of utility. By invoking additive utility theory (Fishburn). (9) can be expressed as: 
(10) 
Where aj, j = 1,... ,k are the weights. Equation (10) allows numerical evaluation of the utility function • 
(9) as a weighted average of utilities from each of the predictors. The utility from jth predictor
 
variable, Uj(X;j)' is evaluated as: .'
 
(11 ) 
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where, Ui(~) represents the level of utility from ~ (the maximum value of ~ in the estimating 
sample), and FP<ij) is the distribution function of X;j relative to all ~'s in the estimating sample. A 
similar assumption was made by Shashua and Goldschmidt. 
Since ~ is the maximum value of ~, Ui(~) is assumed constant and is represented by bj. 
The utility function in (10) then can be expressed: 
(12) 
where, Wj = ~*bj 
Equation (12) allows numerical computation of the utility function (9) as a linear combination 
of the distribution function of each predictor variable. However, because it is based on the 
assumption of additive utility theory, it is valid only if the arguments of the utility function (9) are 
independent. 
The distribution function for a particular predictor may be approximated from the cumulative 
percent of the predictor in the estimating sample. The weights, on the other hand, may be chosen 
based on the relative importance of the predictors. By choosing the weights such that "£Wj = 1, 
equation (12) results in a financial outlook index, Ii' whose maximum possible value is 100. 
The financial outlook index of a borrower is sensitive to the cumulative percent of each of 
the predictor variables in the estimating sample. Accordingly, the financial outlook index will be 
lowered if the cumulative percents of one or more predictor variables are low relative to others in 
the estimating sample. Accordingly, the financial outlook index resulting from (12) has the potential 
of identifying the borrowers who have relatively low levels of one or more predictors and thus 
further screen borrowers evaluated as acceptable from the estimated PBCSM. 
Data and Model Specifications 
Data for the study came from the Illinois Farm Business Farm Management (FBFM) 
Association records. Although FBFM started maintaining records of cooperating farmers in Illinois 
in the 1940's, certification of balance sheets was initiated only in 1985. The majority of certified 
farm businesses are located in central Illinois and are predominantly grain fanns followed by hog 
and dairy farms. Because the coefficients in (8) and weights in (12) are likely to differ between 
grain farms and other types of fanning enterprises e.g., livestock or dairy, the PBCSM in this stUdy 
is estimated for grain farms only. 
The following two criteria are used in selecting the sample for this study - (1) the grain 
farms must have certified financial statements for each of the six years (1985 to 1990), and (2) at 
least three grain fanns must be in a given county to reduce heterogeneity in the sample data. In 
checking the FBFM records, only 74 grain farms satisfied the criteria. 
A grain farm is classified as having acceptable (problem) business performance if the 
repayment ability (sum of depreciation and net farm income net of income tax, social security tax 
and family living withdrawal) of the business in year t is higher (lower) than the repayment 
obligations in year t. Because the repayment ability of a business at the end of year t depends on 
the solvency and liquidity position at the beginning of year t, as well as the realized profitability and 
operating efficiency during the year t, these criteria are identified as potential predictors of business 
performance. • 
..In this study, solvency is represented by the equity to asset ratio (EAR). Higher EAR 
indicates lower debt financing which in turn implies less repayment obligation. The liquidity position 
is represented by the current ratio (CR) which is measured as the ratio of current assets to current 
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liabilities. Higher liquidity is associated with higher repayment ability. Profitability is represented by 
the rate of return on equity (ROE) because it is sensitive to the financial structure of the business. 
ROE is measured as the ratio of net farm income from operations less unpaid labor charge for 
operator and family to the farm equity. Higher profitability implies a stronger repayment ability of 
the business. Efficiency is measured by the operating efficiency ratio (OER) which is computed as 
the ratio of gross returns plus depreciation net of operating expenses to the gross returns. This 
ratio reflects the efficiency of operating expense management. Hence, higher the OER the higher 
is the profitability and repayment ability. 
The dichotomous logit model is specified as : 
(13) 
where, Xli is the observed ROE of the business in year t, ~i is the EAR of the business at the 
beginning of year t, ~ is the CR of the business at the beginning of year t, and X4i is the observed 
OER of the business in year t. Other variables have been defined above. 
Model Estimation and Validation Resuhs 
The end of the year balance sheet for the preceding year is the same as the beginning of 
the year balance sheet for the following year. Accordingly, the beginning of the year balance sheet 
and the income statement for year t were used to compute business performance for year t and the 
levels of the predictor variables for year t. For example, the end of the year balance sheet for 1985 
and the income statement for 1986 were used to compute the business performance for 1986. 
This resulted in a pooled time series of 370 observations on business performance and predictor 
variables (74 for each of the years 1986 to 1990). Of this, a pooled time series of 296 observations 
(74 observations from 1986 to 1989) were used as an estimating sample and the observations for 
1990 as a hold-out sample. In the estimating sample 142 observations (i.e., 47.97 percent) had 
acceptable business performance and the remaining 154 (i.e., 52.03 percent) had problem business 
performance. Since the businesses are chosen and then their performances are observed later, 
the sampling design used is considered exogenous (Manski and Lerman). 
SAS LOGIST procedure was used for model estimation. Because the coefficient of current 
ratio had a p-value of 0.69 it was omitted from the final model. The estimates of the final model 
are presented in Table 1. All coefficients are significant at the 0.02 level. The R statistic for the 
model is 0.575 which is relatively high. R statistic is similar to the multiple correlation coefficient in 
the norr:nal setting after a correction is made to penalize for the number of parameters to estimated 
(Harrell). To highlight the relative importance of predictor variables in indicating acceptable 
business performance, their estimated elasticities (evaluated at the means) are also presented in 
Table 1. These elasticities represent the percent increase in the probability of acceptable business 
performance for one percent increase in the corresponding predictor variable. Based on estimated 
elasticities the OER has the greatest impact on the probability of acceptable business performance 
followed by EAR and ROE, respectively. 
Validation of the Estimated PBCSM 
The validity of the estimated PBCSM was examined by its accuracy in predicting known 
1990 business performances of 74 grain farms in the hold-out sample. Of the 74 businesses in the 
hold out sample, 32 had acceptable and the remaining 42 had problem business performances. 
•The predicted business performance for each observation is based on whether the estimated 
probability of acceptable business performance is higher or lower than the predetermined cut-off 
probability level. The estimated model is validated using cut-off levels of 50 and 60 percent in 
order to examine the sensitivity of the model validation to changes in the cut-off probability. The 
predicted business performance for each observation is then compared with its actual performance. 
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The results are presented in Table 2 for the cut-off probability levels of 50 and 60 percent. 
respectively. 
Table 1. Estimated Perfonnance Based Credit Scoring Model 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error ChI-square P Value Elastlchles 
Intercept -6.04 0.88 46.67 0.00 
ROE 14.95 2.57 33.79 0.00 0.536 
EAR 2.91 0.93 9.65 0.02 1.060 
OER 5.82 1.34 18.71 0.00 1.690 
Model Chi-square with 3 degrees of freedom = 141.71.
 
P Value = 0.00.
 
R Statistic = 0.575.
 
Using the information in Table 2, different prediction measures of the estimated PBCSM for 
the hold-out sample are calculated and presented in Table 3. Table 3 also presents the prediction 
accuracy of the estimated model in the estimating sample. The estimated PBCSM correctly 
predicted 74.32 and 78.38 percent of the business performances in the hold-out sample for the cut­
off levels of 50 and 60 percent. respectively. These predictive accuracies are associated with type I 
errors of 30.96 and 19.05 percent, respectively. The estimated model also correctly predicted the 
business performances of 80.40 and 77.03 percent of the estimating sample for the cut-off levels of 
50 and 60 percent, respectively. The corresponding type I errors are 20.13 and 12.99 percent, 
respectively. These results do not differ significantly from the prediction accuracies of reported 
credit scoring models in the literature e.g., 79.7 percent for Lufburrow. Barry and Dixon; 85.7 
percent for Miller and LaDue, and 69.7 percent for the Logit model in Turvey. However, because 
the economic environment generating the observations in the hold-out sample may be different 
from the economic environment that generated the estimating sample, the validity of the PBCSM is 
subjected to a more stringent test than these credit scoring models. 
Table 2. Classification Table for Ahernatlve Cut-off Levels, Actual Data 
Predicted Classlflcatlon 
Acceptable Problem Total 
50 Percent Level 
Actual Acceptable 26 6 32
 
Classification Problem 13 29 42
 
Total 39 35 74
 
60 Percent Level 
Actual Acceptable 24 8 32
 
Classification Problem 8 34 42
 
Total 32 42 74
 
• 
As expected. the prediction results in Table 3 indicate a modest degree of sensitivity to 
changes in the cut-off level. Raising the cut-off level from 50 to 60 percent reduces the likelihood 
of type I error; however, the likelihood of type II error also rises. 
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Table 3. Prediction Measures 
Cut-off Level of 
Measures 50 Percent 60 Percent 
Hold-out Sample 
Total Predictive Accuracy 
Type I Error 
Type II Error 
Estimating Sample 
Total Predictive Accuracy 
Type I Error 
Type II Error 
74.32 
30.96 
18.75 
80.40 
20.13 
19.01 
78.38 
19.05 
25.00 
77.03 
12.99 
33.80 
Construction of Financial Outlook Index 
Two requirements must be satisfied for the construction of financial outlook index· (1) each 
predictor should be measured such that the higher the level of the predictor, the higher is the 
lende(s utility level, (2) the predictor variables must be independent. The measures of ROE, EAR 
and OER (significant predictors of business performance) satisfy the first requirement. However, 
the estimated sample correlation coefficients among these variables are significantly different from 
zero and, hence the second requirement is not satisfied. The predictor variables are, therefore, 
needed to be represented by their transformations such that the transformed variables are 
independent of one another. For this, the three predictor variables are substituted by three 
principal components, PCp; p = 1,2,3. Accordingly, equation (12) is expressed as 
Uj{.) = W, F,{PCi,) + W2 F2{PCi2) + W3 F3{PCi3) (14) 
The computation of financial outlook index, therefore, requires - (a) the construction of three 
principal components for each observation in the hold-out sample, (b) the cumulative percent of 
each of these principal components in the estimating sample, and (c) the weights. The principal 
components for each observation in the hold-out sample are constructed in two ~eps - (i) the 
predictor variables are first standardized using their means and standard deviations in the 
estimating sample, and (ii) the standardized predictors are then multiplied by the eigne vector corre­
sponding to each principal component in the estimating sample. Moreover, since the eigne values 
represent the amount of variance in the data accounted for by the principal components, the 
proportion of the variance explained by each principal component is used as the weights in 
computing the financial outlook index. 
The resulting financial outlook index is used to further evaluate the borrowers in the hold­
out sample that are acceptable by PBCSM. For the cut-off levels of 50 and 60 percents, the 
estimated PBCSM respectively predicted 39 and 32 observations in the hold-out sample to have 
acceptable business performances (Table 2). However, of these only 26 and 24 actually had 
acceptable business performance. Hence if the credit evaluation was based on PBCSM alone, 
there was a potential of committing type I error in 13 and 8 cases respectively. This is where the 
•financial outlook index may be helpful. 
Of the 39 observations in the hold-out sample that are acceptable by the PBCSM at 50 
percent cut-off level, only 32 have a financial outlook index greater than 50. The remaining 7 with 
the financial outlook index less than 50 have in fact problem business performances. Similarly, of 
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the 32 observations in the hold-out sample that are acceptable by the PBCSM at 60 percent cut-off 
level, only 28 had a financial outlook index greater than 50. The remaining 4 with less than 50 
have in fact problem business performance. Hence, if the financial outlook index is used to further 
screen acceptable borrowers from PBCSM, the potential type I error may be reduced by 53.84 
(=(7/13)*100) and 50 (=(4/8)*100) percent, respectively. 
Simulated Data for Updating PBCSM 
Two approaches to generate a data base for updating PBCSM were explored. First, a 
stochastic multi-period model of a case grain farm business was formulated. The attempts to 
establish the validity of such a multi-period model were not successful because of the lack of 
detailed information about the case farm in FBFM records. As a result, the data base is generated 
using separate simulation models for each year (with no linkages over the years) of the case grain 
farm. This approach utilizes the available certified balance sheet and income statements for the 
case farm. These statements in a given year reflect actual business performance for the chosen 
asset structure, operating expenses, financing terms, tenure status, solvency position, production, 
price levels, etc. 
A data base on business performance and its predictors is generated by subjecting the 
case farm to a set of stochastic outputs and their prices under alternative solvency and tenure 
scenarios. The solvency position reflects the repayment obligation due and interest expenses. The 
tenure status reflects the operator's share in the revenue and operating expenses as well as the 
liability structure (because of differences in the level of real estate loan to finance real estate across 
tenure status). Hence for the same volumes and prices of outputs, the income statement for the 
same asset structure will differ across solvency and tenure scenarios. The data base generated 
this way may be interpreted as the potential consequences if the farm operator were to choose the 
same asset structure across alternative solvency and tenure positions. 
A farm business in Champaign county was randomly selected as a case farm from a list of 
grain farms in FBFM records that represented majority of grain farms in central Illinois. The case 
farm's balance sheet information for 1985 to 1990, and actual crop acreages, crop yields, prices, 
tenure status, operating expenses, operator's share in revenue and expenses, other farm income 
including government payments, interest expenses, depreciation and unpaid family and operator for 
1986 to 1990 are reported in Khoju. 
The crop revenue is computed as the sum of the returns from corn and soybeans. The 
operator's revenue includes 100 percent of the revenue on the land the operator owns plus one-half 
of the revenue on the leased land. The operator's crop revenue is then subtracted from operator's 
reported revenue (in FBFM records) to calculate the amount of other farm income including 
govemment payment. 
Alternative solvency positions affect the repayment obligations and interest expenses, and, 
hence, the repayment ability. For data generation purpose, four debt-to- asset ratios - 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 
and 0.8 - were used to represent solvency scenarios. The liabilities under alternative debt-to-asset 
ratios are adjusted using the debt adjustment factor (the ratio of assumed debt-to-asset ratio to the 
actual debt-to-asset ratio). This factor is used to proportionately adjust the short, intermediate and 
long term liabilities. The interest expenses on the liabilities are calculated using the actual interest 
rates prevailing in each year (Agricultural Statistics, 1990). 
Alternative tenure status is associated with different operator's share in the revenue and 
operating expenses as well as the liability structure. Since these variables have direct effects on the 
repayment ability, for data generation purpose, five tenure levels (proportion of tillable acres owned 
by the operator) are considered· 0.05, 0.20, 0.40, 0.60 and 0.80. The farm size across tenure 
status, however, is assumed fixed to maintain similar machinery and other required inputs. The 
I 
/ 
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operator's share of land ownership under alternative tenure scenarios is adjusted by the land 
adjustment factor (the ratio of assumed tenure status to actual tenure status). 
The operator's ownership of land is assumed to be financed by the same ratio of debt 
financing as the actual ratio of real estate loan to the farm real estate, henceforth called the land­
debt factor. For the changes in the real estate loans, the principal amount due each year is also 
adjusted using the ratio of actual annualized principal amount due to the actual real estate loan. 
These adjustments alter the liability structure and, therefore, the solvency positions. Since four 
alternative solvency positions have already been considered, the reported median debt to asset 
ratios for the group of farms within tenure status of 0-10, 11-25,26-50,51-75 and above 75 
(Financial Characteristics of Illinois Farms) are used as the solvency position for assumed tenure 
scenario of 0.05, 0.20, 0.40, 0.60 and 0.80, respectively. The liability structure is then adjusted 
using the ratio of median debt to asset ratio to the debt-to-asset ratio for the given tenure status 
resulting from the adjustments in land ownership and its financing. Detailed discussions about the 
adjustment factors can be found in Khoju. 
For the given solvency and tenure scenarios, the business performance for the asset 
structure depends on the realized outputs and their prices. Prediction of these stochastic variables 
for each of the years (1986 to 1990) is discussed next. 
Prediction of Crop Yields and Prices 
The farm level yields and prices for each crop (corn and soybeans) are assumed to be 
uncorrelated for two reasons. First, the production level at a particular farm is not large enough to 
affect its price (assuming a perfectly competitive market). Secondly, crop prices are not expected 
to affect current production levels because acreage decisions are based on future expected prices. 
Corn and soybean yields, however, are assumed to be correlated because they are grown under 
the same conditions (weather, pest damage etc). Similarly, since corn and soybeans are 
substitutes to each other to some degree their prices are also assumed to be correlated. 
Accordingly, the crop yields and prices can be predicted separately. 
Farm level crop yield reflects two sources of risk: 1) aggregate factors such as weather and 
pest infestations in a county, and 2) idiosyncratic factors such as localized weather, soil fertility and 
management. The variability attributable to these factors represents, respectively, the systematic 
and nonsystematic risks of an individual farm yields. Because county average yield (acreage 
weighted average of individual farm yields) diversifies away the nonsystematic risl<, it may be used 
to represent aggregate risk factors. As a result, just as the return of an individual security is related 
to the level of an index (Sharpe's single index model), the crop yields of an individual farm are 
linearly related to the county average yields and random elements. Estimation of such a 
relationship is used to predict farm level crop yields given the predicted levels of county average 
yields (systematic risk) and random elements (idiosyncratic risk). The county average yields are 
predicted from their estimated density function using their available long series, and the random 
elements are predicted from the distribution of the residuals of the estimated single index models. 
This approach of predicting farm level crop yields is discussed in detail in Khoju, Nelson and Barry. 
Following this approach a total of 225 com and soybean yields (25 for each of 9 scenarios i.e., 4 
solvency and 5 tenure positions) were predicted for each of the years 1986 to 1990. 
Time-series on com and soybean nominal prices are available only at the county level 
(Illinois Agricultural Statistics). Because crop prices received by farmers in a county are essentially 
equal, the historical data are used to estimate the parameters of the density function, the random • 
draws from which are used to represent farm level prices. Because negative crop prices are not 
possible, corn and soybean prices are assumed to have log-normal distributions. Since the most 
recent prices contain the most information about future prices, the parameters of the density 
function were estimated using the price series from 1970 onward only. The predicted corn and 
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soybean prices are represented by the random draws from their estimated bivariate log normal 
distribution. To predict prices for 1986, the bivariate log normal distribution was estimated using 
the price series from 1970 to 1985. Similarly, the prices for 1987 to 1990 were predicted. As with 
the crop yields, 225 prices were drawn randomly for each year. 
Model Estimation Based on Generated Data Base: 
Using the beginning of the year balance sheet and the predicted price and production 
levels, the income statement for each year is computed for assumed solvency and tenure 
scenarios. The business performance and the predictor variables for the Iogit model are computed 
as in the case of pooled time series. This approach resulted in a sample of 900 observations (225 
for each of the years 1986 to 1989) on business performance and predictors. 
The generated sample of 900 observations was used to examine the usefulness of PBCSM 
estimated from the simulated data base. Of these, 638 (Le., 70.88 percent) had acceptable 
business performance and the remaining 262 (i.e., 29.12 percent) had problem business 
performance. These were used to estimate the PBCSM. Since the liquidity measure was not a 
significant predictor of business performance in the pooled time series, it was dropped as a 
potential predictor of business performance in the generated data base. The estimates of the 
model are presented in Table 4. All regressors are highly significant and have the expected signs. 
The R statistic for the model is 0.88 which is higher than 0.575 for the model estimated from the 
observed pooled time series data base. The estimated elasticities of the predictor variables f. 
(computed at the means) are also presented in Table 4. These elasticities indicate that the EAR 
has the greatest impact on the probability of acceptable business performance followed by OER 
and ROE respectively. 
Table 4. Perfonnance Based Credh Scoring Model EstImated from
 
Generated Data Base
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Chi-square P Value Elastlchles 
Intercept -27.00 3.03 79.04 0.00
 
ROE 60.06 6.66 81.34 0.00 0.159
 
EAR 25.42 2.47 105.17 0.00 0.395
 
OER 12.88 3.18 16.40 0.00 0.211
 
Model Chi-square with 3 degrees of freedom =847.08.
 
P Value = 0.00.
 
R Statistic = 0.88.
 
Validity of PBCSM Based on Generated Data 
TO examine the usefulness of the PBCSM estimated from the generated data, the 
estimated model was also used to predict business performance in the hold-out sample of the 
pooled time series (i.e., actual business performances of 74 grain farms in 1990). For this, the 
coefficients estimated from the simulated data were used to compute the estimated probability of 
acceptable business performance for each observation in the hold-out sample. Parallel to the 
PBCSM estimated from the observed pooled time-series, this model was also validated using cut­
off levels of 50 and 60 percent. The predicted business performances are compared with their • 
actual performances and the classification results are presented in Table 5. 
Using the information in Table 5, different prediction measures of the estimated models are 
computed. For comparison, these prediction measures for the PBCSMs estimated from actual and 
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generated time series are presented in Table 6. While both models have respectable degrees of 
accuracy, the prediction accuracy of the PBCSM estimated from pooled time series was higher and 
it has lower type I error. The pooled time-series represents the experiences of a group of farms 
over time, rather than the single farm in the case of the generated data. The pooled time series for 
a sample of grain farms represent the actual relationship of predictor variables to business 
performance in each of the years 1986 to 1989. The generated data base was created by 
subjecting the case grain farm to a set of stochastic production and prices under alternative 
solvency and tenure positions. Moreover, the hold-out sample consisting of 74 grain farms are 
heterogenous in terms of farm size. The predictive accuracy of the PBCSMestimated from 
generated data, therefore, may be increased if the model is estimated from generated data for 
three case grain farms each representing small, medium and large farms, respectively. 
Table 5. Classification Table for Alternative Cut-Off Levels, Generated Data 
Predicted Classification 
Acceptable Problem Total 
50 Percent Level 
Actual Acceptable 
Classification Problem 
Total 
28 
23 
51 
4 
19 
23 
32 
42 
74 
60 Percent Level 
Actual Acceptable 
Classification Problem 
Total 
28 
21 
39 
4 
21 
25 
32 
42 
74 
Of all the credit scoring studies related to agricultural lending, Turvey and Brown (1990) 
examined the prediction accuracy of the estimated credit scoring model using the observations for 
the following years as the hold-out samples. They estimated the credit scoring model using the 
observations for 1981 and examined the prediction accuracy using the observations for 1982. The 
estimated model had a total predictive accuracy of 61.29 percent with 71.70 and 8.64 percent type I 
and type II errors. Based on the type I error for one year ahead projection, the PBCSM estimated 
from the simulated data for a single case grain farm yielded a lower type I error than Turvey and 
Brown credit scoring model. Such results are expected because the PBCSM is estimated from the 
observations over four years while Turvey and Brown model was estimated from the observations 
of only one year. 
Table 6. Prediction Measures of Estimated PBCSM Based on Simulated Data 
PBCSM from Pooled Data PBCSM from Simulated Data 
Measures 50 Percent 60 Percent 50 Percent 60 Percent 
Total Predictive Accuracy 74.32 78.38 63.51 66.22 
Type I Error 30.96 19.05 54.76 50.00 
Type II Error 18.75 25.00 12.50 12.50 
• 
..
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Concluding Comments 
This study is designed to assess the usefulness of PBCSM as a new approach to credit 
evaluation of agricultural firms. The results of the study indicate that the PBCSM has respectable 
degree of prediction accuracy and is close to the prediction accuracies of existing credit scoring 
models even though the PBCSM is SUbject to a more stringent test. The credit evaluation based on 
PBCSM should be appealing to lenders because it is based on the potential performance of the 
financed business, rather than on subjective classification of lenders. Moreover, the financial health 
of the lender also depends on the business performance of the borrowers in terms of both timely 
loan repayment and increased loan demands in the future. 
The financial outlook index developed in this study allows the lender to further investigate 
the levels of the predictor variables of the borrowers that are evaluated as acceptable from 
estimated PBCSM. This index helps in identifying and excluding the borrowers with relatively 
undesirable levels of one or more predictor variables from the loan portfolio. The results of this 
study indicate that adoption of this approach may reduce the type I error by as much as 50 percent. 
Hence, the financial outlook index should be of interest to the lending institutions. 
This study also evaluated the usefulness of one cost effective technique of updating the 
PBCSM -- a farm level simulation approach of data generation. The validation results of the 
PBCSM estimated from the simulated data indicate respectable degrees of prediction accuracy. 
Accordingly, this approach of updating PBCSM has potential usefulness and warrants further 
research. 
•
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CHARACTERISTICS OF FMHA GUARANTEED FARM LOANS IN DEFAULT 
Steven R. Koenig and Patrick J. Sullivan' 
Abstract 
Much of the Farmers Home Administration's (FmHA) credit assistance to farmers
 
now comes in the form of loans made by commercial or cooperative lenders, but
 
guaranteed against default losses by FmHA. As a result, FmHA's loan guarantee
 
programs represent a growing source of potential Federal liabilities. To better
 
understand the factors contributing to guaranteed farm loan default, this study
 
profiles and compares fiscal 1988 guaranteed farm loans that subsequently went
 
into default by June 1992 with nondefaulting loans made in that year. Results
 
indicate that defaulting borrowers are more highly leveraged and operate under
 
slimmer profit margins than nondefaulting borrowers. Defaulting loans show
 
regional and commodity specific concentration and tend to be larger and carry less
 
collateral than nondefaulting loans.
 
The Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) provides both direct and guaranteed farm loans. 
In the 1980's, policy changes affecting FmHA's farmer programs placed greater reliance on the use 
of loan guarantees. As a result, annual obligations for farm loan guarantees have risen sharply 
over the past 10 years and now comprise near1y 70 percent of FmHA's total farmer program 
obligations. Under its guaranteed farm loan programs, FmHA guarantees repayment of up to 90 
percent of the losses on a loan made by a qualifying lender if the borrower defaults on the loan. 
To date, FmHA's loan guarantee programs have experienced low rates of delinquency and 
default, especially given the programs' objective of assisting lenders serve high risk farm borrowers. 
At the end of fiscal 1992, loan volume delinquency rates were just two percent and net charge-offs 
were just 1.3 percent of yearend outstanding guarantee volume. However, these modest rates 
might be misleading because many guaranteed farmer loans are relatively new and hence have yet 
to experience repayment shortfalls more common among maturer loans. Delinquency rates (90­
days past due and/or in nonaccural status) on the outstanding farm loan volume of commercial 
banks, the Farm Credit System (FCS), and life insurance companies ranged from 3.3 to 5.5 percent 
at mid-1992 (USDA). 
With the greater emphasis on delivering Federal farm credit assistance through loan 
guarantees, we need to better understand the factors that determine the success or failure of 
guaranteed loan program participants. An improved understanding of the factors contributing to 
default could help improve program design and assist in developing methods to predict and screen 
loans with a higher than average potential for default. Therefore, the initial step of this research 
and our primary objective in this paper is to provide a profile of the characteristics of a sample of 
defaulted and nondefaulted guaranteed loans and borrowers. Specifically, we compare projected 
income statements, balance sheets, loan terms, and collateral statements for these two classes. 
• 
The authors are agricultural economist and financial economist, respectively, with the
 
Agriculture and Rural Economy Division, Economic Research SerVice, U.S. Department of
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Data Development 
We use data obtained from sections of FmHA's national database (the Guaranteed System) 
and from a special survey of loan records maintained at FmHA's county offices. The Guaranteed 
System database (referred to as the master file) concentrates on accounting and administrative 
information and, therefore, does not contain information about an applicant's financial health or 
income. This information is obtained at the time a loan application is made, but is retained at the 
county office issuing the guarantee. A special survey of county office files was completed to obtain 
this and other information. 
The special survey, conducted in two stages, collected information from the applicant's 
balance sheet, annual projected cash income statement, and collateral statement at the time of loan 
application. Questions on loan terms were included in the questionnaire to supplement loan term 
data available from the master file. Some general borrower characteristics were also collected. 
Only loans guaranteed under the farm ownership (FO) and operating loan (OL) programs 
that were obligated (received FmHA approval and commitment to fund) and disbursed in fiscal 1988 
were included in the study. (Fiscal 1988 ran from October 1,1987 through September 30,1988.) 
Applying these criteria, the universe consists of 12,042 guaranteed loans and 9,149 borrowers 
(Table 1). These loans totaled $1.2 billion. 
Table 1. Guaranteed Loan Program Borrowers, Loans, 
and Dollar Volume 
By Survey Status, Fiscal 1988 
Numbers 
program Survey Universe proponlon Surveyed 
Number Percent 
Borrowers· 1,922 9,149 21.0 
Nondefaults 1,580 8,758 18.0 
Defaults 342 391 87.5 
Loans 1,994 12,042 16.6 
Nondefaults 1,592 11,582 13.7 
Defaults 402 460 87.4 
Million Dollars 
Volume 212.4 1,226.6 17.3 
Nondefaults 167.6 1,176.5 14.2 
Defaults 44.8 50.1 89.4 
•	 Because a single borrower can have more than one loan, the total number of borrowers is less 
than the number of loans. 
Sources: 1988 and 1992 SUivey of FmHa's guaranteed loan applicant folders and the Guaranteed 
System's master file. 
• 
Default Definition 
We considered a fiscal 1988 guaranteed loan to have defaulted if·a loss settlement was 
paid to the participating lender or if the loan was delinquent with principal past due greater than or 
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equal to a selected minimum percentage of loan volume (10 percent for FO and 50 percent for OL 
loans). Only loans meeting this definition on or before June 30. 1992 are included. Therefore. 
loans that defaulted but had sufficient collateral to repay the lender without guarantee are not 
included in our analysis. However. for program management purposes these are less important 
and maybe few in number. Using these criteria, 460 loans made to 391 borrowers were in default. 
When a borrower fails to make scheduled payments, the participating lender is required to 
notify FmHA of any repayment shortfall that exceeds 30 days. To prevent default, lenders are 
allowed to adjust loan repayment schedules or terms, provided certain conditions hold. and FmHA 
approves. When such servicing actions cannot cure a loan delinquency. the lender may proceed 
with collection of the loan. While FmHA must agree to a liquidation plan and has the right to take 
over the liquidation process, the lender normally handles the liquidation, including any legal 
foreclosure actions. FmHA reimburses the lender for up to 90 percent of its realized losses 
(principal, accrued interest, and liquidation costs). Beginning in 1991, lenders can receive 
reimbursements from FmHA for losses incurred under a partial farm liquidation. 
County Survey 
The special survey of county files was conducted jointly with FmHA in two stages. The first 
stage was completed shortly after the close of fiscal 1988 as part of a study to establish a baseline 
of information about the operation of the guaranteed loan programs before the advent of the 
Federally sponsored secondary market for such loan guarantees (Koenig and Sullivan). This stage 
called for a 15-percent sample of guaranteed loans that were obligated and disbursed during fiscal 
1988. Of the survey responses completed by county staff, 1,643 loan guarantees were deemed 
usable for analysis. 
The second stage was completed in late-1992 and covered only guaranteed loans in 
default on or before June 30, 1992. Of the 460 defaulted loans identified, 51 had already been 
surveyed during the first stage. Therefore, in the second stage, 409 questionnaires were sent to 
county offices. Of these, 351 were returned suitable for analysis, giving a total of 402 loans or 342 
borrowers. Roughly half of the 58 unsuitable questionnaires were excluded because the file was 
unavailable to county staff. The remaining had gross discrepancies or certain key data was missing 
from the file. The unsuitable records did not appear to be concentrated in anyone subset. All 
questionnaires were subjected to extensive logic and consistency checks. However, checks made 
on collateral data from the first stage were not as extensive as the second stage, so comparisons 
made may not be as reliable as other aspects of the survey. 
Combining stages one and two yielded a total survey sample of 1,994 loans and 1,922 
borrowers representing 16.6 and 21.0 percent of the universe totals, respectively. The 402 
defaulted loans for which usable survey data was collected represent 87.4 percent of all defaulted 
loans and 87.5 percent of defaulting borrowers. Nondefaulting loans and borrowers surveyed 
comprise 13.7 percent and 18.0 percent of their respective universe totals. 
Survey data was then merged with data from the master file. The analysis reported here is based 
on the merged data from these two sources. Whenever a data item, such as the loan amount or 
percent of loan guaranteed, is available from the master file, we report statistics based on all fiscal 
1988 guaranteed loans (the universe), and not just those in the survey. 
Programs Analyzed 
• 
Statistics are reported for the guaranteed farm ownership (FO) and operating loan (OL) 
programs. Guaranteed OL loans can be made for a range of purposes, including annual crop and 
feed expenses. the purchase of livestock and machinery, and the refinancing of nonreal estate 
debt. FmHA guarantees these loans for up to seven years. but under certain circumstances the 
guarantee could be extended for up to 15 years. Both lines of credit and term notes are eligible, 
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but in 1988 the lines of credit were guaranteed for only three years and limited to payment of 
annual expenses. The total amount of guaranteed loans to any borrower is capped at $400,000. 
In fiscal 1988, loans guaranteed under the farm ownership program could be for the 
purchase, repair, or improvement of farm real estate and the refinancing of existing farm real estate 
debt. Loans are typically secured with a first lien on real estate and attached structures. FO loan 
guarantees are made for up to 40 years and are capped at $300,000 per borrower. 
An interest rate assistance program for guaranteed loans was in operation during fiscal 
1988 (known as the Interest Rate Buydown Program). Under the program, lenders received 
payments from FmHA if they agreed to reduce interest rates on fixed-rate guaranteed FO and OL 
loans to borrowers that could not demonstrate a positive cash flow without such a reduction. 
Lenders were reimbursed for 50 percent of the cost of the reduction, up to a maximum write-down 
of four percentage points for a maximum of three years. The program was changed in 1990; 
FmHA now provides 100 percent reimbursement of the writedown cost. 
Loan Characteristics 
Default Rates are Modest 
The guaranteed FO and OL programs provided 9,149 applicants with 12,042 loans in fiscal 
1988 using our selection criteria. By June 30, 1992, 391 borrowers (460 loans) had defaulted on 
$50.1 million in guaranteed loans. Defaults represented 4.3 percent of total borrowers and 4.1 
percent of guaranteed loan volume (Table 2). Considering that the mission of these programs is to 
assist high risk farm borrowers, the rate of default is modest. 
Table 2. Guaranteed Loan Program Defaults
 
By Program, Fiscal 1988
 
Borrowers Loan Amount 
Program	 Defaults Total Proportion Defaults Total Proportion 
Number Percent Million Dollars Percent 
Farm Ownership 37 2,293 1.6 6.1 345.2 1.8 
Operation Loans 364 7,645 4.8 44.1 881.4 5.0 
Cred~ Lines 247 4,618 5.3 27.9 407.1 6.8 
Notes 166 4,727 3.5 16.2 474.3 3.4 
391 9,149 4.3 50.1 1,226.6 4.1 
a	 Because a single borrower can have a loan from more than one program and can have more than one loan 
w~hin a program, the total number of borrowers is different from the sum of borrowers participating in each 
loan program. 
Source: Guaranteed System's master file. 
There are sizable differences in default rates in the FO and OL programs. The FO 
program has a much lower incidence of default than the OL program, 1.8 percent versus 5.0 • 
percent. This occurrence was anticipated since FO loan guarantees have longer maturities, are 
better collateralized with real estate, and farmers tend to keep real estate loans current when 
repayment difficulties occur. The data supports this contention in that farmers having both an FO 
and OL loan were more likely to default on their OL loan than their FO loan. Furthermore, 25.6 
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percent of nondefaulted borrowers had an FO loan, but only 13.6 percent of.-defaulted borrowers 
had one. 
With higher default rates the OL program accounted for the majority of total defaulting 
borrowers, loans, and loan volume. OL loans accounted for 81 percent of total loan numbers and 
72 percent of total dollar origination volume in fiscal 1988. By mid-1992, that program accounted 
for 92 percent of defaulted loans and 88 percent of defaulted loan volume. Within the OL 
program, credit line loans had a higher default rate than loans made with notes. One explanation 
for this finding is that lines of credit are used to finance annual production expenses whereas notes 
often finance chattel purchases that offer greater collateral coverage and control of loan proceeds. 
Borrowers in Default Often Have More Than One Loan 
There is a tendency for defaulted borrowers to have more than one OL loan. Of the 391 
defaulted borrowers 32 percent had two or three OL loans. This compares with 21 percent for the 
nondefaulted borrowers. Only 19 defaulting borrowers did not have at least one OL loan 
(exclusively FO program borrowers). 
Experience with the guarantee program did not appear to be influencing default rates for 
fiscal 1988 loans. Most defaulting and nondefaulting borrowers were new to the guarantee 
programs in fiscal 1988. Over 69 percent of nondefaulting borrowers did not have a previous OL 
loan and only slightly more defaulting borrowers (72 percent) were first time users of the program. 
Likewise, for the FO program, 97.3 percent of borrowers not in default and 98.2 percent of 
borrowers in default did not have an FO loan prior to fiscal 1988. No defaulting borrower had more 
than four previous loans from either program, whereas 0.4 percent of nondefaulting borrowers had 
between five and eight loans prior to fiscal 1988, all from the OL program. 
Loans and Borrowers Show Geographic Concentration 
Geographic dispersion of defaulted loans is closely aligned with geographic location of all 
guaranteed loans. Defaults are concentrated in the central U.S., with the Lake States, Southern 
Plains, and Delta States showing the highest concentration (Figure 1). One State, Louisiana, 
clearly dominates as a source of defaulted loans issued in fiscal 1988 and hence significantly 
influences the values of the statistics presented. Louisiana accounts for 11 percent of all 1988 
borrowers and 10 percent of all loans, but 39 percent of defaulting borrowers and 38 percent of 
defaulting loans. The default rate of Louisiana's guaranteed loans was 14.5 percent as of mid­
1992. The next closest state is Texas which accounts for four percent of total guarantees and 7.6 
percent of defaulted loans. In terms of numbers or dollar volume, defaults in the Northeast and 
West were few and sporadic. 
When examined by region, the story is very similar. Borrower default rates for eight of the 
10 USDA production regions ranged from 1.4 to 3.5 percent, while the Southem Plains and Delta 
States reported default rates of 6.0 and 10.8 percent, respectively (Figure 2). Again, Louisiana and 
Texas dominate these two regions. Because of their dominance, the type of agriculture (cotton and 
rice farms) in these two regions greatly influences the overall comparison of defaulted and 
nondefaulted loans and borrowers. The lowest default rates are in the Corn Belt, Northern Plains 
and Pacific regions. 
Banks are Leading Source of Defaults 
• 
Commercial banks were the primary source of defaulted guaranteed farm loans obligated in 
fiscal 1988. Banks' share of total 1988 nondefaulted loans was 75.8 percent, but the share of 
defaulted loans was 87.6 percent (Figure 3). The share difference can primarily be attributed to the 
relatively low default rate of FCS loans. The FCS accounts for nearly 23 percent of nondefaulted 
loans, but only 8.5 percent of defaulted loans. Default rates were 4.4 percent for banks, 1.5 
... 
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percent for the FCS, and 10.3 percent for other institutions. Other lenders with defaulted loans 
included savings and loans, credit unions, mortgage loan companies, and unspecified lenders. 
Mortgage companies accounted for 60 percent of the 175 loans originated by other classified 
lenders and 72 percent of the 18 loans that defaulted. 
In terms of loan volume, the results are similar. Banks' account for 74.3 percent of the $1,176 
million loan volume not in default, but 86.2 percent of the $50 million of defaulted loan volume. 
Defaults Not Prevalent in Refinancing Loans 
A smaller proportion of loans in default (29 percent) where primarily used to refinance 
existing farm debt than in the nondefaulting group (37.5 percent) (Table 3). There is a perception 
that many lenders are using the guarantee program to minimize losses on existing high risk loans 
that have little or no chance of success. If correct, this should be particularly true for fiscal 1988 
loans because of the farm financial stress still present during the period. However, this data does 
not appear to support that perception. 
Table 3. Selected Loan Attributes of Defaulted and Nondefaulted
 
Guaranteed Loans, Fiscal 1988
 
Loan Attribute Loans In Default Loans not In Default 
Percent 
Proportion of Loans Borrowed 
for the Purpose of: 
Refinancing Existing Debt 28.9 37.5 
Operating Expenses 57.2 48.2 
Purchasing: 
Real Estate 1.2 6.9 
Machinery 4.0 2.6 
Breeder Livestock 2.5 1.8 
Feeder Livestock 5.5 1.5 
Repairing or Constructing 
Farm 0.8 0.0 
Structures 0.0 0.3 
New Farm Start-up 0.0 1.2 
Other 100.0 100.0 
Total 
Proportion with Maturity of: 
9.1 13.9 
Less than 1 Year 56.3 41.3 
1 to 4.9 Years 27.4 26.8 
5 to 9.9 Years 2.2 7.1 
10 to 19.9 Years 5.0 10.9 
20 Years or Morea 100.0 100.0 
Total 
Years 
Average Loan Maturity 5.1 6.9 
a The maximum maturity on guaranteed operating and farm ownership loans is 15 and 40 years, 
respectively. 
Source: 1988 and 1992 surveys of FmHA's guaranteed loan applicant folders and the Guaranteed 
System's master file. 
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The largest share of defaulted loans went to finance annual operating expenses--57 
percent of the total. These are the most risky loans that lenders provide to farmers. Remaining 
loans in default--13.9 percent--were concentrated in loans for livestock and machinery purchases. 
Only a few loans made to purchase farm real estate went into default by June 30, 1992. Just over 
one percent of defaulted loans were for that purpose, far less than the nearly seven percent share 
of nondefaulting loans. 
The average maturity of loans in default was nearly two years less than those not in 
default. Only 7.2 percent of defaulted loans had maturities greater than 10 years, while 18 percent 
of nondefaulting loans had such maturities. The low default rate of long-term FO loans and high 
default rates on three year credit lines likely explains much of the maturity differences. 
Larger Loans and Greater Guarantees 
Mean and median values indicate that loans in default tend to be larger ($109,000) in size 
than loans not in default ($101,579) (Table 4). Most of the difference is evident in two size groups: 
less than $50,000 and $50,000 to $150,000. Defaulted loans are less prevalent in the under 
$50,000 class, but are more prevalent in the $50,000 to $150,000 class. 
Table 4. Selected Loan Characteristics of Defaulted and
 
Nondefaulted Guaranteed Loans, Fiscal 1988
 
Loan Attribute Loans In Default Loans not In Default 
Dollars 
Size of Loana ; 
Mean $109,000 $101,579 
Median 83,225 77,000 
Percent 
Proportion of Loans: 
Less than $50,000 22.0 32.0 
$50,000 to $149,999 53.9 44.5 
$150,000 to $4249,999 16.1 15.8 
More than $250,000 8.0 7.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Percentage of Loan 
Guaranteed by FmHA: 
Mean 88.9 88.2 
Median 90.0 90.0 
Proportion: 
Below 80 Percent 4.1 5.9 
80 to 90 Percent 3.5 7.8 
90 Percent 92.4 86.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 
a	 Guaranteed farm operating and farm ownership loans are capped at $400,000 and $300,000, 
respectively. • 
Source: Guaranteed System's master file. 
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Loans in default had a slightly higher probability of carrying the maximum guarantee rate 
(90 percent) than nondefaulting loans--92.4 percent versus 86.3 percent. A lower guarantee 
percentage means the lender must adsorb greater losses in the case of default. The greater the 
risk of default, the greater the incentive for a lender to seek the highest guarantee percentage 
available from FmHA. 
Interest Rates 
Loans with a higher than average probability of default typically get charged higher interest 
rates with shorter term commitments to compensate the lender for greater default risk. Under the 
FmHA guarantee programs. as operated in fiscal 1988, lenders could charge their guaranteed 
customers no more than one percentage point higher than their average farm customer received. 
Therefore. little difference in rates charged among guarantee borrowers should be expected. Yet, 
loans in default show a higher probability of carrying variable-rate terms and somewhat higher 
variable interest-rates. The mean rate on variable rate loans posted at mid-1990 was a half a 
percentage point higher for loans in default (Table 5).2 Fixed-rate loans showed no difference 
between defaulted and nondefaulted loans. 
Table 5. Selected Loan Tenns for Defaulted and
 
Nondefaulted Guaranteed Loans, Fiscal 1988
 
Loan Attribute	 Loans In Default Loans not In Default 
Average Interest Rate on 5190: 
Fixed Rate 
Variable Rate· 
Proportion of Guaranteed Loans on 5/90 with: 
Fixed Rates 
Variable Rates 
Total 
Proportion of Variable Rate Loans Using a Base 
Rate of: 
Lender's Prime 
Major Bank Prime 
Regional Bank Prime 
FCS Rate 
U.S. Treasury Rate 
Othef 
Total 
Spread Between Base Rate and Rate Charged on 
Variable Interest Rate Loans: 
Mean 
Median 
Percent 
10.1 
11.9 
10.1 
11.4 
21.2 
78.8 
100.0 
27.2 
72.8 
100.0 
32.6 
24.3 
26.3 
4.7 
3.3 
9.0 
100.0 
46.9 
32.3 
4.3 
6.7 
6.7 
3.1 
100.0 
Percentage Points 
2.4 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
• Variable rates vary depending upon frequency of adjustment and frequency of reporting to 
FmHA. Therefore, comparisons made from one loan to the next may be inappropriate. 
b	 Includes Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, Federal Reserve Discount. Federal Funds, 
and other rates. 
Source: 1988 and 1992 survey of FmHA's guaranteed loan applicant folders. 
Comparisons of variable rate loans is difficult to properly assess because the rate quoted 
depends upon when the lender last Updated the loan record. 
2 
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Variable rate defaulted loans tended to use a wider range of base rates than nondefaulted 
loans. Where 79 percent of nondefaults were tied to the lender's own prime- or a major bank prime 
rate, defaults were more equally tied to either the lender's own prime rate, a regional bank prime, 
or major bank prime rate. The use of an FCS base rate is lower in the defaulted population 
because the default rate on FCS loans was low. 
Less Collateral 
Loans in default were not as well collateralized as their nondefaulting counterparts. 
Average loan-to-collateral value ratios were 0.62 for' defaulting loans, but only 0.53 Borrowers for 
nondefaulting loans (Table 6). The absolute value of collateral and the quality was also better for 
nondefaulting loans. Where collateral was equally spread between chattel, crops, and real estate 
for nondefaults, nearly half of the collateral value backing a defaulting loan was concentrated in 
crops, either growing or in inventory. Typically, most of the crop collateral value results from 
expected values of growing crops. This collateral often does not materialize when production does 
not meet projected output and is more frequently sold without the proceeds being applied against 
the loan. It was not uncommon for the listed crop collateral value to be equal to the entire value of 
projected crop income for the coming year. 
Table 6. Collateral Backing Defaulted and 
Nondefaulted Guaranteed Loans, Fiscal 1988 
Attribute Loans In Default Loans not In Default 
Dollars 
Average Net Value of 
Collateral: 
Machinery and Chattel 53,565 64,503 
Crops 84,650 65,739* 
Real Estate 39,174 67,906* 
Total 177,938 198,701 
Average Loan Amount 
Ratio 
Loan-to-Collateral Ratio· 0.62 0.53 
a Average loan amount divided by total net collateral value, weighted. 
* Mean values significantly different at the five percent level. 
Source: 1988 and 1992 survey of FmHA's guaranteed loan applicant folders. 
Borrower Characteristics 
Data suggest that borrowers with defaulting loans typically owned less farmland, had fewer 
assets, and projected greater gross incomes than borrowers with nondefaulted loans. Noteworthy 
among the farm enterprise distribution is that the percentage of defaulting borrowers listing cotton • 
or tobacco as their major enterprise was nearly double that of the nondefaulting borrowers 
(Table 7). The majority of this category are believed to be cotton farms. Poultry operations on the 
other hand. although small in number, had very low default rates. This might be attributable to the 
high percentage of poultry operations borrowing only through the FO program and from more stable 
incomes resulting from production contracting. 
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Table 7. Selected Guaranteed Loan Program Borrower Characteristics 
Defaulted and Nondefaulted, Fiscal 1988 
Borrower Attribute Borrowers In Default Borrowers not In Default 
Percent 
Proportion whose Major Farm 
Enterprise is:
 
Cash Grain 37.1 44.3
 
Dairy 11.7 16.0
 
Beef, Hog, and Sheep 15.5 15.1
 
Cotton and Tobacco 21.6 11.0
 
Specialty Crops 6.7 7.5
 
General Farming 3.8 3.0
 
Poultry 0.6 3.0
 
Other Livestock 2.1 0.3
 
Other Enterprises 0.9 0.0
 
Proportion with Total Assets 
of:
 
Less than $100,000 24.9 12.7
 
$100,000 to $499,999 56.4 59.4
 
$500,000 to $999,999 12.6 21.3
 
$1,000,000 or More 6.1 6.7
 
Proportion with Gross Cash 
Farm Income of:
 
Less than $40,000 4.1 9.0
 
$40,000 to $99,999 19.6 25.4
 
$100,000 to $249,999 50.9 44.8
 
$250,000 to $499,999 20.2 15.4
 
$500,000 or More 5.3 5.4
 
Proportion with Planned 
Farmland of:
 
Less than 100 Acres 15.2 8.4
 
100 to 499 Acres 34.5 34.1
 
500 to 999 Acres 28.1 30.0
 
1,000 to 1,499 Acres 10.2 13.1
 
1,500 Acres or More 12.0 14.5
 
Acres 
Average Planned Farm Size-

Farmland Owned 172.3 322.0*
 
Farmland Rented 624.3 592.6
 
Cropland Owned 113.2 196.0*
 
Cropland Rented 491.9 445.2
 
_ Borrower's projection of acres to be farmed in the coming year. 
­
..

* Mean values significantly different at the five percent level. 
Source: 1988 survey of FmHA's guaranteed loan applicant folders. 
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The lack of financial resources among defaulting farmers in evident in that the amount of 
farmland owned is roughly half that of nondefaulting borrowers, or just 172 acres. But, defaulting 
borrowers rented slightly more total farmland than nondefaulting borrowers. Therefore, in terms of 
total farmland acres, defaulting borrowers planned only slightly smaller operations. 
Defaulted Borrowers Project Greater Expenses 
Defaulting borrowers were projecting greater cash incomes, but were also projecting much 
greater cash expenses than nondefaulting borrowers. The result is projected net cash incomes of 
borrowers in default was only 58 percent of nondefaulted borrowers (Table 8). The fact that 
defaulting borrowers were anticipating tighter cash flows is consistent with expectations about these 
borrowers. On average, projected cash income-to-expense ratios were 1.41 for defaulting 
borrowers and 1.56 for nondefaulting borrowers. Also, the proportion of borrowers with high ratios 
(greater than 1.4) was less for borrowers in default. 
Table 8. Average Projected Cash Income Statement for
 
Guaranteed Loan Program Borrowers
 
Defaulted and Nondefaulted. Fiscal 1988
 
Borrower Attribute Borrowers In Default Borrowers not In Default 
Dol/ars 
Cash Farm Income From: 
Livestock Sales 
Crop Sales 
Other Sales 
Total 
69,060 
113,751 
23,936 
206,897 
52,468* 
107,785 
33,712* 
190,420 
Net Nonfarm Income 8,012 9,380 
Total Cash Income 215,516 201,255 
Cash Expenses for: 
Hired Labor 
Interest 
Property Taxes 
Family Living 
Total8 
10,756 
20,285 
1,806 
13,815 
187,401 
10,262 
22,255 
3,026* 
14,906* 
152,965* 
Net Cash Income 28,115 48,400* 
Ratio 
Cash Income/Expense Ratiob 1.41 1.56* 
Percent 
Proportion with Cash 
Income/Expense Ratios: 
Less than 1.0 
1.0 to 1.09 
1.1 to 1.39 
1.4 to 1.69 
1.7 or More 
Total 
8 Totals include expenses not listed. 
2.1 
12.9 
55.3 
15.8 
14.0 
100.0 
2.3 
10.6 
49.4 
22.1 
15.6 
100.0 • 
.' 
b Defined as the ratio of total gross cash income to total cash expenses. 
* Mean values significantly different at the five percent level. 
Source: 1988 and 1992 survey of FmHA's guaranteed loan applicant folders. 
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These projections were made for just one year, typically calendar year 1988, and therefore 
may not be indicative of the borrower's longer term prospects. Defaults were registered through 
mid-1992 and so many of these borrowers would have made income and expense projections for 
sUbsequent years that might present a different picture. Furthermore, cash income projections do 
not provide an indication of long-term profitability because noncash expenses, such as capital 
depreciation, are not considered. 
Defaulting Borrower are More Leveraged 
The total value of assets held by defaulting borrowers is significantly less than 
nondefaulting borrowers. Defaulting borrowers had an average $352,017 in assets as opposed to 
$420.999 for nondefaulting borrowers (Table 9). Although real estate accounts for much of the 
difference, machinery and livestock asset values are also less for defaulting borrowers. The 
percentage of defaulting borrowers with less than $100,000 in assets is nearly double (24.9 
percent) that of nondefaulting borrowers (12.7 percent). 
Table 9. Average Balance Sheet for Guaranteed Loan Program Borrowers
 
Defaulted and Nondefaulted, Fiscal 1988
 
Borrower Attribute	 Borrowers In Default Borrowers not In Default 
Dollars 
Value of Assets: 
Livestock 32,663 
Machinery 82,875 
Real Estate 163,755 
Totar	 352,017 
Value of Liabilities: 
Chattel and Crop 128,178 
Real Estate 109.061 
Other 24,616 
Total	 261,866 
Value of Equity	 90,151 
Ratio 
Debt!Asset Ratio: 
For All Borrowers 0.92 
For Solvent Borrowers 0.67 
Percent 
Proportion with Debt!Asset 
Ratio: 
Less than 0.4 10.2 
0.4 to 0.7	 25.2 
0.7 to 1.0	 38.3 
1.0 or More	 26.3
 
Total 100.0
 
42,915*
 
93,794*
 
220,235* 
420,999* 
109,599* 
148,008* 
18,519 
279,359 
141,884* 
0.70* 
0.62* 
13.7 
44.2 
33.7 
8.4 
100.0 
• 
a Totals include assets not listed. 
* Mean values significantly different at the five percent level.
 
Source: 1988 and 1992 survey of FmHA's guaranteed loan applicant folders.
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On the liability side of the balance sheet, defaulting borrowers reported less real estate debt 
but greater chattel and crop debt. The net affect is that average total liabilities of defaulted 
borrowers are only slightly less than nondefaulting borrowers. Lower debts did not offset the 
difference in total assets, leaving borrowers in default with nearly $52,000 less equity than 
nondefaulting borrowers. 
With a much smaller asset base and only slightly less debt burden, defaulting borrowers 
are more leveraged than nondefaulting borrowers. Defaulting borrowers had an average 
debt/asset ratio of 0.92 while nondefaulting borrowers averaged 0.70. Both these ratios are very 
high compared to all farm operators, which report an average ratio of less than 0.20. These ratios 
decline significantly if insolvent borrowers are excluded. The debt/asset ratios falls to 0.67 for 
defaulting and 0.62 for nondefaulting borrowers. 
Over one in four borrowers in default was insolvent in fiscal 1988 and hence had no equity 
in their farm operation. This compares to only 8.4 percent for nondefaulting borrowers. Clearly, 
guarantees made on loans to insolvent borrowers represent a much greater default risk to the 
agency. Moreover, two-thirds of defaulting borrowers had ratios in excess of 0.70 as opposed to 
42 percent for nondefaulting borrowers. 
Much of the little equity that borrowers do possess tends to be in real estate. Debt/asset ratios for 
the nonreal estate portion of the balance sheet were different at 1.14 for defaulting and 0.74 for 
nondefaulting borrowers. The low equity position of borrowers produced high guaranteed loan 
amount-to-equity ratios. For defaulting borrowers with equity, the ratio was double that of 
nondefaulting borrowers with equity--8.47 to 4.00. 
Conclusions 
The default rate on fiscal 1988 guaranteed farmer program loans through mid-1992 has 
been relatively modest, especially when the period in which these loans were made is taken into 
consideration. These loans were guaranteed on the heels of a period of significant financial turmoil 
in U.S. agriculture and just a few years after loan guarantees were elevated in importance. Loans 
in default exhibit some common characteristic, many of which were anticipated given the objective 
of the programs. We found that annual operating loans are the greatest source of defaults and that 
defaults were regionally concentrated in the Delta and Southern Plains. Banks were more likely to 
originate a defaulting loan than were FCS lenders, but less likely than other classes of lenders. 
Defaulting loans had a greater tendency to be larger in size, have less collateral, and carry a 
greater .guarantee rate than nondefaulting loans. Analysis of borrowers indicates that defaulting 
farmers had fewer financial assets and were more leveraged than their nondefaulting counterparts. 
Not only were defaulting borrowers more leveraged, they also were more likely to project slimmer 
cash flow margins (less projected net cash income), mostly due to higher projected operating 
expenses. Guaranteed loans made to farmers with insolvent balance sheets had a high probability 
of default. 
• 
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AN ANALYSIS OF MUL"n-PERIOD AGRICUL"rURAL CREDrr 
CLASSIFICA"nON MODELS FOR NEW YORK DAIRY FARMS 
Eddy L. LaDue and Michael P. Novak1 
One of the most important factors influencing the quality of a lender's loan portfolio is the 
character of the loans selected for inclusion. As lenders search for ways to improve the selection 
process, the use of credit scoring or credit screening models has been given increased 
consideration. The initial models (Johnson and Hagan; Dunn and Frey; Hardy and Weed; Hardy 
and Adrian; Hardy, Spurlock, Parrish and Benoist; Mortensen, Watt and Leistritz) reported in the 
agricultural literature validated their models with within sample statistics only. That is, the 
effectiveness was measured by the proportion of the fitted sample that were correctly classified by 
the model. This procedure was improved upon by later researchers who used hold out samples or 
cross validation methods to validate the models (Lufburrow, Barry and Dixon; Miller and LaDue). 
Of course, these methods also use the same basic data set, or part of it, as the test data for 
validation. Therefore, the test data were from the same basic group of farms, for the same year. 
More recently, Turvey and Brown found that models developed under the economic 
conditions of anyone year may be unreliable predictors in years with different economic conditions. 
Model parameter estimates and significance levels may be unstable over time for models fit to data 
for different time periods. The ability of fitted models to predict whether a borrower will default or 
be creditworthy next year or in some future year is poor. Since the most frequent application of 
such models by lenders is to use a model fit using data from one period to classify loans for a 
future period, this shortcoming of previously developed models severely limits their usefulness. 
The objectives of this study are to test the conclusions reached by Turvey and Brown using 
a different data set and evaluate the use of a multi-period model, employing Farm Financial 
Standards Task Force (FFSTF) ratios and economic environment indicators, as a method of 
reducing parameter estimate instability and increasing model usefulness. To meet these objectives 
we (1) develop a set of single period best-fit models for a series of years, (2) fit a prespecified 
model to several years of data, and (3) developed multi-period models with economic environment 
indicators for two and three year periods. 
In the remainder of this article we describe the creditworthiness model used, explain the 
data set used for the analysis and present the results obtained with the best-fit, prespecified and 
multi-period models. Finally, we present some conclusions. 
The Creditworthiness Model 
Previous research on agricultural credit evaluation models has largely been concentrated 
on loan review or credit screening, where the credit classifications are related to a pre-existing, 
mutually exclusive, loan classification schemes. Most commonly, these schemes establish two 
groups, one denoting a "good" loan and the other a "bad" loan. "Good" loans are paid current and 
"bad" loans are in some form of default, inclUding slow paying, delinquency, bank examiner 
classification, and official default (Betubiza and Leatham). 
A problem with the default oriented classification methods is that they can be influenced by 
the borrower's or lender's SUbjective behavior (Miller and LaDue; Lufburrow, et al.). The lender can • 
influence the classification by decisions to forbear, restructure or grant additional credit to repay a 
Professor of agricultural finance and graduate research assistant,Department of 
Agricultural, Resource, and Managerial Economics, Cornell University. 
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delinquent loan. A borrower with split credit may have one loan paid current and classified as 
"good" with one lender, and another loan that is delinquent and classified as 'bad" with another 
lender. Borrowers may also have avoided a current default status because they have made 
payments by selling assets or through other unrepeatable means. An infusion of funds from 
inheritance when aunt Sara dies or sale of the combine cannot be repeated next year, or in any 
future year. Such behavior on the part of the borrower or the lender can result in intrinsic errors in 
credit evaluation models. 
One alternative to default measures is a lender classification where the lender identifies 
good and bad borrowers or uses the examiner evaluations. However, this introduces a high level 
of subjectivity. 
This study avoids these borrower and lender influences without introducing added 
subjectivity by measuring creditworthiness rather than default. A creditworthy borrower is defined 
as one with a positive capital replacement and term debt repayment margin. Two debt repayment 
margin definitions are used. The first, called the fann and nonfarm debt repayment margin, uses 
the FFSTF definition where the debt repayment margin equals 
Net farm income 
+	 Nonfarm income 
+	 Interest expense 
+	 Depreciation expense 
Personal withdrawals 
Personal income taxes 
Planned principal and interest payments 
The second definition, called the fann debt repayment margin. is calculated in the same 
manner, except that nonfarm income is excluded. The rationale for this measure is that in many 
cases the lender and/or farmer is most interested in whether the farm business generates sufficient 
income to make the necessary payments. Businesses with loans that can be repaid from farm 
sources without an infusion of funds from nonfarm sources may be lower risk than when loan 
repayment is dependent on nonfarm income. This approach views the farm operation as a 
business unit separate from the operation's nonfarm and family activities. 
The creditworthiness measure has the advantage that it can be applied to any set of 
financial statements. It does not depend upon lender default classifications. It can be applied to 
businesses that provide financial statements but for which the evaluator does not have data on past 
debt payment history. Thus, it can be used in either credit scoring or credit screening situations. 
The model used in this study is a qualitative, lagged-dummy model. The model is 
expressed as: 
N 
V i,l+1 =~1 Vi,l + ~2 PI + L ~k ~,i,1 + ul 
koG 
where	 i = 1,2,... M refers to the individual farm, and 
t = 1,2•... T refers to a single year. Thus, 
y il+l is the dependent variable representing creditworthiness for farm i in time period t+1. 
Similarly, v i,l is a lagged dependent variable representing creditworthiness for farm i in time 
period t. The creditworthiness measure is a binary dependent variable. That is, a positive • 
repayment margin is converted to one, and a negative repayment margin is converted to 
zero. 
P, is the economic environment indicator, 
X k,i,l refers to the (N-2) explanatory variables for farm i in time period t, and ~ is the 
corresponding coefficient for the explanatory variables. 
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The logit statistical method was employed. It was chosen over the linear probability model 
and discriminate analysis based on the logit's favorable statistical properties and the ability to 
translate credit classifications into creditworthiness scores. The choice of the Iogit over the probit 
method was based on the fact that the logit coefficients are not affected by the unequal sampling 
rates of creditworthy and less creditworthy farms. Only the constant term is affected, therefore, 
there is no need to weight the observations before estimation (Maddala). 
The logit model is specified as: 
1Pi .. _~~1+e-(x,B) 
where e is the base of natural logarithms and Pi is the probability of the ith farm being creditworthy, 
given knowledge of X;, the set of financial and production ratios and measures. 
For estimation purposes this equation is restated as: 
p. 
In~"xiB 
I 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the odds that a particular farm will be creditworthy. ~ is 
a 1 by (N-2) vector of regressor coefficients corresponding to the (N-2) by 1 independent variables 
in X for the ith farm. The model was estimated using the maximum likelihood method. 
The economic environment indicator is designed to reflect the differences in the year to 
year economic environment in which the farms operate. A major factor contributing to inaccurate 
model predictions of borrower creditworthiness is variation in the basic profitability of the type of 
business being evaluated. On dairy farms, most costs tend to move upward with inflation. These 
cost shifts tend to influence profitability, and thus, creditworthiness, in a somewhat predictable way. 
The primary exception would be feed costs which show somewhat more variability. On the other 
side of the profit equation, however, the milk price SWings widely. Thus, year to year variability is 
caused largely by fluctuation in milk prices. To reflect this variability, the percent change in the 
New York blend milk price was used as the economic environment indicator. For validation and 
general use of the model, where the future price change is not known, blend price projections as 
published by the Department of Agricultural Economics at Cornell University (New York Economic 
Handbook: Agricultural Situation and Outlook) were used. 
Two basic principles were used in selecting the remaining individual farm variables. First, 
model is to include only one explanatory measure from each of the factor categories. Multivariate 
analysis requires that each ratio or measure in the model convey as much information as possible 
(Beaver). In other words, ratios or measures with similar components should not be used in the 
same credit evaluation model (Chen and Shimerda). Financial ratios and measures from the same 
factor category usually have a higher occurrence of multicollinearity which can confound the 
Interpretation of the individual ratio coefficient and overall production ability of the models. 
Therefore, it is important that one measure in most cases be selected to represent each factor 
category in a multivariate statistical analysis. In this study, no two measures from the same factor 
category will be used in the creditworthiness evaluation model, except for production measures. 
The production measures may exceed the one measure limit because these measures are not 
usually derived from the same components, unlike many of the financial measures. 
• 
The second procedure is to use the FFSTF recommended ratio and measure definitions to 
represent the factor categories whenever possible. In previous research, the financial ratios' and 
measures' definitions have varied considerably (Betubiza and Leatham). This variation has largely 
been due to researchers selecting ratios and measures they deem as impOrtant or were accessible 
from the data available. As a consequence, these predispositions and limitations have precluded 
C 
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comparison between credit evaluation models and data sets. Hopefully, by employing the FFSTF 
recommended ratios and measures, it will initiate a foundation for future comparison of credit 
evaluation models. By using the same ratio and measure definitions, credit evaluation models can 
be tested on alternative data sets. 
Selection of individual variables largely draws from previous empirical agricultural credit 
evaluation studies and the results of a regional survey on credit evaluating procedures in 
agricultural banks (LaDue, Lee, Hanson, Hanson, and Kohl). 
The measure that was used most consistently, that is in 89 percent of the previous studies 
(Table 1) was a measure of solvency. This usage can be attributed to the concept that credit 
evaluation models are loosely analogous to capital structure theory, where an increase in leverage 
is directly related to an increase in financial risk (Miller). However, the analogy stops there, for 
farms with a higher debt/asset ratio usually have a higher degree of financial risk, but a higher 
degree of financial risk does not always necessarily mean a greater degree of financial stress (Lins, 
Ellinger, and Lattz). This is especially true for highly profitable farms which can sustain high debt 
levels. Furthermore, the results of a regional survey on credit evaluation procedures were 
consistent with previous studies where 100 percent of the banks responding used a solvency 
measure in their credit evaluation. This study will use the debt/asset ratio as a measure of 
solvency. 
Table 1. Summary Factor Categories and Related Measure
 
for Credit Scoring Models
 
Usage In 
Factor Prior Bank Measures 
Category Research- Evaluatlonb Used 
Solvency 
Liquidity 
Profitability 
Repayment Capacity 
Financial Efficiency 
Collateral 
Production 
Economic Risk 
percent 
89 
33 
22 
67 
33 
22 
100 
57 
14 
100 
36 
71 
Debt/Asset RatioC 
Current RatioC 
Rate of Return on AssetsC 
Repayment Trend 
Asset Turnover 
None 
Milk Per Cow (1,000 Ibs) 
Hay Per Acre 
% Change in Milk Price 
a The percentage of prior research that included the factor. 
b The percentage of agricultural banks that include the factor in their credit evaluation procedures. 
FFSTF recommended calculations. 
Two other factor categories included in 33 and 22 percent of the previous studies were 
liquidity and profitability, respectively. In addition, these categories were used by 57 and 14 
percent, respectively, of the banks surveyed. While these two categories have been used 
extensively in nonagricultural credit evaluation, the adaptation to agriculture has been limited. This 
study will include the current ratio as a liquidity measure and the rate of return on assets as a • 
profitability measure. The relatively low use of profitability in previous credit evaluation studies is 
perhaps a reflection of the historical emphasis on loan default, not creditworthiness. 
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Only 33 percent of the previous studies included some type of repayment capacity 
measure, while the survey found that 100 percent of the banks used a repayment capacity 
measure. This study will incorporate a lagged dependent variable. The lagged dependent variable 
will represent whether a farm was able to make its debt payments the previous year using the 
same debt repayment margin calculation. 
The factor category efficiency encompasses various titles in previous research such as 
financial, capital, and economic efficiency. An aggregate of the three was found significant in 33 
percent of the previous studies. However, limiting this category to just financial efficiency, the 
survey results showed that 36 percent of the banks used some type of financial efficiency measure. 
This stUdy will use an asset turnover ratio as a measure of financial efficiency. Collateral was used 
in 33 percent of the previous studies and by 71 percent of the banks surveyed. A collateral 
measure may be a viable explanatory variable in a single loan default model, however, in a 
creditworthiness model a solvency measure may be more appropriate because it can be viewed as 
a claim on the entire farm's assets, not collateral on a single loan. 
The primary nonfinancial measures found significant in previous studies were production 
measures. Given that this study is limited to the dairy industry, the production management 
measures selected are pounds of milk produced per cow, and tons of hay crop harvested per acre. 
Turvey and Brown also showed that commodity types and geographical regions can be 
used as indicators of credit risk. However, neither commodity type nor geographic region will be 
included in the model because the data are all dairy farms located in New York State where 
creditworthiness is not expected to differ much by region. Based on previous studies, a 
creditworthiness model can appropriately be expressed as a function of solvency, liquidity, 
profitability, repayment capacity, financial efficiency, and production management measures. 
The Data Set 
The data for this study were collected from New York State dairy farms in a program jointly 
sponsored by Cornell Cooperative Extension, and the Department of Agricultural Economics at the 
New York State College of Agricultural and Life Sciences, Cornell University. The information 
collected includes a complete set of financial statements with the essential components for deriving 
a complete set of financial ratios and measures as recommended by the FFSTF. One key 
component available was each farm's planned debt payment for the subsequent year. 
The number of participants in this program averaged 410 per year for the 1986-91 sample 
period.. Since participation is on a volunteer basis, not all farms submit data each consecutive year. 
There were 155 farms that did submit data for each year of this particular time period, and of these 
farms, only 138 used debt in their capital structure. Data for these 138 farms are analyzed in this 
stUdy. 
Due to the procedure used to select participating farms, this is not a random sample. 
However, the sample does provide consistent information for 138 farms over the sample period. 
Such a data set is critical in studying the dynamic effects on farm creditworthiness. 
The nonrandomness of the data does not pose a problem for the credit evaluation model 
estimation. Loan portfolios of financial institutions are by nature nonrandom. 
•Table 2 exhibits the annual mean value of the financial and production measures for the 
138 farms. All financial ratios and measures have been calculated according to the FFSTF 
Guidelines (1991). The production measures, in general, are fairly specific to the dairy industry and 
were selected because of their historical use as proxies for the production management capabilities 
of the farm operators. 
196
 
Table 2. Average Financial and Selected Production Measures, 
138 New York Dairy Fanns, 1987-91 
Year 
Measures 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Liquidity 
Current Ratio 3.23 3.49 3.83 3.12 2.84 
Solvency 
Debt!Asset Ratio .38 .36 .34 .35 .35 
Repayment Capacity 
Term Debt and Capital 
Lease Coverage Ratio 1.86 1.57 1.90 1.69 1.08 
Profitability 
Return on Assets 4.56 4.07 5.72 3.69 1.07 
Other 
Milk Sold/Cow (Ibs) 
Hay Crop (T/A) 
16.576 
2.8 
17.091 
2.7 
17.516 
2.7 
17.815 
2.9 
18.222 
2.7 
This group of farms could be viewed as a combination commercial lender and FmHA 
portfolio. It contains more marginal borrowers than a typical commercial lender portfolio where they 
have eliminated many of the marginal borrowers by not making loans to them. 
Single Period Best-Fit Models 
To test the basic conclusions of Turvey and Brown that model parameters and levels of 
significance of single period models are unstable, a series of single period best-fit models were 
estimated (Table 3). These models used the farm definition of creditworthiness; nonfarm income 
was excluded. The models were estimated using a 95 percent confidence level decision rule, 
stepwise variable selection procedure. The initial set of variables incorporated were those identified 
for the basic creditworthiness model (above) except that the economic environment indicator was 
excluded. The resulting models are similar to the types of single period models reported in most 
ear1ier studies. Researchers with data covering only one year could be expected to report such 
model results with some confidence in their value. 
For both models. statistics are not excellent but are quite acceptable for individual farm 
data. The within sample prediction rate is similar to that found in previous studies. However, the 
out of sample prediction rate is much lower. Part of this low out of sample prediction rate results 
from the fact that 1991 was used for ou1 of sample evaluation. 1991 was one of the worst years for 
the dairy industry for some time. The observed very high rate of false positives likely results from 
these unusually poor economic conditions. 
The basic instability of such models is clearly indicated by these two models. Even though 
the same farms are used in both years, the variables included change completely from one year to 
the next. This confirms. in a rather significant way, that the magnitude. sign and/or significance of 
single period model coefficients can be much different from year to year. It is not surprising that ex 
ante prediction rates using such models are poor. 
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Table 3. Two Best-Fit Single Period Fann Creditworthiness 
Evaluation Models 
138 New York Dairy Fanns 
1989 Model 1990 Model 
Variable (P-Value) (P-Value) 
Intercept -5.56 0.65 
(0.00) (0.49) 
Lagged Dependent 1.49 
(0.00) 
Milk/Cow 0.25 
(0.01 ) 
Working Capital 0.10 
(0.04) 
Debt/Asset -5.21 
(0.00) 
Debt Repayment Margin 0.20 
(0.01 ) 
MilklWor1<er 0.04 
(0.02) 
Operating Expense Ratio 4.51 
(0.05) 
R 0.42 0.45 
Model X2 39.19 38.76 
Within Sample Prediction (%) 
False Positive 24.1 15.7 
False Negative 32.7 43.3 
Positive 77.8 87.5 
Negative 64.9 50.0 
Total Correct 72.5 78.3 
Out of Sample Prediction (1991) (%) 
False Positive 53.7 56.3 
False Negative 25.4 11.4 
Positive 63.3 91.8 
Negative 59.6 34.8 
Total Correct 60.9 55.1 
Single Period Prespeclfled Models 
Credit scoring or screening models are usually factor-based because there is no well 
developed theoretical foundation for their design (Marais, Patell, and Wolfson). To compensate for 
this lack of theory. a starting point for developing a model and selecting a useful set of factor 
categories. is prior empirical research (Chen and Shimerda). However. if the prior research is 
complete and correctly interpreted, once a basic model has been developed it should be 
•appropriate for all years. The type of results that researchers could expect to obtain. depending 
upon the particular year for which they had data, are illustrated in Table 4. In this case the 
prespecified model is used in all years. The variables included are those indicated in the model 
description above. 
,
.
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Table 4. Two Prespeclfled Single Period Fann Creditworthiness 
Evaluation Models 
138 New Yor1< Dairy Fanns 
1989 Model 1990 Model 
Variable (P·Value) (P·Value) 
Intercept -6.93 -2.20 
(0.00) (0.30) 
DebVAsset Ratio 0.11 -5.11 
(0.94) (0.00) 
ROA 0.01 0.15 
(0.91 ) (0.03) 
Current Ratio 0.08 0.16 
(0.21 ) (0.30) 
Lagged Dependent 1.39 -0.30 
(0.03) (0.62) 
Capital Turnover -0.22 3.85 
(0.92) (0.19) 
Milk/Cow 2.87 0.11 
(0.01 ) (0.31 ) 
Hay/Acre 0.41 0.38 
(0.11 ) (0.24) 
R 0.37 0.39 
Model y(­ 39.12 37.24 
Within Sample Prediction (%) 
False Positive 25.9 15.0 
False Negative 36.8 32.0 
Positive 74.1 92.3 
Negative 63.2 50.0 
Total Correct 69.3 81.9 
Out of Sample Prediction (1991) (%) 
False Positive 52.2 59.3 
False Negative 23.2 5.0 
Positive 67.4 98.0 
Negative 59.6 21.3 
Total Correct 62.3 48.6 
The statistical properties are slightly poorer than those obtained with the best-fit models, but 
are still in the reasonable range for individual farm data. The out of sample prediction rate is still 
much lower that the within sample rate with a large number of false positive. The 1990 model was 
much superior in within sample prediction but much poorer in out of sample prediction. 
The sign, magnitude and significance of the variables changes significantly from year to 
year. For example, the parameter value for the debVasset ratio goes from being small, positive and 
insignificant with 1989 data to being much larger, negative and significant with 1990 data. The 
lagged dependent variable is positive and significant in 1989 and negative and insignificant in 1990. 
• 
Clearly, the characteristics of these confirm the Turvey and Brown results that single period 
models have unstable parameters that could be expected to make them unreliable in predicting 
borrower performance. There is good reason for nonadaption of such models by lenders. 
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Multi-Period Models 
In an attempt to develop models with improved stability and predictive ability, the complete 
model including the economic indicator variable was fit to two and three years of data (Table 5). 
Model statistics were similar to, or better than, those obtained for single period models. Parameter 
values and levels of significance were much more stable. Comparing the two year model with the 
three year model showed no sign changes and all had the expected sign. 
Within sample prediction rates were within the range of those found with the single period 
models, however, there is less variation between years. The multi-period model had rates of 77.5 
to 73.7 percent compared to 69.3 to 81.9 percent for the single period models. Since a model is 
less likely to be able to fit to the specific characteristics of one year's economic conditions, it is 
expected that the within sample prediction rates would be similar to those found with single year 
models. The predictive results are also similar to those obtained by previous research. It, thus, 
appears that use of the FFSTF categories did not significantly improve model performance. It is 
likely that this results from the fact that the FFSTF ideas are not new and many of the suggested 
variables have been used in prior research. 
The out of sample prediction rates were better, 63.0 to 64.5 compared to 48.6 to 62.3, than 
those found with any of the single period models. This indicates the superiority of the multi-period 
model. However, the absolute improvement achieved was not great. There were still a large 
number of false positives. The unusual economic conditions of 1991 are not well predicted with 
any of the models fit. 
The economic environment indicator appears to be of value in bridging the interyear gap. 
Although its coefficient is quite small, the level of significance is quite high in both multi-period 
models. One shortcoming that this variable has, of course, is the fact that it must be estimated to 
use the model for predicting. Economists performance in predicting future prices has been 
reasonable, but is not perfect. 
Based on this experience, it appears that multiple period models may be an improvement 
over single period models. The peculiarities of any individual year have less influence on the 
model. 
Including Fann and Nonfarm Income 
The models presented in Tables 3 through 5 use the fann definition of creditworthiness; 
nonfarm income is excluded. Including both farm and nonfarm income is consistent with the FFSTF 
definition of repayment capacity (term debt and capital lease coverage ratio), represents the ability 
of the family to make debt payments, and is closer to a default equivalent. For many farm 
situations, including nonfann income provides a more accurate measure of creditworthiness. 
Using the basic model with the farm and nonfarm definition of creditworthiness (Table 6) 
resulted in considerably poorer results. Model statistics were not as good; both the Rand X2 were 
lower. Also, both within and out of sample predictions were lower. However, the biggest problem 
is that the sign on the ROA is negative. The coefficient is not large and the level of significance 
waivers, but the sign is negative. 
Re-examination of the model indicates that all of the explanatory variables are farm based 
in nature and that possibly a nonfarm income indicator should be included. Do to its character, the 
number of variables available to predict nonfarm income are few. In an effort to correct the 
situation, the previous years level of nonfarm income was added to represent predicted nonfarm 
income (Table 7). 
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Table 5. Two Multl·Perlod Fann 
Creditworthiness Evaluation Models 
138 New York Dairy Fanns 
1988-89 Model 1988-90 Model 
Variable (P.Value) (P·Value) 
Intercept -4.47 -4.59 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Debt!Asset Ratio -3.79 -2.25 
(0.00) (0.01 ) 
ROA 0.13 0.06 
(0.01 ) (0.09) 
Current Ratio 0.11 0.09 
(0.17) (0.08) 
Lagged Dependent 0.30 0.62 
(0.46) (0.05) 
Capital Turnover 3.28 1.46 
(0.06) (0.22) 
Milk/Cow 0.19 0.19 
(0.02) (0.00) 
Hay/Acre 0.33 0.38 
(0.11 ) (0.01 ) 
Milk Price Change 0.07 0.07 
(0.00) (0.00) 
R 0.47 0.42 
Model X2 92.24 112.3 
Within Sample Prediction (%) 
False Positive 17.3 19.8 
False Negative 34.1 37.7 
Positive 84.5 78.7 
Negative 62.9 64.4 
Total Correct 77.5 73.7 
Out of Sample Prediction (1991) (%) 
False Positive 52.0 50.0 
False Negative 28.4 31.5 
Positive 49.0 30.6 
Negative 70.8 83.1 
Total Correct 63.0 64.5 
The nonfarm income parameter value was negative. This is consistent the net effect many 
believe nonfarm income may have on dairy farms. There are two possible explanations (1) as 
nonfarm income increases, the amount of time and attention that is focused on the farm, and thus, 
farm income, declines. or (2) the farmers that are not very good managers, and have low farm 
incomes as a result, have to get nonfarm jobs to make debt payments. However. adding the 
nonfarm variable did not help with our sign problem on ROA. It continues to be negative with .. 
variable levels of significance. 
At this point we do not have a solution to the problem. If this group of geniuses has 
suggestions on the cause of, or solutions to the problem, we would be glad to hear them! 
201 
Table 6. Two Multi-Period Fann and Nonfarm 
Creditworthiness Evaluation Models 
138 New York Dairy Fanns 
1988-89 Model 1988-90 Model 
Variable (P-Value) (P-Value) 
Intercept -2.71 -4.23 
(0.06) (0.00) 
Debt!Asset Ratio -1.72 -1.33 
(0.07) (0.07) 
RCA -0.03 -0.06 
(0.45) (0.09) 
Current Ratio 0.17 0.05 
(0.09) (0.25) 
Lagged Dependent 1.13 1.10 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Capital Turnover 3.50 1.99 
(0.05) (0.10) 
Milk/Cow 0.05 0.16 
(0.56) (0.01 ) 
Hay/Acre 0.33 0.41 
(0.11 ) (0.01) 
Milk Price Change 0.07 0.06 
(0.01 ) (0.01 ) 
R 0.37 0.34 
Model 'Xl 59.62 76.3 
Within Sample Prediction (%) 
False Positive 15.7 19.4 
False Negative 49.9 50.9 
Positive 81.0 71.3 
Negative 56.3 61.7 
Total Correct 74.9 68.4 
Out Of Sample Prediction (1991) (%) 
False Positive 44.1 50.0 
False Negative 36.5 40.0 
Positive 33.3 15.8 
Negative 81.5 88.9 
Total Correct 61.6 58.7 
• 
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Table 7. Two Multi-Period Fann and Nonfarm 
Creditworthiness Evaluation Models 
138 New York Dairy Fanns 
1988-89 Model 1988-90 Model 
Variable (P-Value) (P-Value) 
Intercept -2.46 -3.81 
(0.08) (0.00) 
Debt!Asset Ratio -1.64 -1.04 
(0.09) (0.18) 
ROA -0.03 -0.08 
(0.57) (0.04) 
Current Ratio 0.25 0.07 
(0.02) (0.15) 
Lagged Dependenr 0.36 0.87 
(0.41 ) (0.01 ) 
Capital Turnover 3.55 2.12 
(0.04) (0.08) 
Milk/Cow 0.29 1.37 
(0.72) (0.02) 
Hay/Acre 0.51 0.49 
(0.01 ) (0.00) 
Nonfarm Income -0.28 -0.25 
(0.14) (0.01) 
Milk Price Change 0.06 0.06 
(0.02) (0.06) 
R 0.34 0.33 
Model y,2 53.64 72.71 
Within Sample Prediction (%) 
False Positive 16.8 19.4 
False Negative 51.9 52.9 
Positive 80.0 69.6 
Negative 53.5 69.6 
Total Correct 73.2 67.4 
Out of Sample Prediction (1991) (%) 
False Positive 43.6 48.0 
False Negative 35.4 38.9 
Positive 38.6 52.0 
Negative 79.0 61.1 
Total Correct 62.3 59.4 
•
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THE DEMAND FOR AGRICULTURAL LOANS AND THE
 
LENDER-BORROWER RELATIONSHIP
 
Calum G. Turvey and Alfons Weersink' 
Much of the economic literature on loan demand views it in terms of the lender-borrower 
relationship. Early work in this field, namely Freimer and Gordon; and Jaffee and Modigliani, 
viewed loan demand and credit risk as being passive to the borrower but active to the lender; that 
is the loan offer curve made explicit use of credit risk, whereas the borrower's decision did not. 
The Jaffee-Modigliani model of credit rationing has received wide attention and encouraged 
substantive debate as to exactly what the borrower-lender relationship should be. 
The question of whether or not borrowers actively incorporate credit risk in their demand for 
loans is an important one. In tenns of pure conjecture it seems unreasonable to characterize 
borrowers as making risky investment decisions using financial leverage independently of the 
incremental increase in financial risk associated with debt financing. Azzi and Cox argue that if 
borrowers offer collateral or equity to secure debt, lenders would be able to recover at least some 
portion of financial obligation below' the default rate of return, and as they argue borrowers must 
satisfy the collateraVequity needs in order to convert a desire for loan into a demand. 
In related work Smith argues that borrower's equity acts as an 'external economy' to the 
lender which implies an intrinsic stochastic dependency between the borrower and lender which 
allows for an increasing supply of debt as borrower equity increases. Baltsenberger commenting 
on Smith, and Hansen and Thatcher, note a certain independence between the contractual rate of 
interest charged the borrower and loan demand. Baltsenberger; and Hansen and Thatcher argue 
that loan demand must be viewed by both borrower and lender in terms of loan quality, where 
quality refers to the riskiness of the loan measured in terms of debt relative to equity. Thus the 
borrower's interest payment must be related to the amount of equity provided and the probability of 
default. In Baltsenberger's formulation parieto efficient loan contracts consistent with a competitive 
equilibrium in the loan markets exists, whereas in Smith's model parieto efficient contracts cannot 
exist if equity is an external economy to the lender and firms have limited liability. Rather, Smith 
argues that parieto efficient contracts emerge only through negotiated contracts wherein lenders 
constrain borrower's equity capital to a minimum while borrowers constrain debt capital to a 
maxima. 
A related class of problems occurs when there is more than one class of borrower 
distinguished in a perfect infonnation economy by investments with differing expected returns 
and/or risk. In such an economy parieto efficient outcomes can be established through lenders' 
offerings of multiple contracts with each being unique to the risk class of individuals. To avoid 
credit rationing of any sort borrowers must be willing to accept interest rates above the prevailing 
market price while lenders must be allowed to offer differential interest rates to different classes of 
borrowers. In equilibrium, credit rationing would not occur. 
However, in reality infonnation is not perfect, and obtaining perfect information comes at a 
cost to the lender. Asymmetric information may be sufficient to drive equilibrium solutions which 
are characterized by credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss; Jaffee and Russel). For example, it is 
•plausible that a lender may assess multiple loan applicants investing in projects of equal expected 
returns, but different risks. Since probability information is far more difficult to garnish than 
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expected returns there would be sufficient ambiguity in establishing which borrowers are high risk 
and which borrowers are low risk. Lenders can then employ screening devices such as credit 
scoring models to objectively sort risk classes and thus eliminate demand rationing (Bester). 
However credit scoring models are in themselves imperfect because they may reject or ration loans 
which would otherwise be acceptable or accept loans which would otherwise be rejected. 
Alternatively, lenders may charge all borrowers the same rate of interest based upon the pooled 
risk, but this is again inefficient since loans would be a bargain, and therefore attract, high risk 
types, while being to dear, and therefore rationing low risk types. 
Pooled interest rates can also act as a signalling device, which can lead to adverse 
incentive effects which actually increase the riskiness of loan portfolios. Recall again that pooled 
interest rates are sufficient to attract high risk types to the loan market, but they may also 
encourage low risk types to increase their desired loan amount and encourage adoption of higher 
risk projects (Stiglitz and Weiss; Jaffee and Stiglitz). 
While arguments such as those presented above focus on the borrower-lender relationship 
they have not been used to establish characteristics which can be used to empirically estimate loan 
demand curves. Perhaps this is because a unified, generally agreed upon notion of what 
constitutes demand or the lender-borrower relationship has yet to surface. Yet there is much in 
these theories which dictate what a candidate loan contract curve could look like, while explaining 
some potentially observable characteristics of the lender-borrower relationship. 
While in theory opinions on loan demand and supply are diverse, in practice loan demand 
is probably related to all of the factors considered above. First, because of the borrower-lender 
relationship the desired demand is unlikely to be observed. In terms of data, what is observed are 
contracts whereby borrowers and lenders have negotiated a loan amount at a specified price. 
From the theory we can suppose that factors such as probability of default, debt-equity structure, 
limited liability, and security/collateral, are all factors to be considered. But it is not observed, nor 
could it possibly be observed, how individual market participants negotiate, say equity structure and 
collateral, in order to satisfy the lender-borrower relationship. 
What can be observed are ex post characteristics of this relationship and the probability of 
default given various performance measures. These are the same characteristics which are used 
to obtain objective ex ante probabilities from credit scoring models which are used to screen loan 
applicants. Thus if we can use quantitative and qualitative variables to compute loan default 
probabilities from credit scoring models then we should be able to determine the 'demand for loans' 
from credit scoring models as well. However, 'demand for loans' in this context must be viewed as 
a hybrid 'loan contract' function of the borrower/lender relationship along a locus of feasible loan 
outcomes. 
The purpose of this paper is to empirically estimate the demand for credit on loans made to 
Canadian farmers through the Farm Credit Corporation. In the next section we develop a general 
model of the borrower-lender relationship assuming both are profit maximizers and note that the 
implicit demand for debt is a function of the probability of default and the implicit supply of debt is a 
function of this same probability. The result implies that when information is perfect and costless all 
loans lie on a concave (backward-bending) contract curve. The importance of the result is that it 
refutes the notion that loan demand and loan supply can generally be viewed in isolation, which 
thus implies that empirical estimation using observed loan contracts may be justified. In addition 
we show that downward sloping loan demand curves are guaranteed to exist if loan default 
probabilities are constant along their slope and lenders are profit maximizers. The converse 
possibility that distinct loan supply curves are downward sloping holds too if lenders apply credit 
scoring or other screening devices which restrict risk in a safety-first context. while borrowers are 
profit maximizers. These concepts are then expanded to show how ambiguous probability 
information about multiple classes of borrowers, can lead to credit rationing. From analyzing the 
basic structure of the lender-borrower relationship we use empirical credit scoring models to derive 
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loan 'demand' functions for different risk classes of agricultural loans. The advantage of this 
theoretical model guiding the empirical model is that consideration of hedonic pncing such as that 
proposed by Baltsenberger, as well as collateraVequity consideration as proposed by Smith, Azzi 
and Cox; and Stiglitz and Weiss, can be evaluated within the basic structure of the Jaffee­
Modigliani model. 
The Borrower-Lender Relationship 
The Borrower's Problem 
This section develops, along the lines of Smith, a general model of the borrower-lender 
relationship assuming a profit maximization objective. The firm has a fixed amount of wealth, WO' 
which can be invested in a riskless asset or as equity in a leveraged risky investment. The 
investment horizon and loan payback period is for one year. If 9 is the proportion of wealth 
invested in the risky asset, and (1-9) in the riskless asset then end-of-period wealth, defined by 
initial wealth plus profits, is: 
(1 ) 
where At equals 1 plus the nskless rate of return, Requals 1 plus the expected rate of return on 
risky investment, and I is 1 piUS the interest rate on debt, O. We assume limited liability which 
protects personal holdings of the riskless investment. Hence the loan is in default if r < r· , where 
(2) 
is the critical or breakeven (1 plus the) rate of return. Since ar·,al, and ar·,aO are positive, increases 
in interest rates or debt increase the chance of default, while ar·,ae and ar·,aW indicate that 
increased equity or initial wealth decreases the chance of default. Let f(r) be the probability density 
function about the random return on the risky investment. Then with limited liability and loan 
default risk expected terminal wealth is given by 
Maxe,D it = (1-9)WoR, + (9Wo+D)R - ID (3) 
- r"[(9Wo+D)R-/D] ~tjdr . 
Integrating the last term by parts and substituting in r· yields 
(4) 
The firm's choice is to maximize terminal wealth by choosing the optimal equity investment 
in risky to riskless assets, 9, and how much of the risky investment is to be financed with debt. 
Assuming that all second order conditions are satisfied, the first order conditions for an interior 
maximum are 
(5) 
and 
• 
~ =< R-I + (9Wo+D) F(rO)r; + fro F(tjdr =0 (6) 
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where r*e =ar·/de = -W ID/(9W +D)2 and rD· =ar·/aD =9W l/(9W +D)2. Substituting (5) into (6) yields o o o o
the optimal condition 
ailaD "" R, - (1-F(rO)) I "" 0 , (7') 
or 
F( 0) "" I - R, (7)r __,_' 
the implicit solution of which provides the loan demand curve D(9,W ,f\,I,F'(r*)). The condition o
implies that debt will be used in place of equity until the probability of default F(r·) equals the loan 
risk premium as a percent of the interest cost. As the riskless rate increases the investor places 
relatively more resources into risk investment and borrows less for risky investment so loan default 
risk decreases. As interest rates increase the probability of default increases as fixed financial 
obligations increase. 
The Lender's Problem 
The lender's problem is to maximize expected end-of-period wealth i. Here the lender 
must choose the optimal amount of debt, B, given the borrower's equity position, and facing the 
possibility of bankruptcy. If r < r· then the borrower under limited liability foregoes (9W +B)R < lB.o
The lender takes a loss on the loan but the loss may not be total. It is also assumed that the 
lender can acquire all of B at the opportunity cost rate O. The lender's objective function is 
(8')MA~B i"" FO [9Wo+B]R f(r)dr + IB ,off(r)dr - oB 
or 
(8) 
First order conditions are given by ai/aB and ai/de. Here the derivative ai/de refers to Smiths view 
that the proportion of equity a borrower puts into risky investment is an external economy to the 
lender. Differentiation yields the following first order conditions. 
(9)
 
and 
(10)(10) aiJaB "" (I~) - FO F(r)dr - (9W +8) F(rO) r; "" 0 .o
Here r·e and r·B are the same as for the borrower except B is substituted for D. Substituting (9) into 
(10) gives 
- (11') aZlaB "" 1(1-F(rO))~ "" 0 
or, 
F(rO) "" I~ . (11 ) 
I 
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In (11), 1-5 is the risk premium required by the lender in order to supply the amount of debt implied 
by F(r} This is the same solution obtained by Jaffee and Modigliani and thus takes on the general 
backward-bending shape of the Jaffee-Modigliani loan supply curve. 
Equilibrium in the BorrowerlLender Relationship 
Equations (7) and (11) provide the optimal conditions for loan demand and supply. If a 
parieto efficient contract is to be made then clearly there must be agreement between the borrower 
and lender on not only the probability of default, F(r\ but also the amount of equity contributed to 
investment, and the interest rate charged. Importantly a necessary condition for optimality is that 5 
= At; that is unless the lender's opportunity cost of capital (passbook account charges, GIC's, and 
operating/monitoring costs) equals the risk free rate, competitive equilibrium parieto efficient loan 
contracts cannot occur. However, under the assumption that At = 5 there is a further point of 
importance. If equity is treated as an external economy to the lender then there does not exist, in 
the usual sense of the terms, distinct loan demand curves or loan supply curves. All parieto 
efficient demand and supply combinations are satisfied along this curve. 
The implicit solution to the loan contract problem is given by equations (7) and (11) which 
are equivalent for contracts O=B and At=5. Implicit differentiation yields 
dD 1-F(r") - IF' (r")r," (12)
dT '" IF' (r")r~ 
Since the denominator is always positive the slope of the loan contract curve is determined by the 
numerator. Using rl" = O/(9Wo+O), the slope of the contract curve is determined by 
1 ~ r" F'(r") (13) 
< 1-F(r") 
The term F'(r")/(1-F(9)) in (13) is the conditional probability of default (Smith). Since ar"/al > 0, 
ar"/aO> 0 and a2r"/alaO > 0, r" increases along the demand curve until dO/dl = 0, and then 
decreases as 0 decreases. The conditional probability of default increases at all points along the 
contract curve. Loan contract curve with these features is illustrated in Figure 1, where the vertical 
axis is measured in terms of the optimal debt-equity ratio, and the horizontal axis, the marginal 
interest rate. The main results of the lender-borrower relationship are summarized in the following 
paragraphs. 
Proposition I: Under perfectly competitive conditions, loan demand and loan supply curves 
are Identical for both the borrower and lender. 
The result implies that along a single locus of loan contracts expressed in terms of debt, 
equity and interest rates marginal expected profits of the borrower equal marginal expected profits 
of the lender. The proof is obtained by noting that ailas = cwao = 0 for 0 = B at an optimum. 
That both demand and supply lie along a single contract curve, as discussed above, is proven by 
setting 5 = At and noting that equation (7) and equation (9) are identical for aliI. 
Proposition 1/: For both borrower and lender marginal profits are constant along the 
contract curve as I Increases. 
• 
Proof: Assume that O=B and At=5, so that (7') and (11') are equivalent. Integrating both sides of 
(7') over outcomes below r· so that rF(r)dr=I'"(I-r,)/1 dr = (I-At)r"/1. Substituting this into (4) and (8) 
To see this note that aF(r*)/a5 < 0 in (11. If 5 > Rf, (1-5)/1 > (I-Rf)/1 the acceptable risk to 
the borrower for a given interest rate will always be greater than that acceptable to the 
lender, and the borrower will be forever rationed. 
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gives conditional profit functions ft' and Z'. Differentiating with respect to I, yields mf/al=O and 
ai'/al=o. The result implies that optimal contracts along the contract curve for increasing I 
represent parieto optimal contracts. because profits are neither increasing or decreasing for 
borrower or lender. The result contrasts with Jaffee and Modigliani and Kalay and Rabinovitch, 
who find that marginal profits are increasing for lenders along the contract curve. 
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Corollary I: GIven perfect Information about F(e), and R,=fJ, parleto optimal loan contracts 
are not characterized by any credit rationing equilibria: that Is gIven proposItions I and II 
both borrowers and lenders can have theIr respective loan demands and supplies satisfied 
at the prevailing market rate of Interest. Furthermore sInce these parleto optImal outcomes 
are also competitive equilibria,lenders would never have to act as discriminating 
monopolists, as described In Jaffee and Modlgllanl. 
Proposl1.lon 11/: For any given I, borrower profits Increase as debt Is varied any direction 
from the optImum while lender profits decrease. 
Proof: From (7) It is found that ~a02-IF'(r2)r'D > 0 for the borrower, and from (11'), 'iliJa02=­
IF'(r")r"o<:O. The results imply that borrower's profits are convex in (0,0) while lenders' profits are 
concave in (a.B). 
Proposition IV: Debt and equity are gross substitutes fOr borrowers and gross compliments 
for lenders. 
Proof: First from (7'). a:'nlaoaO=IF'(r')r'g <: O. for r"g <: O. Second from (11'), a:'21aBaa=-IF'(r')r'g > O. 
The proposition Is an interesting one for it provides the key motivation for borrower behavior. When 
the contract curve is upward sloping borrowers increase debt for each dollar of equity. thereby 
transferring equity into risk-free personal holdings which are bankruptcy protected. The preference 
to the borrower is to leverage increased financial risk. and risk of default. through increased 
personal holdings in riskless assets. As interest rates increase there is a point where financial risk 
is so high, that in order to maintain profits, equity is transferred from personal holdings to the risky 
investment so that the proportion of debt relative to equity in risky investments decrease. 
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In contrast, lenders would prefer to see an increase in borrower provided equity, since this 
would reduce expected losses due to default. Lenders would be willing to increase the amount of 
debt available if the lender were to provide more equity. Azzi and Cox; Smith; Baltsenberger; 
Stiglitz and Weiss; and Jaffee all provide collateral-based arguments supporting this proposition. 
However, the result is indicative of conflicting objectives in the borrower-lender relationship. 
This conflict arises from the concavity-convexity conditions outlined in Proposition III. Should the 
lender demand more equity for a given amount of debt the borrower would, all other things being 
equal, anticipate a marginal decrease in profits and would thus respond by decreasing debt until 
marginal profits are zero. Likewise, lenders facing a demand for debt which is disproportionate to 
equity contributed, would anticipate a marginal decrease in expected profits, and respond by 
increasing the equity reqUirement until marginal profits are zero. Through this mechanism a single, 
zero marginal profit contract curve emerges. Indeed, competitive equilibria, must be described by 
this process if loan contract outcomes are to be parieto optimal. This notion of equilibrium is 
consistent with Smith. 
Proposition V: All other things held constant, as R, Increases relative to ~, lenders would be 
rationed for alii, and as ~ Increases relative to R, borrowers would face credit rationing for 
alii, 
Proof: As defined by Jaffee and M9digliani, credit rationing occurs to borrowers if they cannot 
obtain all that is demanded at the prevailing market price, and in Jaffee, lenders are rationed if they 
cannot supply the optimum amount of debt at the prevailing market price. 
Given (7) and (11) and Corollary I, parieto optimal, competitive equilibrium solutions occur 
along a single contract curve for both borrower and lender, if Rf=~' However, there are many 
frictions in the market which may cause ~ to differ from At. For example, variations in deposit rates, 
excessive costs of servicing and monitoring may all rise, at least in the shortrun, to affect 
equilibrium. When a parieto optimal equilibrium does not exist then supply and demand can be 
identified along uniquely identifiable curves. That is for At~ the risk premiums (I-At);t(I-~). 
The effect on optimal leverage can be seen by noting that aF(e)/aAt=aF(e)/ao=-1/I<O sos 
that the optimal probability of default must decrease. Thus, as illustrated in Figure 2, the demand 
curve will lie everywhere above the supply curve is At>~, and everywhere below for Rf<~' The 
characteristics of this problem prohibit parieto efficient-competitive equilibrium solutions from 
occurring, and depending on Sign(At-~) either borrowers or lenders would be rationed for all I. 
Proposition VI: Parleto opt/mal loan contracts reqUire complete agreement between 
borrower and lender as to the exact probability distribution which characterizes R. 
Proof: The proof is by example. Suppose that borrowers and lenders are in fundamental 
agreement about R and its variance rIRI but do not SUbjectively agree on the nature of the 
underlying probability distribution. Assume that the borrower perceives risk to follow a two­
parameter logistic distribution of the form F(r')=1/(1+e(r'-R)/O), while the lender assumes a more even 
dispersement of probabilities as suggested by the uniform distribution F(r')=(r'-a)/(b-a) where a=R­
30 and b=R+30. 
For At=~.06, 0=.15, and R=1.15, the two contract curves are depicted in Figure 3. For the 
borrower, the lender's perception of risk would be sufficient to ration credit t all points to the left of 
the intersecting curves, while the lender would be rationed at all points to the right. Likewise, if it 
were the lender perceiving the logistic distribution and the borrower, the uniform, rationing criteria 
would be reversed. 
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That differences In risk perception, or asymmetric Information about outcome probabilities. 
can lead to different contract curves provides the following corollaries. 
Corol/sry 1/: When lenders snd borrowers differ In their perception of risk distinct losn 
demsnd snd supply curves csn be defined, snd 
Corollsry III: Differences In risk perception between the bo"ower and lender csn lead to 
outcomes for which either the bo"ower or lender are rationed over some range of Interest 
rates. 
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Proposition VII: An exogenous Increase (decrease) In downside-risk holding I constant, 
leads to a corresponding decrease (Increase) In the contracted loan amount. 
Proof: Assume a mean preserving transformation which either increases downside risk through 
increased variance, or increases downside risk through allocating probabilities from the upper to 
lower end of the probability distribution as in Rothschild and Stiglitz or Menezes et al. Then the 
transformed density function G(r') must be greater than the original distribution. Let dF(r')=G(r} 
F(r·»O. Then from (7') or (11'), dD/dF(e)=-1/F'(r·)r·o<0. The result implies that loan contract curves 
shift down (up) as downside risk increases (decreases). 
Proposition VIII: An exogenous Increase (decrease) In downside-risk, holding debt constant, 
leads to an Increase (decrease) In the contracted loan rate. 
Proof: Using the same assumptions as Proposition VII, then from (7') or (11 ') dl/dF(e)=12/F\=12/o>0. 
Propositions VII and VIII are depicted in Figure 4, for a logistic distribution with R=1.10, and 0=.10, 
.15 and .20. By changing the variance, contract curves shift down and to the right, thus confirming 
the propositions. We have also the following corollaries: 
Corollary IV: As downside-risk Increases (decreases) the slope along the loan contract 
curve becomes flatter (steeper). 
Proof: Define the conditional probability of default by ).,(r·)=F'(r·)/(1-F(r·)), then divide the numerator 
and denominator of equation (12) by (1-F(r)) to get dD/dl=(1-r·).,(r·))/I).,(r·)r·o' Then cfD/dld).,(e)=­
).,(r}2<0. Thus, high-risk contracts are likely to be less responsive to increasing interest rates than 
low-risk contracts. Evidence of this is provided in Figure 4, as risk increases the slope of the 
contract curves become flatter. 
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• 
Corollary V: Mutually Identifiable groups of borrowers with distinct, measurable, and 
heterogenous Investment risk profiles can be separated Into different loan classifications by 
lenders. ­
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The corollary follows proportions VI and VII and Corollary IV. If we assume, as do Stiglitz 
and Weiss and Bester, that single lenders with multiple borrowers cannot due to asymmetric 
information possibly identify all default risks a priori then they face a problem of adverse selection. 
Then lenders will use screening or signalling devices in order to identify borrower' risks and create 
risk pools. Formal credit evaluation techniques such as credit scoring can be used to create such 
pools, and can be used to reduce the number of adversely selected borrowers. 
Credit scoring is one such screening device. Since credit scoring models are used to 
estimate F(r\ the probability default, they can be used, according to (7) to identify diverse groups 
for which F,(I»F2(1»F3(1), where the subscripts represent customer types and the probabilities are 
measured relative to a given interest rate. This too is illustrated in Figure 4 where the three curves 
can be viewed as contract curves for three different risk groups. Through screening devices, such 
as credit scoring, lenders can offer different loan contracts. If properly identified, these contracts 
will be parieto optimal (Bester). However, if either type I error (i.e., a good loan is rejected), or 
Type II error (i.e., a bad loan is accepted), then credit rationing outcomes, consistent with adversely 
selected groupings can occur. 
Proposition IX: For profit maximizing lenders and borrowers with self-Imposed (or safety­
first) credit risk constraints, unique demand and supply curves, can be defined wIth the loan 
demand curves beIng everywhere downward sloping. 
Proof: Set the right-hand side of equation (7) equal to probability F, such that F(r·)~F. Total 
differentiation yields dD/dl=-r"/r'R=-D(9Wo+D)/19Wo<0 and d2D/dI2>0. 
This situation is presented in Figure 5 which shows the lender supply curve for the logistic 
distribution with R=1.15, 0=.15, and probability limits equal to .05, .10, and .15, respectively. All 
points on the demand curves reflect equal probabilities for all (0,1) combinations. At points to the 
left of the demand-supply intersection borrowers would appear to be rationed by the lender. 
However, since the nature of the constraint is an ~ inequality there is no reason to suspect that the 
iso-risk demand curves would be binding. Thus, loan contracts would follow along the lender's 
supply curve until the constraint becomes binding at the loan demand-supply intersection. Points to 
the right of this intersection indicate that borrowers ration lenders. A reverse proposition holds for 
profit maximizing borrowers and risk constrained lenders. If both borrowers and lenders impose 
internal risk constraints one of the two will be rationed unless risk constraints are equal. 
FigureS 
0 
~ 
§ 
0 
w 
~ 
w 
0 
'{_~_-~--"""-- LOAN SlJ'PLY CAN BE SATISFIED BY 
CHARGING INCREASED RATES FOR 
INCREASED RISK 
4.5 
4 
3.5 
3 
2.5 
2 
1.5 
1 
0.5 
BORROWER CONSTRAINED DEMAND CURVES 
5.---:.~-----------------, 
~ 1S0RISK DEMAND CURVES ARE HIGiER 
\ THE GREATER THE RISK
•\ 
" 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 
INTEREST RATE 
1- F-.OS ....­ F-.10 .... F-.15 - SUPPLY I 
215 
The notion of safety-first constraints implies the existence of a shadow-price for risk, which 
represents profits foregone by borrowing below the parieto optimal contract Curve. This would 
appear irrational in a frictionless economy, but in reality there are many reasons why borrowers 
would impose such constraints including prohibition on future debt use which would come at a 
much higher oppol1unity cost, the loss of reputation due to public embarrassment of perceived 
failure, or risk. Aversion regUlatory controls on maximum loan-loss provisions. 
Loan Demand and the Empirical Significance of Credit SCoring 
From the theoretical model of Section I, and the above results, it is clear that loan demand 
is indistinguishable from loan supply, even for disequilibrium loan contracts. From an empirical 
perspective, data on loans is generally censored because neither the actual loan request, the 
maximum loan possible, or loans applications denied are not generally observable. What is 
observed are the contract amounts at stated interest rates. Thus it is virtually impossible to directly 
test for the significance of intemal or external credit rationing on the borrower/lender relationship. 
However, it is possible to use loans contract data to estimate the two types of loan contract 
curves discussed if loan demand is estimated in conjunction with a credit scoring model, and loan 
amount and interest rates are included as arguments in both models. This is the intention of this 
section. In particular this section estimate for farm credit corporation loans data, a logistic credit 
scoring function and a quadratic loan contract equation, and thus derives estimates of the loan 
contract curve and iso-risk contract curves. 
A total of 8,451 mortgage and refinancing loan records are used in the analyses covering 
about 25 percent of all FCC loans made between 1981 and 1988. Data used represent only those 
loans which were still outstanding as of January 1, 1992, were clean of possible errors, and had 
maintained the originalloan.3 The status of loans were categorized as being current, or noncurrent 
as at January 1, 1992, with noncurrent loans being defined as those being over $500 in arrears. 
No data on actual loan default was available", hence credit risk is proxied by the probability of 
being in arrears. 
Agriculture, unlike most other industries, has the unique characteristic that seemingly 
homogenous. products are produced with varying degrees of risk depending on the region of 
production, soil fertility and quality, heat, sunlight, moisture and other environmentaVecological 
factors. Hence it is questionable as to whether or not a single aggregate demand for loans is 
reasonable: As posited in the theoretical section investment classes defined by differential means 
and variance would be characterized by different levels of demand, all other things being equal. 
Similarly, since the FCC is a federal lending agency its loan portfolio includes loans made 
to different types of farming. For example, cash crops - mostly grains and oilseeds, dairy and 
poultry, beef and hogs, and other horticultural, specialized farming operations must be served. 
Each one of these farming types faces unique risks which are not entirely systematically related to 
the others. Furthermore, similar commodities grown in different regions, have different associated 
risk, (Turvey; Turvey and Brown). This heterogeneity of risks across commodities and regions 
provides a unique opportunity to empirically investigate the borrower/lender relationship. 
3	 •Loans outstanding and free of error were 12,229. However, some loans had been
 
adjusted, added to, or restructured over time. Because the nature of the loan adjustement
 
was unknown, these loans were eliminated.
 
..	 Approximately 20,000 of the loans made between 1981 and 1988 were retired, but there 
was no indication which of these were paid out or loan losses. 
216 
Accordingly the loans were categorized into four different regions, Pacific (British Columbia 
and Alberta), Prairies (Saskatchewan and Manitoba), Central (Ontario and Quebec) and Atlantic 
(Newfoundland, Price Edward Island, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia). Farm types were 
categorized into cashcrops (grains and oilseeds), supply managecf (dairy and poultry), livestock 
(hogs and beef) and other. Each region is defined by these commodities so there are a total of 16 
commodity-region combinations. Some sample statistics are presented in Table 1. 
The econometric formulation of the estimated loan contract curves is defined by two 
equations. The first equation is a logistic credit scoring model which includes variables reflecting 
liquidity, solvency, profitability, repayment capacity, security, and farm-type and regional risk 
differentials. It is of the for 
(14)RZ) : 1/(1 +e-Z) + £ 
where 
OCZ : + OC 1 LR + oc DA + oc DCM + OC4 ROA o 2 3 
+ OC s RR + OC s LS + OC 7 LOAN + OC s RATE 
447 (15) 
+E E oc S+k DR/j +E oc 24+Y DYy
 
;'1 jel )"1
 
and LR is the liquidity ratio; OA is debt-asset ratio; OCM is the change in contribution margin; ROA 
is the return on assets; RR is the repayment ratio; LS is the loan to security ratio; LOAN is the loan 
contract amount; and RATE is the interest rate charged on the loan. The 16 dummy variables 
OR;Fj represent covariance between regions (Ri) and farm type (Fj) while the dummy variables OYy 
represent the year in which the loans were made. To avoid singularity a dummy variable for loans 
made in 1981 was not included. 
The loan demand (contract) curve was estimated using a simple quadratic form: 
LOAN: B +B1RATE +B2 RATE2 +B3 F(Z)o 
447 (16)
+E E Bs +, DR; 'i +E B17+y DYy + e . 
;'1 jel )"1 
In (16), F(Z) is the estimated probability of default as proxied by the probability of a loan being 
noncurrent. The predicted value of (15), F(Z), is used as an instrumental variable in this equation. 
Both equations were estimated in SHAZAM (White, et.al.) with equation (16) being corrected for 
heteroscedasticity. 
Results 
Econometric results are presented in Table 2. As would be expected, loan default 
probabilities decrease with increased liquidity (LR), profitability (ROA), repayment ability (RR), and 
security (LS), and increase with financial leverage (OA), change in contribution margin (OCM), 
absolute loan amount (LOAN), nominal interest rate (RATE), and with refinancing (REFIN). 
Relative to loans made in 1981, loan default probabilities were higher for loans made in 1982 and 
1985, but none of the year dummy variables were significantly different from zero at the five 
• 
s Supply managed commodities such as dairy, broilers, eggs and turkeys, face institutional
 
quotas on individual farm and aggregate production. Farmers must purchase quotas at a
 
fair market price, and are penalized for over producing. However, farmers holding quota
 
receive monopoly-like prices, and hence tend to earn super-normal profits at low risk.
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Table 1. Sample Statistics for Empirical Model 
Risk Class OBS F(Z) LR OA OCM ROA RR LS 
Loan 
Amount 
Interest 
Rate 
Pacific 
Crops 
Dairy/Poultry 
Livestock 
Other 
7n 
162 
366 
53 
.496 
.198 
.415 
.453 
5.46 
(3.94) 
5.15 
(.399) 
5.66 
(3.784) 
5.46 
(3.89) 
.512 
(.205) 
.565 
(.189) 
.483 
(.212) 
.477 
(.299) 
.084 
(.184) 
.015 
(.101 ) 
.088 
(.194) 
.082 
(.184) 
.053 
(.038) 
.076 
(.031 ) 
.053 
(.039) 
.055 
(.034) 
1.27 
(.399) 
1.345 
(.369) 
1.343 
(.511 ) 
1.261 
(.356) 
.685 
(.157) 
.724 
(.150) 
.703 
(.143) 
.691 
(.154) 
183400 
(130150) 
237860 
(162240) 
164970 
(118080) 
150450 
(94338) 
10.82 
(2.94) 
9.285 
(3.002) 
10.784 
(2.868) 
11.398 
(2.951 ) 
Prairie 
Crops 
Dairy/Poultry 
Livestock 
Other 
4,139 
124 
486 
68 
.527 
.250 
.496 
.544 
6.039 
(3.73) 
4.896 
(3.82) 
5.467 
(3.701) 
5.491 
(4.078) 
.414 
(.221 ) 
.518 
(.225) 
.444 
(.225) 
.462 
(.187) 
.049 
(.144) 
.041 
(.120) 
.082 
(.172) 
.110 
(.148) 
.056 
(.039) 
.08 
(.032) 
.061 
(.04) 
.065 
(.049) 
1.289 
(.336) 
1.325 
(.326) 
1.367 
(.35) 
1.335 
(.336) 
.651 
(.129 
.708 
(.138) 
.664 
(.163) 
.713 
(.134) 
129300 
(91064) 
158130 
(114360) 
122750 
(95236) 
108120 
(87762) 
11.458 
(2.55) 
11.006 
(2.883) 
11.210 
(2.53) 
12.076 
(2.035) 
Central 
Crops 
Dairy/Poultry 
Livestock 
Other 
606 
821 
485 
68 
.256 
.107 
.177 
.324 
3.799 
(3.815) 
4.284 
(3.958) 
4.094 
(3.562) 
4.068 
(3.847) 
.544 
(.240) 
.478 
(.197) 
.593 
(.231 ) 
.529 
(.268) 
.085 
(.165) 
.019 
(.102) 
.054 
(.163) 
.115 
(.228) 
.085 
(.047) 
.061 
(.026) 
.072 
(.045) 
.056 
(.058) 
1.310 
(.441) 
1.305 
(.386) 
1.420 
(.490) 
1.447 
(.496) 
.690 
(.170) 
.677 
(.179) 
.737 
(.156) 
.755 
(.139) 
162840 
(118910) 
149810 
(106940) 
123140 
(85201) 
106960 
(72445) 
11.897 
(2.059) 
10.399 
(2.732) 
10.971 
(2.727) 
12.615 
(1.441) 
Atlantic 
Crops 
Dairy/Poultry 
Livestock 
Other 
119 
99 
46 
4 
.319 
.131 
.239 
.50 
3.369 
(3.294) 
4.806 
(4.116) 
4.736 
(3.753) 
3.564 
(4.303) 
.513 
(.189) 
.422 
(.198) 
.474 
(.233) 
.459 
(.076) 
.052 
(.171 ) 
.005 
(.092) 
.015 
(.110) 
-0.79 
(.137) 
.0060 
(.046) 
.054 
(.029) 
.040 
(.048) 
.056 
(.038) 
1.411 
(.616) 
1.297 
(.316) 
1.381 
(.392) 
1.356 
(.229) 
.700 
(.160) 
.676 
(.181 ) 
.686 
(.162) 
.709 
(.068) 
115030 
(97128) 
76037 
(56970) 
77204 
(74101) 
63000 
(59099) 
11.186 
(2.727) 
11.419 
(2.342) 
11.57 
(2.234) 
12.350 
(.900) 
• 
.. 
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 r 
, v 
percent level of confidence. The regional-farm type dummy variables indicate that the most risky 
loans are those made to Saskatchewan cash-crop farmers. In fact with the exception of the supply 
managed commodities in that province, Saskatchewan loans tend to be more risky than any other , 
region in Canada. The supply managed commodities, dairy and poultry are in each region prone to 1­
the least amount of credit risk, while livestock and other crops pose modest credit risks. 
•
i 
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~Table 2. Results of Econometric Models I
 
Loan Demand EquationProbability Model
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error 
Constant -2.542 .679 85735 22409
 
lR -.033 .069
 
ROA -.304 .697*
 
RR -.436 .084
 
RATE2 -411.13 232.77
 
DCO -.216 .525 10023 14820*
 
D83 -.244 .403* 57995 232.77*
 
D84 -.227 .411* 48483 8631.90
 
DA .961 .152
 
DCM .727 .164
 
lS .457 .194
 
lOAN .225E-5 .271E-6
 
RATE .127 .018 -10570 4149
 
REFIN .507 .078
 
F(Z) 519480 10501
 
DPC .876 .452 -53057 12473
 
DPS -.415 .492* 118470 15605
 
DPl .622 .460* -29338 12719
 
DPO .701 .531* -50142 15837
 
DPRC 1.266 .447 -112400 12181
 
DPRS -.299 .498* 54386 14019
 
DPRl 1.139 .456 -108110 12564
 
DPRO 1.056 .516 -116880 14795
 
DCC -.605 .456* 75766 12601
 
DCS -1.136 .460 96791 12433
 
DCl -.786 .462 54550 12442
 
DAC .108 .491* -17738 14293*
 
DAS -.813 .541* 35192 12977
 
DAl -.197 .574* -14907 15593
 
DAO .778 1.136* -125040 13301
 
D82 .051 .410* -17466 41492
 
D85 .027 .416" 17019 8247.1
 
D86 -.635 .409* 86725 8981.6
 
D87 -.679 .409* 79096 9001.8*
 
D88 -.812 .436* 88812 8851.3
 
R2 .20 .41
 ~ 
Prediction r 
Success 
.. 
Overall 61.3%
 
Type =0 56.9%
 
Type =1 53.3%
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The overall prediction accuracy of the credit scoring model is 61.3 percent, with 66.9 
percent of current loans being correctly predicted, and 53.3 percent of noncurrent loans being 
correctly predicted. Typically, it is more difficult to predict bad loans because extraneous factors 
(such as death, divorce, drought, trade wars). etc.• are much more difficult to assess a priori than 
objective measures of liquidity, profitability and solvency, etc. 
The predicted values estimated by the credit scoring model were used, in the second stage, 
as an instrumental variable in the loan demand (contract) function. However, there is a major flaw 
in the procedure which cannot easily be overcome, and this may cause bias. The flaw is that the 
estimated logistic probabilities are defined in terms of posterior probabilities, whereas realistic credit 
scoring and credit rationing are theoretically dependent on prior probabilities. Thus it is assumed 
that the posterior, conditional probability estimates are perfectly correlated with SUbjectively or 
objectively determined prior probabilities. 
The demand equation, corrected for heteroscedasticity, had an adjusted R 2 of 41.1 percent 
which is fairly high for cross-sectional data. Holding risk constant the demand elasticity (flexibility) 
is given by E1= -(10570 RATE + 411.13 RATE2)/LOAN. When risk is variable (Le., aF(Z)/aRATE :F­
oand aF(Z)/aLOAN :F- 0) the elasticity is determined by the total derivative (dD/dl) rather than the 
partial derivative, aD/al. 
The total derivative is given by 
dLOAN (8, + 2~ RATE + 83 aF(Z)/aRATE) (17)"'-----~-~----dRATE (1 - 8 aF(Z)/aLOAN)3 
where aF(Z)/aRATE = CXs(1-F(Z))F(Z) and aF(Z)/aLOAN =Oq (1-F(Z))F(Z). 
From Table 2 the estimated equation (16) 81 = -10520, 82 = -411.13, and 83 = 519,480, and from 
equation (15), CXs = .127, and 0.7 = .226E-5. Hence 
dLOAN '" _(10570+ 822.26 RATE - (519,480)(.127) 1-F(Z))) F(Z))) (18) 
dRATE (1 - (519,480) (.00000226) (1-F(Z)) F(Z)) 
Since the denominator in (18) is, by these estimates, always positive, the shape of the demand 
curve is determined by the numerator. As proposed in the theoretical section, the demand curve is 
downward sloping when risk is held constant so it is the impact of credit risk on demand which 
causes a backward-bending curve. This possibility is allowed by equation (18) which will be 
positive (negative) when (10570 + 822.26 RATE) < (» (519,480)(-127)(1-F(Z))F(Z). 
In Figure 6 we plot the derived demand for credit for cash-crop farms in the Pacific, Prairie, 
and Central regions of Canada, as well as the average loan demand function. The first point of 
interest is that Prairie cash crops shows a backward-bending contract curve: up to approximately 
nine percent interest loan demand is increasing. Cashcrop loans in Ontario and Quebec seem to 
be more responsive to changes in interest rates than Prairie and Pacific which are equally 
responsive, except that Pacific region loans tend to be higher on average. 
What is important about these contract curves is the different shapes they take. For 
relatively homogenous products (grains and oilseeds) regional characteristics, including risk. are 
significantly unique, to affect loan demand. Corresponding to this is the argument that regional 
supply of debt must also respond to regional and farm-type differences. • 
The elasticities, as derived in (17) and (18) are presented in Table 3 along with the average 
nominal interest rates, loan contract amounts and probabilities of default and success, used in the 
calculations. The fifth numerical column in Table 3 indicates the relative elasticities when default 
risk is excluded from the elasticity measure (i.e., equation (17)). These elasticities range from -.56 
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for Pacific region dairy producers to -3.067 for Atlantic producers of 'other' commodities. Evaluated 
at the means, all elasticities are negative. In general the 'other' category showed the more elastic 
response in all regions; that is a one percent increase in the nominal interest rate would decrease 
the loan amount by 1.16, 1.74, 1.85, and 3.067 percent for the Pacific, Prairie, Central, and Atlantic 
regions. respectively. With the exception of the Atlantic region, the smallest elasticity Is attributed 
to dairy and poultry fanns, which are the least risky of all commodity groups. 
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In the sixth numerical column in Table 3 we present the elasticities for loans which exclude 
the marginal change in default probabilities (Le., equation (18». The effect is to either increase or 
decrease the elasticity relative to those in column 5. Nine of the 16 classes showed a decrease in 
the elasticity amount. For example, the Central region crop elasticity falls from -1.35 to -1.18 when 
risk is induded, whereas Central dairy farms showed an increase from -1.03 to -1.27. 
That elasticities can either increase or decrease ought not to be surprising given the 
theoretical model. In essence, if default or bankruptcy risk is incorporated into the profit maximizing 
level of investment, then increasing the amount of debt -and the probability of default - may be 
optimal for some farmers. Recall that from the borrower's perspective, debt and equity are 
substitutes; for some fanners debt may be increasing as equity is decreasing, while for others, debt 
may be decreasing while equity is increasing. 
Figure 7 shows the aggregate contract curve and two contract curves which have constant 
(hypothetical) risk of 20 and 30 percent, respectively. These iso-risk contract curves are more 
responsive to increased interest rates than the aggregate function. If we view the aggregate 
function as a demand curve and the 2 iso-risk curves as supply response functions consistent with 
credit scoring criteria, borrowers would be rationed for loans below and to the right of intersecting 
points. Alternatively, if the aggregate curve represents aggregate supply, and the two iso-risk 
curves borrower demand. then lenders would be rationed for all loans below and to the right of the 
intersecting points. 
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Table 3. Average Loan Demand (Contract) Elasticities .­
Default Default 
Risk Risk 
Probability Probability Loan Interest Held Allowed to 
Variable of Default of Success Amount Rate Constant Change 
Pacific 
Crops .496 .503 183400 10.822 -.89 -.87 
Dairy/Poultry .197 .802 237860 9.285 -.56 -.55 
Livestock .415 .585 164970 10.784 -.98 -.59 
Other .453 .547 150450 11.398 -1.16 -.44 
Prairie 
Crops .527 .472 129300 11.458 -1.35 -1.18 
DairyIPoultry .250 .750 158130 11.006 -1.05 -.93 
Livestock .496 .504 122750 11.21 -1.39 -.26 
Other .544 .456 108120 12.076 -1.74 -1.51 
Central 
Crops .256 .744 162840 11.897 -1.13 -1.40 
DairyIPoultry .107 .893 149810 10.399 -1.03 -1.27 
Livestock .177 .823 123140 10.971 -1.34 -1.51 
Other .324 .676 106960 12.615 -1.85 -1.89 
Atlantic 
Crops .314 .681 115030 11.186 -1.475 -1.74 
DairyIPoultry .131 .869 76037 11.419 -2.29 -2.79 
Livestock .239 .761 77204 11.574 -2.29 -2.13 
Other .500 .500 63000 12.35 -3.067 -4.06 
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The iso-risk curves in Figure 7 are derived from the theoretically consistent loan contract 
curves and as such do not truly reflect demand or supply, nor is it possible to determine whether, 
for any given rate of interest, the borrower is being rationed, or the lender is being rationed or if any 
rationing is taking place at all. However. the derived iso-risk curves do span all points along the 
loan contract curve and thus they span the distribution of loan-rate observations about the average 
loan. lt is thus feasible that the aggregate loan contract curve reflects loan-interest rate 
combinations for loans which are rationed by either the borrower or the lender. We are not, given 
unavailable data on lender-borrower intent, able to prove this and it is thus treated here as 
conjecture only. 
Conclusions 
This research developed first a series of propositions about the lender-borrower relationship 
and used these to develop and interpret empirical loan demand (contract) equations for Canadian 
Farm Credit Corporation Loans. From the theoretical model it was shown that loan demand and/or 
contract curves can have backward bending properties which are the result of bankruptcy 
probabilities. For the borrower, debt and equity are substitutes so that over some range of 
contracts debt relative to equity actually increases for risky investment, while personal holdings of 
risk-free investments, protected from bankruptcy by limited liability increases. Asymmetric 
information was posited as one reason why distinguishable loan demand and loan supply curves 
could emerge. It was also noted that loan demands differ SUbstantially across different loan-type 
classifications, and asymmetric information can be resolved by identifying separate groups of 
borrowers. 
From an empirical perspective, the irrefutable conclusion that loan demands cannot be 
estimated in isolation of default probabilities is an important one. In fact, screening devices such as 
credit scoring are employed by lenders to lessen informational asymmetries. For a contract to 
occur there must then be subjective agreement between the borrower and lender on the probability 
of success. This property is then used to estimate a loan contract function which includes a 
measure of loan default probability as an endogenous variable, where the loan default probability is 
estimated from an empirical credit scoring (logistic) regression. 
The results confirm, for 16 pooled risk classes representing different regions and 
commodity groupings across Canada, that indeed different demand functions emerge according to 
risk. From a lender's perspective it is important to identify how loan demand might change given 
an increase in the nominal rate. For the data used in this study, elasticities ranged from a low of ­
.55 to a high of -4.06. It was also shown that for some classes, recognition of the marginal 
changes in default probabilities caused an increase in elasticity measures, while for others a 
decrease. This result is consistent with the theoretical model. 
There are several points on which to conclude. First, the notion of farm level loan demand, 
as defined by the lender-borrower relationship should account for loan default probabilities, which 
differ across farm regions and types. Second, it is unlikely that any single loan demand curve 
exists which can describe the entire industry without taking into account farm type and regional 
differences. Finally, lenders should recognize that heterogenous risks imply heterogenous 
demands, and thus should be prepared to offer multiple loan contracts to each distinctive risk 
classes. 
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